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ABSTRACT 
Growing attention is being paid to co-occurring mental health and 
substance use disorders or concurrent disorders (CDs) in relation to treatment 
services and supports. A related theme is the mental health self-advocate vision of 
recovery that includes respecting peoples' subjective self-determination (SD) in 
treatment. Client SD is an important social work concept but its meaning and 
purpose remains unclear and it is typically defined from the professional 
perspective. Understanding SD meanings of people with CDs in relation to 
recovery may help social workers better assist people with CDs to achieve their 
recovery goals. This study explored the meanings of SD in CDs treatment and 
recovery experiences among five female and three male participants. Interview 
transcripts were analyzed using a qualitative grounded theory approach. 
SD meanings hinged on the subjective "sense of self' of participants 
within their ecosystem. Three interrelated SD meaning components were 
identified: key standpoint elements (beliefs and values, attitudes towards self and 
ecosystem, sense of control, and aspirations), a power or force (associated with 
being determined) and determining processes (knowledge building and decision 
making). A primary sense of self and a later more "nuanced" sense of self in CDs 
recovery were distinguishable within participants' descriptions and meanings. The 
more nuanced sense of self reflected more situationally relative, compatible, and 
discerning meanings of the self, SD, the ecosystem, mental health, addiction, and 
CDs recovery. Hermeneutic knowledge building is interpreted as facilitating the 
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trend towards a more nuanced sense of self over time. One practice implication 
involves the role and importance of SD in relation to regulating the relative 
stability of the sense of self simultaneously with growth and change associated 
with CDs recovery. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
Introduction 
One recent trend in the field of mental health involves persons with mental 
illness demanding greater self-determination (SD) in their interactions with 
treatment and rehabilitation systems, programs, and professionals (Ralph, 2000; 
Stroman, 2003). Contextually, client self-determination (CSD) has been an 
important concept in social work for the past eighty years (Taylor, 2006). The 
term "client" is typically used to refer to people who are receiving services that 
involve social workers although it is critiqued as being potentially de-
personalizing and disempowering (Fook & Askeland, 2007). 
The meaning and purpose of CSD in social work are disputed (Reamer, 
2006) and there is a paucity of research focusing on it. The small number of 
published studies over the last thirty years typically deduced meanings or 
definitions of CSD in order to explore workers' attitudes and behaviors towards it 
in different practice settings or hypothetical contexts. I found no published social 
work studies that focused solely on what SD means to people who have received 
treatment and rehabilitation services for mental health issues or mental illness. A 
greater understanding of the meaning(s) of SD from the experiential point of view 
of people living with and recovering from mental illness, and how they may relate 
to social work's concept of CSD, is an area of research that could enhance current 
social work practice knowledge. Research in this area could augment social 
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workers' ability to assist individuals with mental health challenges to achieve 
their recovery goals. 
Another intersecting trend in mental health is the growing recognition of 
the need to integrate assistance for substance use disorders into mental health 
treatment and rehabilitation (Health Canada, 2001; Meuser, Noordsy, Drake & 
Fox, 2003). The calls for greater integration stern from mental health treatment 
systems, programs, and practitioners not typically addressing substance use 
disorders directly (Osher & Drake, 1996; Health Canada, 2001). Similarly, 
substance abuse or addiction treatment programs have not traditionally dealt with 
co-occurring but relatively independent symptoms of mental illness (Center for 
Substance Abuse Treatment; 2006a). Studies suggest that people living with both 
addiction and mental illness are at a greater risk of harming themselves and being 
socially marginalized (Health Canada, 2001). The traditional sequential or 
uncoordinated parallel treatment approaches may not best help most people 
challenged by both issues (Grella, Gil-Rivas & Cooper, 2004). Finally, a high 
prevalence of substance use problems being found among people with mental 
illness has also led to calls for people dealing with both issues to be seen as 
typical rather than atypical in treatment (Minkoff, 2001; Gil-Rivas & Grella, 
2005). Consequently, this study of the meanings of SD focuses on people with co-
occurring mental health and substance use disorders or concurrent disorders 
(CDs). 
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1.1 Defining CDs 
Many terms may refer to CDs in North America. Co-morbidity is common 
(Schuckit, 2006). In the United States, dual diagnosis and dual disorders may be 
used separately or interchangeably (Meuser et al, 2003). Co-occurring disorders 
is gaining popularity in the literature (Center for Substance Abuse Treatment, 
2006b). The Canadian term, concurrent disorders (CDs), is used in this 
dissertation (Health Canada, 2001; Centre for Addiction & Mental Health, 2004). 
Researchers and service delivery providers may arbitrarily define CDs 
differently (Todd et al., 2004). For example, definitions may be limited by 
severity and/or differential diagnosis (Meuser, Drake, & Wallach, 1998). The 
general definition used in this dissertation is: "a combination of 
mental/emotional/psychiatric problems with the abuse of alcohol and/or other 
psychoactive drugs" (Health Canada, 2001, p. v). 
1.2 Significance of the Problem 
Despite the strong push for more integrated and coordinated service 
delivery for people with CDs there is not yet a strong base of research and 
practice knowledge to support evidence-based treatment guidelines in this area 
(Watkins, Hunter, Burnam, Pincus, & Nicholson, 2005; McHugo et al., 2006). 
Consequently, people with CDs face treatment pr0grams and practitioners, 
including social workers, who typically do not have extensive CDs training, 
experience, or who can refer confidently to a proven body of ethical and effective 
treatment guidelines (Gil-Rivas & Grella, 2005; Smith, 2007). As mentioned 
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above, there is a simultaneous call for mental health treatment and rehabilitation 
reforms to include greater SD within a person-based, rather than expert-based, 
vision of recovery (Stroman, 2003). However, mental health self-advocates do not 
usually refer to addiction issues in recovery and the addiction self-help movement 
tends to keep professional services at arms length. The need to better understand, 
respect, and integrate whenever possible meanings of SD in individuals' vision of 
recovery could be argued to be even more critical for people with CDs because of 
the limited current knowledge and experience to guide integrated services and 
supports that have a likelihood of helping and not doing more harm. 
1.3 Purpose of the Study 
The purpose of this study is to begin the systematic process of developing 
empirical knowledge and practice-related theory that builds on an understanding 
of the meanings of SD for persons facing the challenges associated with CDs. 
This study also hopes to shed some light on how participants' meanings of SD in 
treatment and recovery experiences associated with CDs might relate to: (a) 
current social work conceptualizations of CSD; and (b) its optimization in social 
work practice in the area of mental health and addiction. 
1.4 The Research Question 
How are meanings of SD defined and perceived, among a sample of 
persons who self-identify as having CDs, within the context of their treatment and 
recovery experiences? 
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1.5 Rationale for Study 
Exploring the research question may contribute to the initiation of the 
systematic development of integrated practice knowledge for CDs that is inclusive 
of client meanings of SD. The systematic development of integrated social work 
CDs practice knowledge needs to begin with inductively exploring 
understandings that are grounded in client experiences and SD meanings becau e: 
• CDs are being seen as a major risk for the majority of people with mental 
illness living in the community (Center for Substance Abuse Treatment, 
2006c). 
• People with CDs face mental health systems, programs, theorie , and 
practices that historically were developed and evaluated separately from 
those that focused on substance use disorders (Health Canada, 2001; 
Blakely & Dziadosz, 2007). 
• Mental health self-advocates are calling for reforms to mental health 
treatment and rehabilitation services and supports that include greater SD 
(Stroman, 2003); however, SD is not commonly mentioned by self-
advocates vis-a-vis addictions. 
• Studies suggest that people with CDs are more at risk than persons with 
mental health or substance use issues alone to abandon treatment, to be 
marginalized by treatment providers, to be victimized in society, to relapse 
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in recovery, to commit suicide, and to experience an increased array of 
employment, housing, and relationship difficulties (Health Canada, 2001; 
Gil-Rivas & Grella, 2005). 
• CDs are being recognized as an important practice issue in current mental 
health social work (Kimberley & Osmond, 2003; Smith, 2007). 
• This author found no published research in social work that studied 
peoples' meanings of SD or focused on CSD in relation to CDs. 
Given the nature of the issues that confront clients with CDs and the paucity of 
social work research that focuses on the client' s perspective on SD, this 
dissertation study is exploratory in nature and employs a qualitative grounded 
theory methodology. Consistent with this methodology, professional and 
disciplinary literature is not used to pre-determine what key problems should 
surface or what key theoretical concepts should emerge (Strauss & Corbin, 1998). 
Prior to presenting the methodology, Chapter Two provides a literature review 
that is designed to orient the reader to: (a) conceptualizations of the self and SD in 
philosophy, psychology, social work, and the mental health self-help movement; 
and (b) social work theory and practice in the fields of mental health, addictions, 
and CDs. Within the context of the review, I will clarify my own position on the 
issues that are discussed. Chapter Three discusses the methodology and the 
methods used in this study, Chapter Four presents the inductively developed 
grounded theory, Chapter Five discusses the findings, and Chapter Six is a brief 
conclusion. 
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1.6 Researcher's Statement 
Transparency and reflexivity of a researcher's background, values, and 
interests that may inform or bias the research process contributes to a qualitative 
research study's degree of rigor and the reader's judgment of the study's 
trustworthiness (Sandelowski & Barroso, 2002). Professionally, I have worked as 
a CDs specialist outside of Ottawa, Ontario since 2001. I have joint appointments 
with a publicly-funded out-patient addiction services agency and community-
based mental health services agency. My position is adjunct to the mental health 
agency's crisis program. My primary role has been to provide comprehensive 
functional assessments and coordinated treatment planning for people seeking 
assistance for CDs. Previously, I was an addiction counselor in a different 
addiction treatment agency. In this position, I found I was an agent of, and 
experienced first-hand, the forced "run-around" of people seeking help for CDs. 
The runaround was, I believe, due to a number of factors, including agencies and 
practitioners exercising powers to arbitrarily limit or withhold assistance. Such 
actions appeared to be based on, at least partly, different personal and/or 
theoretical perspectives underlying unproven assumptions as to the causes and 
solutions vis-a-vis CDs-related symptoms and relapses. 
Personally, I did see a counselor on my own initiative for a brief but useful 
time in my twenties. However, I have not been diagnosed with a mental health 
disorder nor experienced being a patient or client in relation to an addiction. 
Working with people who have struggled in these areas has certainly led me to 
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reflect on my own substance use and misuse in my teens and early twenties. This 
has led me to decide that a key factor in my life has been "luck" in terms of not 
becoming a system client at some point. For example, drinking and driving was 
"normal" in the rural area of British Columbia where I grew up in the seventies. I 
could have easily been charged with impaired any number of times, which could 
have set up interactions with authorities and medical experts that led to me being 
a formal (potentially non-compliant) client. I have al~o reflected on difficult 
interactions I have had with others but none that were significantly traumatic or 
abusive. Finally, I have had many struggles managing my emotions or moods. My 
belief is that we all have the capacity to struggle with mental health issues, 
substance use problems, and their "treatments." 
Overall, I have come to believe in the relevance of self-efficacy and SD in 
the recovery from mental illness and/or addiction. I believe that understanding 
meanings of SD for people living with and recovering from the many potential 
challenges associated with CDs may be critical for evolving clinical social work 
practice in ways that are congruent with: social work' s professional values; the 
risks and obstacles that people with CDs face; and the needs, rights, and strengths 
of people seeking assistance. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
Literature Review 
2.1 Introduction 
The role of the literature review in qualitative grounded theory 
methodology is different than in studies using a quantitative approach (Strauss & 
Corbin, 1998; Charmaz, 2006). The difference lies with the qualitative 
methodology's goal of identifying naturally arising meanings among participants 
rather than defining and operationalizing meanings of key concepts prior to the 
sampling in order to test a hypothesis. 
This literature review provides background to orient the reader to: (a) 
conceptualizations of self and SD in philosophy, psychology, social work, and the 
mental health consumer/survivor movement; and (b) social work theory and 
practice in the fields of mental health, addiction, and CDs. The review also 
highlights my perspective vis-a-vis the area of inquiry and sets the stage for the 
presentation of the analysis of the findings and discussion. Elaboration on my 
own perspective on the issues discussed serves to make the inquiry more 
transparent and underlies the choice to employ qualitative grounded theory 
research methodology to address the research question. One main theme underlies 
my perspective: meanings of self and/or SD are highly contested and highly 
confusing within and between the fields of philosophy, psychology, and social 
work. Consequently, exploring the subjective meanings of SD in treatment and 
recovery experiences among people recovering from CDs is both necessary and 
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appropriate because of the potential contribution to the well-being of people who 
are challenged by CDs. This inquiry also looks to contribute to a better 
understanding of the discussion of CSD within social work and other fields of 
study and practice. 
2.2 Self and SD in Philosophy and Psychology 
The Oxford English Dictionary (Murray, 1933) stated that the etymology 
of self is unclear. The general meaning involved a person's essential being, 
nature, or personality. The use of self in combination with other words began 
around the middle of the 16th Century and expanded in the 17th Century when new 
words appeared in theological and philosophical texts. From a reflexive verbal 
phrase such as "to determine oneself," a series of related words arose such as SD, 
self-determining, and self-determined (9: p. 409). The definition of determination 
included: "the definite direction of the mind or will toward an object or end, by 
some motive, regarded as an external force" (3: p. 269). 
The 1933 edition listed one definition for self-determination: 
"determination of one's mind or will by itself towards an object" (9: 418). 
Metaphysics was the field of usage. The dictionary's second edition (Simpson & 
Weiner, 1989) added a second meaning for SD in the area of politics: "the action 
of a people in deciding its own form of government, free determination of 
statehood, postulated as a right" (14: p. 919). 
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2.2.1 Philosophy and the Self 
How people may be uniquely free, unpredictable, and self-determining 
and yet simultaneously subject to, or limited by, a battery of pre-determining or 
deterministic biological, physical, psychological, social, structural, political, 
and/or divine forces has long been the subject of debate in Western philosophy. 
The debate is often framed in terms of free will versus determinism (Reamer, 
1983). Compatibilists argue that free will and deterministic forces, powers, or 
influences may simultaneously occur. Incompatibilists argue that individual free 
will or else some other factor, force, or power (e.g., divine, biological, 
environmental) will determine the other (Flew & Priest, 2002). 
Arguably, free will-determinism debates hinge on competing 
philosophical definitions of the self. Jerrold Seigal (2005) suggested that: "more 
than any other world culture, the modern West has made the debate about 
individuality and selfhood a central question -perhaps the central question - of 
its collective attempts at self-definition" (p. 4). Western philosophical 
understandings of the "modern self' typically cite historical influences and 
comparisons that begin with Ancient Greek philosophers such as Plato, Socrates, 
and Aristotle. Often cited are Plato's (429-347 BC) concept of the immaterial soul 
or psyche, and the soul's three elements: reason, desire, and spirit (Taylor, 1989; 
Seigal, 2005). Plato's organization of these elements promoted the idea that 
reason needed to be the self s "ringleader" in order to find moral good. Moral 
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good was gained through the element of reason making use of the spirit while 
minimizing the influence of desire. 
2.2.1.1 The modern self 
Charles Taylor (1989) argued that John Locke (1632-1704) strongly 
influenced the dualistic view of the modern Western self. This view of the self is 
characterized by a disengagement from the external, natural world, the 
objectifying of it, and also disengaging one's reason from one' s self. Taylor 
referred to this development as a "radical first-person stance" (p. 176). He 
suggested that Locke's "first-person stance" jammed the door open to modern 
Western culture's emphasis on the ideal of individual freedom or independence 
over communitarian aspects of the self. 
Taylor argued that the modern self was at risk of moral disorientation in 
the modern milieu of Cartesian dualism and individualism because people 
searched for moral meanings in the inner world of individual selves and lives and 
marginalized sources of moral meanings in a shared social world. Taylor's 
critique of radical individuality in Western culture is echoed in some social work 
debates over the meaning and purpose of SD and autonomy (e.g., Falk, 1988). 
In contrast to Taylor, Jerrold Seigal (2005) suggested that the modern 
Western self is more accurately characterized as balancing individualism, 
introspection, and communitarianism. He arrived at his thesis of the modern self 
via analysis using three dimensions of the self: the "bodily or material, the 
relational, and the reflective" (p. 5). The bodily/material dimension "involves the 
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physical, corporeal existence of individuals, the things about our nature that 
makes us palpable creatures driven by needs, urges, and inclinations, and that give 
us particular constitutions or temperaments" (p. 5). The relational dimension 
"arises from social and cultural interaction, the common connections and 
involvements that give us collective identities and shared orientations and values" 
(p. 5). Seigal described the third, reflective dimension as: 
The human capacity to make both the world and our own existence objects 
of our active regard, to tum a kind of mirror not only on phenomena in the 
world, including our own bodies and our social relations, but on our 
consciousness too, putting ourselves at a distance from our own being o 
as to examine, judge, and sometimes regulate or revise it (p. 5). 
Seigal argued that a useful way of discerning between various perspectives 
on the modern self is to determine which views argue for only one of his three 
dimensions to be defining versus those that have a more integrated bi-dimensional 
or multi-dimensional view. He noted that one-dimensional views of the self will 
often acknowledge the other two dimensions; however, only one dimension is 
said to be primary or defining (e.g., Plato's reason being not only preferred but 
also capable of being the ringleader of the soul). The di parate viewpoint that 
Seigal and Taylor represent are exemplars of the challenges and complexities 
inherent in attempts to understand meanings of the self and, in turn, SD. 
John Locke was the fust significant philosopher to use the English term, 
self-determination (Murray, 1933). Locke referred to SD in An Essay Concerning 
Human Understanding (1690 [1829]). He referred to it in his critique of English 
Scholastic propositions, which concluded that people have the freedom, liberty, or 
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free will to choose to sin or not while also, simultaneously, being absolutely 
subject to divine predestination or determinism (Stillingfleet, 1662). Locke argued 
that the Scholastic view was incoherent. Consequently, be conceptualized SD as a 
de facto power based on people having the capacity for non-predetermined free 
will to choose to sin or not. Locke's work stands as a nexus linking meanings of 
the modern self in philosophy, later meanings of the self in psychology and 
psychiatry, and meanings of SD. 
Since Locke, utilitarian (e.g., John Stuart Mill), existential (e.g. S!i'Sren 
Kierkegaard), and many postmodern perspectives (e.g., Jean Paul Sartre) argue 
that a relativist view best reflected the meaning(s) of the modern Western self and 
freedom individually and collectively. Immanuel Kant, Charles Taylor and others, 
including proponents of many religions, argue, instead, that some degree of 
universal absolutism best reflects the true meaning of the self and freedom 
individually and collectively. 
Charles Peirce, George Herbert Mead, John Dewey, and William James 
are associated with the anti-positivistic pragmatic philosophical movement. Mead 
(1863-1931) is also credited with being one of the founders of symbolic 
interactionism in social psychology and sociology. Mead saw the self as arising 
and evolving through communication within social relationships. He wrote: 
Thus the child can think about his conduct as good or bad only as he reacts 
to his own acts in the remembered words of his parents. Until this process 
has been developed into the abstract process of thought, self-
consciousness remains dramatic, and the self which is a fusion of the 
remembered actor and this accompanying chorus is somewhat loosely 
organized and very clearly social. Later the inner stage changes into the 
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forum and workshop of thought. The features and intonations of the 
dramatis personae fade out and the emphasis falls upon the meaning of 
the inner speech, the imagery becomes merely the barely necessary cues. 
But the mechanism remains social, and at any moment the proces may 
become personal (1913, p. 377). 
2.2.1.3 The postmodern self Generally, the postmodern movement is 
associated with critiques of the modern Western moral self, its promoted core 
beliefs and values (e.g., social norms, non-reflexive confidence in "progress", 
individualism, rational processes of the mind, and logical positivism's promotion 
of universal truths), its influence on peoples' individual and collective behaviors 
(e.g., colonization, the Holocaust, global warming), and its expressions through 
hierarchical social structures (e.g., holding up notions of objectivity and social 
norms to disguise or validate entrenched patterns of the use of power and 
authority by some to support or perpetuate asymmetrically unfair limitations, 
prejudices, or oppression on others). Relativism, indeterminism, and the valuing 
of subjective knowledge are commonly associated more with postmodern 
perspectives while absolutism, scientific determinism, and the promotion of 
objective knowledge are more associated with modern ones (Flew & Priest, 2002; 
Blackburn, 2005). Pauline Rosenau (1991) distinguished between postmodern 
perspectives in terms of where they fall along an extreme to moderate continuum 
and across a cynical/skeptical to more positive/affirmative continuum. 
A central debate or discourse associated with postmodern critiques of 
modern notions of the self revolve around the capacity of the individual to be self-
organizing or not (i.e., self-constructing or self-producing) and to act 
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idiosyncratically to some effective degree (i.e., human agency) upon an external 
world (Gubriurn & Holstein, 1995; Broad, 2002). For example, Jaber Gubrium 
and James Holstein ( 1995) appeared to be challenging extreme postrnodern 
perspective of the self when they argued that orne postrnodern views can render 
the self as being both "empty" or having no real substance and at the same time 
being "overly saturated" with dispersed meanings embedded within language and 
culture (p. 556). They argued for a postmodern perspective of the self that is not 
only subjectively constructing self-awareness individually and collectively but 
also potentially recon tructing it, because the self has individual agency to assign 
subjective interpretive meanings to relational experiences. 
Michel Foucault ( 1926-1984) avoided aligning himself with any 
philosophical movement. Nevertheless, his historical-philosophical critiques of 
the Western mental health system, the penal system, and sexuality are often linked 
with postrnodernisrn. Foucault argued that all social interrelations, notions of 
freedom, and interconnectedness or systems are fundamentally about relationships 
of power and knowledge. He stated that power is like an energy and "covers a 
whole series of particular mechanisms, definable and defined, which seem likely 
to induce behaviors or discourses" (2007, p. 60). Foucault spoke of the 
importance of describing meanings and social systems in relation to their 
particular knowledge-power "nexus." He thought that an accepted "truth" is not 
given legitimacy by any "originally existing right" (p. 54). Instead, its knowledge-
power nexus had to be "described so that we can grasp what constitutes the 
16 
acceptability of a system, be it the mental health system, the penal system, 
delinquency, sexuality, etc." (p. 54). However, Jurgen Habermas famously 
differed with Foucault's perception of power and truth (Kelly, 1994). Habermas 
was more of an inter-subjective idealist than Foucault's non-committal view of 
the legitimacy of any particular upheld truth, in relation to the human "subject." 
Habermas is associated with furthering notions and applications of critical social 
theory, such as in relation to feminist theory, liberation theology, postcolonial 
theory, critical race theory and anti-oppression theories. 
Michael Kelly (1994) compared and contrasted Foucault and Habermas' 
writings about power. In contrast to Foucault, Habermas argued that while power 
is clearly related to notions of truth and freedom; nevertheless, consensual 
meanings of these concepts can be contextually agreed upon in terms of 
designating legitimate or good and illegitimate or bad uses of power to, for 
instance, further or limit truth and freedom. Habermas argued that Foucault's 
historical critiques implied that there can be no real awareness of self outside of 
strategic power-infused relationships with others. Consequently, there was no real 
hope for objective progress to occur in terms of self-emancipation for people 
collectively through self-awareness from being agents of, and/or suffering with, 
forms of oppression. 
For Habermas and other critical theorists, the use of power can be 
legitimate or illegitimate and it does not just permeate personal relationships but 
also social structures and their institutions. These structural features can include 
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pre-figuring and/or asymmetrically concentrating forms and uses of power that 
oppress some people in communities but not others (Webb, 2000). Critical theory 
seeks to understand and address morally illegitimate uses of power through the 
strategic expression of morally legitimate ones. 
2.2.1.3 Summary. Absolutism refers to: "The opposite of 'relativism', and 
hence infected with all the same ambiguity and indeterminacy" (Flew & Priest, 
2002, p. 2). Debates associated with relativism, individualism, communitarian, 
and absolutism are in no way restricted to i sues of morality and the self. For 
example, a relativist position towards knowledge argues that there is no universal 
objective knowledge or truth of the real world independent of the knower. 
Relativist views of SD would be consistent with compatabilist views of free will 
and determinism, while absolutist SD positions would argue that either free will 
or determinism always "trumps" the other. Parsing the positions illustrates the 
enduring paradoxical nature and complexity of these debates - is a firm relativist 
view of free will absolutist? 
Relativism-absolutism debates in virtually all philosophical areas 
concerning the "self' show no signs of abating, including those concerning 
notions of SD, freedom, truth, autonomy, power, and will. Instead, philosophical 
debates or discourses appear to be growing in ambiguity and indeterminacy with 
the advancing of critical social theories, the advent of postmodern perspectives 
and critiques, a greater respect for cultural diversities, and multiple methodologies 
used in scientific research activities. This trend suggests that an applied discipline 
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such a ocial work accepts at its own peril hi torical and traditional philosophical 
assumptions of the meaning(s) of the self or SD to inform and improve practice. 
2.2.2 Psychology and the Self 
David Murray (1988) sugge ted that John Locke helped give credence to 
the notion fir t attributed to Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679) that all thought is made 
up of two processes - sensation and reflection: 
By sensation the mind receive data from the external world. The 
sen ations vanish, but memories are left. We can observe these memories 
with our minds and by reflecting on them can lay down further memories, 
and, moreover, give our elves certain concepts by the process of mental 
abstraction. A single word ymbolizing a unit of content of the mind at 
any time is 'idea' (p. 97-98). 
Murray attributed Locke with the notion that the meaning of self is 
ultimately acquired by individual through sensations, reflections (memory) and 
ab tractions rather than being somehow innate. Through con ciou memories, one 
has an ongoing sense of self or identity. However, Locke acknowledged that we 
can act without conscious awarene s (e.g., sleepwalking). 
Murray also highlighted Locke's role in furthering an "association of 
ideas" conceptualization of how the human mind works that influenced early 
psychologi ts. It uggested that the mind' activity involves a "flow" of connected 
memorie that are "laid down" by sen ation into a coherent and continuous sense 
of identity or elf. How these memories are processed is learned. 
2.2.2.1 Overview. Psychology emerged and grew in the latter half of the 
nineteenth century. Tracing the meanings of self in psychology i a thesis unto 
itself. However, using Seigal's dimensional framework for analyzing different 
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views of the Western self- the bodily or material, the relational, and the reflective 
-is a rough but useful tool for comparing and contrasting different psychological 
views of the self in relation to meanings of SD. It also overlaps with social work's 
traditional biological/physical, psychological, and social (i.e., "bio-psycho-
social") perspective (Kimberley, 2000). 
Early psychological views of the self tended to emphasize one of Seigal's 
bodily/material, relational, or reflective dimensions. Competing theories 
emphasized one dimension as more important than the other two. Different views 
of the self have waxed and waned within and between various proponents of 
psychological and psychiatric schools of theory and practice (Alexander & 
Selesnick, 1966; Murray, 1988). For example, organic psychiatry's view of the 
self, mental health, mental illness, and addiction that is located in human 
physiology (especially the brain) sits firmly in Seigal's bodily/material dimension. 
This medical perspective gained dominance in the late 1800's, waned through the 
first half of the twentieth century, and has re-emerged with vigor in association 
with technological advances aiding the study of the human body and new 
psychotropic medications (Clarke, 1973; Murray, 1988). 
2.2.2.2 Psychoanalytic/psychodynamic views. Sigmund Freud's (1856-
1939) psychoanalytical theories are situated primarily (but not exclusively) in 
Seigal's bodily or material dimension associated with the human "mind" (rather 
than organic psychiatry's emphasis on the physical processes of the human brain). 
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Despite Freud's acknowledgement of a social dimension of the self and the 
importance of social processes in the inner workings of the id, ego, and superego; 
nevertheless, his early psychoanalytical writings focused primarily on the innate 
drives, internal conflicts, and fantasies of the individual 's mind (Fromm, 1965 
[1941]). Freud' s work in the early twentieth century gained credibility and 
allegiance among many medical and mental health professionals, including social 
workers, until the latter half of the century (Clarke, 1973; Murray, 1988). 
Many of Freud's early collaborators and students, and later 
"psychodynamic" theorists, developed their own distinct views of the self that 
diverged and competed for credibility and influence with Freud until his death, 
and subsequently with each other (Alexander & Selesnick, 1966). Otto Rank 
(1884-1939) was particularly influential in early psychiatric social work theory 
and practice associated with the functional school that is discussed below. After 
breaking from Freud, Rank focused on the bodily dimension in terms of an 
internal, innately creative, but not necessarily always constructive or positive 
force that he referred to as "will" (1945). 
Other subsequent psychoanalytic/psychodynamic views turned to 
emphasizing more of the relational and/or reflective dimensions of Seigal 's 
framework than Freud. Leading examples include the work of Alfred Adler 
(1870-1937), Erich Fromm (1900-1980), and Heinz Kohut (1913-1981), and, 
more recently, Carol Gilligan. 
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2.2.2.3 Behavioral views. Behaviorism is another one-dimensional view of 
the psychoanalytic sense of self. It is located primarily in Seigal ' s relational 
dimension. This view of the self challenged the psychoanalytic tradition in 
psychology through much of the first half of the twentieth century. This 
incompatible or "hard" deterministic view suggested that SD or free will was an 
illusion and that the behavior of the self was determined by environmental 
conditions and consequences (e.g., Skinner, 1971). 
The classic behavioral view of the self has been challenged from within its 
field by more multi-dimensional views of the self. One example is social/earning 
theory (Bandura, 1977). It integrated cognitions and memory (the bodily/material 
dimension) with social modeling processes and conditioned responses to 
environmental stimuli (the relational). The important concept of "self-efficacy" is 
associated with social learning theory. It refers to a person's assessment of his or 
her ability or competency to perform tasks. 
2.2.2.4 Humanist views. Humanism is yet another distinct one-dimensional 
view of the self that arose in the mid-twentieth century. It is located in Seigal' s 
reflective dimension. Murray (1988) suggested that humanism emerged in 
association with existential philosophy, discontent with the psychoanalytical 
school's theoretical emphasis on intra-psychic or internal impulse-driven force 
and processes, and dissatisfaction with behaviorism's belief in deterministic 
environmental forces and processes (p. 415). Humanism sees the individual self in 
terms of not just surviving but "becoming" as the innate primary goal in life, 
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needing a positive attitude to his or her self (e.g., Rogers, 1961), and needing to 
pursue finding and expressing the "best" of his or her self (e.g., Maslow, 1962). 
These beliefs and values coalesced around ideas such as "self-development" and 
"self-actualization" (Murray, p. 416-417). The existential humanist view of the 
self in social work sees a person's subjective perceptions of reality, regardless of 
the degree they are considered to be shared or dysfunctional, as key to 
understanding and helping the person (e.g., Krill, 1996). 
2.2.2.5 Cognitive and social constructivist views. Cognitive theory (e.g., 
Beck, 1976) is another important psychological view of the self that is primarily 
concerned with informational processing of the mind (i.e., Seigal's 
bodily/material dimension). It is often matched with behavioral approaches in 
practice (i.e., cognitive-behavioral therapy) to create a more multi-dimensional 
view of the self. Albert Ellis (1913-2007) integrated rational or cognitive 
processes with emotion-stimulating external events, situations, and/or experiences 
with other people (i.e., rational-emotive therapy). Behavioral, cognitive, and 
rational-emotive therapies tend to promote the therapist being more assertive or 
directive with clients than the psychoanalytic/psychodynamic and humanistic · 
approaches (Reber & Reber, 2001). 
A more relativist perspective associated with cognitive theory is 
constructivism (Granvold, 1996). There are many theoretical variations associated 
with notions of constructivism and social constructivism in psychology and 
sociology (constructionism is another related term). Constructivist views may 
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emphasize individual internal cognitive processes and states while social 
constructivism more formally integrates Seigal's relational dimension (although 
the terms may be used interchangeably). 
2.2.2.6 Power, relationships, and applied practice. As touched on above, 
psychological theories of the self in applied practice influence the perspective and 
practitioner role in terms of determining the cause(s) of problems and the best 
treatment approach. They also influence the relational stance of the practitioner 
(e.g., doctor, psychologist, nurse, or social worker) with people receiving services 
in mental health/addictions treatment settings. One example specific to SD is in 
terms of the worker deciding to be more or less active in overtly or covertly 
directing the client towards adopting/suppressing a particular belief or behavior. 
Rocco Cottone (2001) suggested that the social con tructivist perspective 
in mental health reorients decision-making processes in treatment towards being 
more shared and respectful of the knowledge of the client. The social 
constructivist per pective also inferred that there is a reciprocal constructivist 
process occurring within and between clients and social workers (Granvold, 
1996). Combined with postmodem ideas, constructivism/social constructivism 
has contributed to the development of psychotherapeutic treatment models such as 
solution-focused brief therapy (e.g., Berg & de Shazer, 1993) and narrative 
therapy (e.g., White & Epston, 1990). However, Foucault and critical theorists 
raise important questions about how power, knowledge, and truth are interrelated 
and permeate relationships, including ones between professionals, treatment 
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sy terns, and clients. Complex relativistic ver u absoluti t notion of power 
infuse these questions and concerns. For example, social constructivi t practice 
may facilitate bared decision making and greater respect for the per onal 
knowledge of the client; however, its subjective/relativist stance could, arguably, 
also lead to an infinite degree of elasticity among and between people in terms of 
evaluating and addressing issues of power use and misuse in day-to-day clinical 
interactions. Consequently, the approach could till potentially be highly dhective 
within a co-constructing practice context (e.g., aggressively persuading clients to 
adopt alternative meanings of experience ). 
Critiques of radical relativist view of the self (and, in turn, SD) can echo 
Taylor's communitarian critique of the modern selfs radical first-person stance. 
This view suggest that there needs to be some absoluti t external moral tandards 
to be recognized, drawn from, and upheld. The critique recognize and tries to 
protect and/or advance the rights and needs of people who are collectively 
particularly vulnerable such as children. Critical theory also, for example, argues 
that social interdependencie and asymmetrical or unfair advantages and 
disadvantages structurally exist and are perpetuated for some people but not for 
others (e.g., based on gender, ethnicity/race, class, disability, sexual orientation, 
and/or age). Consequently, shared absolutist standards need to exist to morally 
address illegitimate or unfair expressions of power in societies. The directive 
stance and action of the program/practitioner vis-a-vis the client, regardless of 
theoretical perspective or well-meaning (e.g., utilitarian) intentions, is a key area 
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of concern in relation to mental health self-advocates meanings of SD. Checking 
worker directiveness is one traditional function of CSD in social work 
(McDermott, 1975). 
2.2.2. 7 SD and motivation in psychology. Motivational psychology is 
concerned with what energizes human behavior (Reber & Reber, 2001). A notion 
formally referred to as SD has only recently emerged in this psychological field. 
Edward Deci's Self-Determination Theory (SOT) argued for a multi-dimensional 
and compatibilistic view of the self. 
SDT assumes that SD is a process of utilizing one's will. Will is seen as 
the capacity of the human organism to choose how to act based on the internal 
and external information available. Will is also involved in the intrinsic need of 
people to feel competent and self-determining in relation to their environment. At 
the same time, it integrates the importance of the environment in affecting 
peoples' will in relation to SD as a form of autonomy. SDT emphasizes the 
development of three different loci of "causality" (somewhat similar to notions of 
locus of control in social psychology and attribution theory) that motivate people: 
• Internal causality orientation: Characterized by internal motivation and 
autonomy, and facilitated by responsive, informational environments. This 
orientation is thought to foster the highest degree of autonomy and self-
competency or self-efficacy. 
• External causality orientation: Characterized by people motivated by 
external rewards. Controlling environments are thought to prevent people 
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from resolving conflicts associated with being self-determining. However, 
such environments do facilitate developing self-competency. 
• Impersonal causality orientation: Characterized by people having 
unresolved autonomy and competency issues. Environments that are non-
responsive to persons' needs for autonomy and information are thought to 
undermine SD and self-competency. 
SDT assumes that people struggle with conflicts around establishing trust 
and autonomy (labeled as SD conflicts). People experience self-competency, self-
efficacy, or self-mastery conflicts in relation to their environments. Their specific 
environmental context affects the resolving of these SD and self-competency 
conflicts. People develop a locus of causality in relation to resolving these 
conflicts, or not. Peoples' locus of causality is assumed to be a stable feature or 
state of the self (Deci & Ryan, 2002). 
SDT has been tested quantitatively in relation to athletic performance 
(e.g., Pelletier, Fortier, Vallerand, & Briere, 2001), educational performance (e.g., 
Guay, Mageau, & Vallerand, 2003), and medical treatment compliance (e.g., 
Williams, Rodin, Ryan, Grolnick, & Deci, 1998). SDT hypothesizes that an 
important determinant of involvement in, and compliance to, medical care is 
whether the client feels autonomous (i.e., an internal locus of causality) in 
treatment participation. Behaviors motivated by external pressures, contingent 
rewards, and punishments are assumed to promote an external locus of causality 
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that is not conducive to resilient internally-based motivations to get well 
(Sheldon, Williams, & Joyner, 2003). 
Proponents of SDT state that it's application in mental health and 
addiction practice is best expressed through motivational interviewing (Sheldon, 
Williams, & Joyner, 2003). Motivational interviewing (Miller & Rollnick, 2002) 
emerged in addiction treatment in association with James Prochaska and Carlos 
DiClemente's (1982) Trans-theoretical Model of Change. Like SDT, Prochaska 
and DiClemente's model of change recognized that competing theories of the self 
and change do not fit or explain all people, all of the time. Unlike SDT, their 
model was developed inductively. The authors qualitatively explored the 
experiences of people who reported making major changes in their lives without 
professional help (they began with people who quit smoking cigarettes). They 
then analyzed interviews and compared generated themes with various theories 
and therapies in the area of addiction treatment. They inductively developed a 
heuristic model of self-directed change that occurs in discrete stages. The authors 
argued that treatment should support and facilitate this natural process of change 
rather than force on people some sort of deduced theory and its respective 
prescriptions. 
Prochaska and DiClemente's trans-theoretical model proposed that various 
theories and therapies may have some potential value for helping different people 
at different moments or stages of his or her self-driven process of change. 
Consequently, the skill, wisdom, and knowledge of the professional focuses on 
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how best to nurture or motivate, support, and collaborate with the natural change 
process (through motivational interviewing) and how best to match helpful 
treatment approaches with an individual's unique self, goals, and his or her stage 
of changing (this approach is sometimes referred to as eclectic practice). (Miller 
& Rollnick, 2002). 
The trans-theoretical model of change and motivational interviewing do 
not adhere to any one theoretical perspective. Supporting a person's internally 
motivated and self-directed processes of change is the key. The perspective is 
inclusive of various views of addiction (e.g., medical/12 step "disease" models, 
social learning theory, and self-medication models). It does not commit to any 
particular theory or beliefs about the self in relation to mental health or mental 
illness. Consequently, it is one influential addiction-related treatment framework 
that is being used to try to develop a more integrated and effective treatment 
approach for CDs (Meuser et al, 2003; Finnell, 2003). 
Motivational interviewing (Miller & Rollnick, 2002) is directive in terms 
of using practitioner influence within a therapeutic relationship to openly promote 
change. At the same time, it is not meant to arbitrarily predetermine clients' goals; 
nor is it intended that the cUnician arbitrarily decide for a person how best to 
achieve their goals. This practice approach integrates experiential learning in the 
process of change and it celebrates all change, no matter how small. William R. 
Miller and Stephen Rollnick (2002) discussed their concerns that practitioners 
could use their approach to unethically manipulate or exert "undue influence" on 
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clients in the name of change, through their power in the counseling relationship 
(p. 161-175). Their concerns included how the directiveness towards change 
inherent in the approach is used as the model is being adapted to different 
contexts (e.g., hospital rather than outpatient counseling settings), and issues (e.g. , 
CDs; diabetes self-management). As touched on above in terms of worker power, 
SD, and directiveness, their concerns appear well-warranted. 
2.2.2.8 Summary. The major different views of the self in psychology 
typically start out emphasizing the primary importance of one of Seigal 's three 
dimensions. There is a subsequent trend among all the major schools in 
psychology towards an increasing complexity and integration of one or both of 
Seigal's other dimensions. This trend extends to practice that reflects increasingly 
eclectic approaches. As in philosophy, the trend towards more complex and multi-
dimensional meanings of the self shows no sign of abating. 1 ust as the 
philosophical views of Locke, Hume, Kant, Freud, and others influenced more 
absolutist views of the self in early psychology and social work, critical theorists 
and postmodern critiques are influencing applied mental health and addiction 
treatment fields today in terms of more multi-dimensional, compatibilistic, and 
complementary views of the self. 
2.3 Social Work, the Self, and CSD 
A generalist social work movement emerged in the 1960' s and 70's 
(Bartlett & Saunders, 1970). The generalist view saw social work as a composite 
of key concepts, generalizations, and core principles relating to knowledge, 
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values, and interventions so that the social work base is "not the doing but what 
underlies the doing" (p. 129). CSD was included as one of the core principles. 
The generalist model in social work includes a "person-in-environment" 
perspective of the self. The person-in-environment concept is usually discussed in 
terms of three interrelated, interdependent, and reciprocal dimensions of the lived 
experience: the natural, biological or physiological; the psychological (i.e., 
cognitions or thoughts, emotions and moods, and behavior); and the social 
(Kimberley, 2000; Avarim, 2002). The concept orients applied social work 
practice to the dynamic interactions or transactions of individuals and social 
facets of life, including the relationship between the worker and the client 
(Shulman, 1991; Compton, Galaway, & Cournoyer, 2005). 
An "ecosystems" perspective is replacing references to person-in-
environment in social work (Germaine & Gitterman, 1980). Mark Mattaini and 
Carol Meyer (2002) suggest that: "[the person-in-environment's] hyphenated 
structure has contributed to a continuing imbalance in emphasis on the person or 
the environment. As a result, practitioners have often attended primarily to one or 
the other" (p. 3). They argue that "ecosystems" better upholds an interrelated, 
interdependent, and transactional perspective for different specialized social work 
activities across diverse fields of practice and contexts with different client modes 
(e.g., individuals, families, groups, and communities). 
Both the person-in-environment and ecosystem concepts have their critics 
in social work. Critical theorists provide one example. According to Elizabeth 
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King Keenen (2004), critical theories may vary but they share conceptualizations 
that include: 
• Human actions create pattern over time. Patterns tran late into social 
structures. Such structure "define, limit, and inform po ibilities for 
human action" (p. 540). 
• Human action and dynamic social structures exist in an evolving spiral as 
each form and inform the other through their patterns of interaction. 
• Practice or patterns of behavior may perpetuate or change the existing 
relations between people and tructures. 
• Practices act out particular configurations of culture, power, and identity. 
• Configurations of culture and power that operate through human action 
lead to collaborative networks and asymmetrical or unfair relations. 
• People are socially situated in different position . 
• Different positions specifically construct different perspectives, meanings, 
interests, and the access or use of power. 
Keenan argued that a critical view more clearly articulates the symbiotic 
relationship among individuals and group and their ecosystem. She uggested 
that the ecological perspective, in contrast, remains vulnerable to people assuming 
relationships are purely transactional in nature (although proponents of the 
ecological view argue otherwise). 
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2.3.1 Social Work in Mental Health and Addiction 
In North America, the generalist movement shifted social work in mental 
health away from being such a specialty. Still, social work is said to be the current 
large t single professional group that provides mental health ervices in America 
(Gambrill, 2003). A NASW member urvey in the U.S. (1999) found mental 
health to be the largest primary area of practice reported (39% ). 
While social work in mental health may be the largest practice field, the 
field of addiction appears to be one of the mallest. The same NASW survey 
(1999) cited above found less than 5% of re pondents identifying addiction as 
their primary field of practice. There are many possible rea ons for the lack of a 
strong social work presence in addiction treatment. Regardless, integrating 
addiction and mental health theory/practice knowledge is not neces arily going to 
progre s any ea ier or faster in social work than in medicine, nur ing, or 
psychology. Similarly, The Canadian As ociation of Social Worker (CASW) 
website (member site) also reports that mental health is the largest reported area 
of practice and addictions is one of the smallest. 
2.3.2 The Self in Social Work 
The early integration of the charity organizing and settlement house 
movement , the subsequent generali t practice movement, and the trend towards 
an ecosystems perspective all point to a social work view of the self that is 
fundamentally multi-dimensional. This is a different core disciplinary view of the 
self than the traditional organic or biological focus in health care (e.g., the 
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medical model) or the competing major one-dimensional theoretical movements 
in psychology. However, there is ongoing tension between proponents of various 
multi-dimensional conceptions of the self within social work. Different 
conceptions include more traditional atomistic views of the individual person 
transacting or self-constructing within an environment, communitarian "social 
SD" views of the self that do not radically disconnect the individual self from a 
family, cultural group, or community (e.g., Falk, 1988), and diverse critical 
theory/anti-oppressive perspectives that focus more on the recursive 
interconnectedness between people and social structures in relation to power, 
culture, and identity (e.g., Mullaly, 2002). All of these perspectives of the self 
tend to operate at a fairly abstract level in the social work literature. Each view 
tends to jockey with the others in trying to influence the profession, students, and 
practitioners. They also emphasize psycho-social facets of the self. For example, 
there is a trend to discuss and integrate notions of spirituality more into the social 
work perspective (e.g., McKernan, 2005). However, the organic physiological 
facet of Seigal's bodily/material dimension of the self is often lacking. 
One of the challenges that proponents of the different views above appear 
to share is the difficulty of translating and applying their preferred theoretical 
perspective of the self into social work's many dynamic and often highly-charged 
applied practice contexts, including helping people who are dealing daily with the 
symptoms of CDs. The approach to this challenge that is also fairly consistent 
across the above views is to make theoretical assumptions about the meanings of 
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the self in terms of the client and then to focus their attention mostly on the role of 
the worker in practice contexts. The practicing social worker' s "use" of his or her 
self in relation to the client, practitioner self-awareness, self-reflection, and more 
recently critical self-reflexivity have been repeatedly discussed and debated since 
the beginnings of social casework. 
Mary Ellen Kondrat (1999) highlighted social work's difficulties with 
notions of self in the profession and discussed some conceptual differences 
between the above views. She suggested that: "professional self-awareness is 
widely considered a necessary condition for competent social work practice. 
Definitions of self-awareness rely implicitly on various meanings of the term 
'self.' Yet, the question, what does it mean to be a self? is not directly addressed 
in the practice literature" (p. 451). Kondrat then addressed the issue in terms of 
the worker' s "self' but not in terms of the client. 
As Kondrat's article suggests, social workers will not typically specify a 
clear conception of the client "self' in practice (especially when one includes 
families, various groupings of people, communities, and so forth under the 
umbrella term of "client"). However, when notions of the self are discussed in the 
theoretical social work literature then they are often highly generalized and do not 
offer much more than general principles to apply in practice contexts (a challenge 
similar to codes of ethics discussed below). Consequently, a conception of the 
client meaning of self may often be assumed or implied through the practice 
setting such as an organic view associated with the medical model. Alternatively, 
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workers may assume or adopt one or more of the views associated with 
traditional, critical, or postmodern-related perspectives in philosophy, sociology, 
or the myriad of therapeutic models and traditions in applied psychology. 
When the meaning of self in relation to the client is overtly conceptualized 
in social work theory or practice models, the inner world of the person and the 
outer world (e.g., the environment, ecosystem, and/or social structures) are 
usually included or integrated in some way. For example, the life model 
(Germaine & Gitterman, 1980) and the interactional practice approach (Shulman, 
1991) overtly use ecosystems theory (an integration of general systems theory and 
ecological theory) in their practice models. 
Howard Goldstein ( 1981) provides one detailed example of how the self is 
viewed in relation to social work practice. Goldstein, who cited psychologist 
Gordon Allport as an important influence, described his view of the self as an 
"active and transactional conception" that is best understood as a "state" and a 
"process", and which can only be understood within its environmental context 
rather than as a separate "static entity" (p. 111). Generally speaking, Goldstein's 
concept of self included: 
• An individual's interactions need to be seen within the context of time 
and situation. 
• Perceptions and interpretations of experiences lead to consequences and 
adaptations (including the risk of the self being arbitrarily defined by 
others). 
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• The self is a system that searches for stability within dynamic inner and 
external contexts. 
• Past-present-future and inner image-outer reality "dialects" are an 
important process of the self. 
• The self is "intentional, future oriented, and in pursuit of meaning" (p. 
112). 
Another example of a developed concept of the self in a social work 
practice model is Sharon Berlin's cognitive-integrative perspective ( 1996; 2002). 
Berlin's constructivist view suggested that the self is both discernable from, and 
integrated with, the external world. She posited that the elf is e sentially our 
autobiographical memories that contribute to our different qualities of self-
recognition and experiences. The memories are organized into patterns, schematic 
networks or "self-schemas." (2002, p. 95) Self-schemas are both symbolic (i.e., 
one's self-concept) but they also are "keepers" of gained knowledge from 
experience. The memories serve to construct a stable, consistent or unitary view 
of the self in various areas of life, both internally and with our environment (i.e. , 
we are essentially "meaning makers"). Referencing studies in p ychology, Berlin 
(2002) stated that a "healthy" self involves multiple, relatively independent, and 
largely complementary self-schemas that reflect "self-other interdependence" and 
"variability in the conceptions of self that are activated in different contexts and 
across time" (p. 96). 
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A third example of a developed social work view of the self is focused on 
oppression. Anti-oppressive theory and research in social work seeks to 
understand and address in practice individual and structural processes that 
underpin oppression, stigma, and discrimination (including traditional social work 
values, roles, and practices). The impact of oppression on an individual or group 
of people is often considered in terms of some people being "mentally colonized" 
by others, some people being given negative "labels" that socially define them, 
and some people exhibiting a "false consciousness" that negatively values his or 
her self in relation to others (Quintana and Segura-Herrera, 2003, p. 270). The 
anti-oppressive movement is particularly concerned with understanding how 
constructs of identity, senses of self, or our subjective views of our self develop 
and become fixed individually and collectively in relation to oppressive states, 
social structures, and/or proce ses (e.g., Furlong, 2003). Bob Mullaly (2002), a 
critical/anti-oppressive social work theorist, suggested that most anti-oppressive 
writers: "agree that oppression is linked to social conditions and that the 
environment. . . plays an important role in influencing the individual 
psyche ... . Conversely, there is broad agreement that the individual plays an active 
role in mediating the effects of environmental factors" (p. 122). Mullaly argued 
that oppression is characterized by multiplicity and heterogeneity rather than 
linear divisions between socially interpreted characteristics of the self such as 
gender, social status, sexual orientation, disability, or ethnicity/race. He suggested 
that most people can belong to more than one oppressed category, people can be 
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oppressed by others individually and collectively, and people can individually and 
collectively oppress his/her/their self. 
Mullaly reviewed model of oppression such as the "single strand" model 
(one type or source of oppression is believed to be primary to other ones). He 
argued that this model does not capture the multiplicity of oppression, such a 
what a disabled woman of color might experience in terms of racism, sexism, and 
the stereotyping of her disability. Mullaly acknowledged there are pluralistic 
"parallel" model , but he sugge ted they till do not address the phenomenon' 
relational and overlapping qualities. Mullaly supported an "intersectional model" 
proposed by Steven Wineman (1984). Wineman's model i more like a web or net 
of intersecting forms of oppression that can mutually reinforce each other and 
cannot simply be isolated, under tood, and addressed independently. 
2.3.3 Client Self Determination 
Mary Richmond (1917) is credited with inductively developing an 
empirically systematic (i.e., "scientific") approach to early social casework theory 
and practice from the analysis of thousands of casework files and worker case 
notes. She is associated with the development of the diagnostic school of 
casework. Components broadly consisted of history, an early form of diagnosi 
(i.e., a systematic professional judgment), and treatment. Although attentive to the 
social dimension, the diagnostic approach to casework tended to work with 
individuals and/or families in order for them to adjust better to their social 
39 
situations rather than focus on changing the existing socio-economic environment 
(Turner, 2002). 
By the nineteen-thirties, social work with groups and community 
development activities associated with the settlement house movement were 
growing (Biestek & Gehrig, 1978). Nevertheless, casework continued to dominate 
the field. CSD arrived in social work with the publication of Bertha Reynolds ' 
book, Between client and community (1934). Reynolds was a psychiatric social 
caseworker and educator. Drawing on the work of Virginia Robinson, Reynolds 
promoted CSD as the key philosophical principle around which all casework 
should be organized. She never actually defined her view of self or specifically 
stated her meaning of CSD. This may be because SD was being talked about in 
relation to democracy and politics after World War I, there was a generally 
accepted notion of the ego and meanings of self in psychoanalysis, and/or because 
of assumptions associated with the inherent focus on self-reliance and self-
direction in early diagnostic and functional casework. Nevertheless, the lack of a 
formal definition in Reynolds ' work stands out in relation to social work's 
attempts over the next seventy-plus years to make sense of the concept and to 
operationalize it in practice. 
Reynolds' philosophy was not widely adopted in casework. However, 
CSD came to be seen as integral to all social work activities despite its meaning 
remaining vague and debated (McDermott, 1975, Rothman, 1989, Taylor, 2006). 
For example, over the years, CSD has been described as a "liberating force" 
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(Keith-Lucas, 1963, p. 67), the "focal point of the value system in social work" 
(Biestek & Gehrig, 1978, p. 4), "one of the most prominent and secure pillars 
upon which social work is built" (Reamer, 1983, p. 254), and "the most 
confounding and professionally debilitating concept of all the intellectual 
principles undergirding social work" (Rothman, 1989, p. 599). 
Perhaps because of the confusion around the meaning of CSD, the number 
of published social work research studies concerning CSD pales in relation to the 
number of scholarly discussions. Discussions tend to fall within three major 
categories: (a) discussions of CSD in ideal terms; (b) discussions that focus on 
CSD in ethical terms; and (c) discussions focused primarily on clients' meanings, 
experiences, and outcomes. The categories are interrelated. They are 
distinguishable within discussions in terms of an emphasis in the text on one 
category versus the other two. 
2.3.3.1 CSD ideals. Ideal as a noun refers to "a standard or principle to be 
aimed at" (Soanes & Stevenson, 2006, p. 707). Reynolds promoted CSD as an 
ideal to guide practice. Her idea of CSD supported creating more voluntary 
relationships between workers and potential clients (e.g., educating people about 
social work services and letting them choose to become clients), self-help, and 
client participation in casework (Reynolds, 1934). CSD ideals generally provide 
an overarching reference for applied social work to recognize and uphold the 
client's right to self-direct, self-control, and to apply his/her/their own meanings 
to the indeterminable/unpredictable nature of their lives. Ideal themes fall into at 
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least three major sub-categories: CSD as a need; CSD as a right; and CSD as a 
fact. 
Ideal positions supporting CSD as a "need" often involve beliefs that there 
an inherent universal need among people for SD in order for personal growth to 
occur (e.g., Reynolds, 1934; Wieck & Pope, 1988) and/or to maintain and 
enhance physical health and wellbeing through personal choice and control over 
such areas as personal safety and security, affordable housing, and adequate food 
(e.g., Srebnick & LaFond, 1999). These CSD ideals are closely associated with 
the humanist and existential movements in psychology and ocial work. Ideal 
views of CSD as a right usually include complex moral discussions of individual 
and/or collective rights in relation to SD, freedom, and autonomy as well as 
political, legal, and civil rights that formally enshrine a perceived natural/moral 
right (e.g., Perlman, 1965; Biestek & Gehrig, 1978). In contrast, CSD as a fact of 
being human includes generalizations about physiological processes of each 
human body that are unique and self-driven (e.g., Carpenter, 1996) or practical 
functions that only the client can actually accomplish in treatment (e.g., Keith-
Lucas, 1963). Ideal CSD discussions may promote one sub-category over the 
others (e.g., McDermott, 1975). Alternatively, the three may be mixed into an 
overall statement of the importance of CSD: 
The importance of SD, according to this [Functional School] orientation, 
was placed in the very nature of man; and that was why it was a civic right 
in a democratic society, why it was a psychological need, and why it was 
necessary for effectiveness in social work" (Biestek & Gehrig, 1978, p. 
55-56). 
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2.3.3.2 CSD ethics. Ethical CSD discussions focus primarily on the 
practicing social worker or the profession as a whole. Ethical discussions 
functionally try to forge a coherent connection between CSD as a generalized 
ideal with "front-line" applied theory/practice realities across a wide array of 
practice fields and contexts. The U.S. NASW Code of Ethics (1960) referred to a 
client's right to SD. Subsequent revised NASW codes (1979, 1990, 1994, and 
1999) continued to refer to CSD in some way. For example, the latest Code 
(1999) referred to CSD as an ethical principle and stated: 
Social workers respect and promote the right of clients to self-
determination and a sist clients in their efforts to identify and clarify their 
goals. Social workers may limit clients' right to self-determination when, 
in the workers' professional judgment, clients' actions or potential actions 
pose a serious, foreseeable, and imminent risk to themselves or others. 
Although the Canadian Association of Social Workers (CASW) formed in 
1926 it did not develop a code of ethics until 1977. It was updated in 1994 and 
again in 2005. The CASW codes have also included references to CSD as an 
ethical principle. The latest Code (2005) stated that: "Social workers uphold each 
person's right to self-determination, consistent with that person' s capacity and 
with the rights of others" (p. 4). A separate principle under the same value said 
that: "Social workers uphold the right of society to impose limitations on the self-
determination of individuals, when such limitations protect individuals from self-
harm and from harming others" (p. 5). The CASW Code included a glossary 
definition for SD: 
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A core social work value that refers to the right to self-direction and 
freedom of choice without interference from other . Self-determination is 
codified in practice through mechanisms of informed consent. Social 
workers may be obligated to limit self-determination when a client lacks 
capacity or in order to prevent harm [Regehr & Antle, 1997, p. 11]. 
The NASW and CASW codes share some similarities. Both refer to CSD 
as a "soft" or conditional right and both associate it with supporting the dignity 
and worth of people. It is interesting that the NASW used the term "promote" in 
relation to clients' SD while the CASW used "uphold." The use of the different 
terms suggest that the U.S. code leans towards a CSD meaning that guides 
workers to create opportunities for clients to be more "free" (i.e., positive 
freedom) while the Canadian code more conservatively guides workers to protect 
clients' existing basic personal freedoms associated with citizenship (i.e., negative 
freedom) (see Berlin, 1969). 
CSD meanings in professional codes of ethics are one attempt to establish 
some sort of a shared value, principle, and standard to help guide large numbers 
of social workers active across a wide array of different client modes and service 
delivery contexts. However, the meanings of CSD within these codes are so 
highly generalized or idealized that their utility in complex and dynamic day-to-
day practice contexts is often criticized (e.g., Rothman, 1989). Ethical dilemmas 
and paradoxes abound with respect to CSD ethical statements and social workers 
exercising influence and authority in practice. The paradoxes are critical to 
understanding discussions in the ethics category. For example, one paradox 
involves social workers pursuing status as recognized "experts" in practice. 
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Professional recognition is "usually demonstrated by the powers and privileges 
conferred upon the profession by society" (Yelaja, 1985, p. 3). However, the more 
power the social worker gains, the greater the ability for the worker to override 
the client's right to SD. From a critical theoretical perspective, the social worker 
may also have power and privileges that are asymmetrical to the client in relation 
to their respective socially constructed locations. If the worker does not recognize 
and be reflexive to the significance of these differences, and what they might 
mean to the client, he or she may inadvertently exercise undo influence or 
directiveness that negatively impacts on promoting or upholding CSD ideals (and, 
in turn, harm the client in some way). Alternatively, social workers may also use 
powers and privileges to advocate for and facilitate client abilities and 
opportunities to exercise and expand his/her/their SD. 
Another paradox arises when structural conditions and practices that social 
workers are not directly responsible for are placed on clients (e.g., agency or 
system policies in health care; physician's powers to direct interventions). People 
may become trapped into interventions or interactions with social workers against 
their will. A practice example in health care and mental health is where the 
physicians and psychiatrists have the responsibility to medically diagnose and 
prescribe treatment. Social workers may be responsible for implementing and 
monitoring adherence to interventions imposed by these authorities (Mackelprang 
& Salsgiver, 1996, Aviram, 2002). Such activities have led to critiques of social 
workers being naive, hypocrites or impotent vis-a-vis upholding CSD in the field 
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of mental health (Whittington, 1975; Cohen, 1988; Bentley, 1993; Avarim, 2002). 
However, social workers in these sorts of circumstances with clients may be able 
to use their expertise and authority to affirm and facilitate the empowerment of 
clients in ways that can lead to his/her/their being more self-determining. 
Ethical discussions of CSD reflect at least four major themes in relation to 
the least harm occurring to clients and/or others in practice: the means and the 
ends; paternalism/maternalism; client capacity or competence; and advocacy. 
Means and ends relate to the ethical fit between professional CSD ideals and 
social workers' attitudes and/or actions with clients. One rationale argues that 
beliefs, practice, and outcomes need to be morally congruent. For example, a CSD 
ideal that emphasized philosophical notions of negative freedom or autonomy 
would lead to an absolutist ethical principle of CSD that restricted social workers 
from invading or intervening in any citizen's personal "space" in practice except 
under very specific conditions (e.g., McDermott, 1975). However, another 
absolutist perspective is closer to utilitarianism, where practices that are 
incongruent with an ideal of CSD that upheld autonomy are defended as 
appropriate for some later positive outcome for the person and/or a larger "good" 
for others (e.g., Davis, 2002). A third more relative perspective argues for 
dynamically matching supports and limits to CSD with changing client issues and 
circumstances (e.g., Murdach, 1996) . 
. Paternalism/maternalism in ethical discussions is sometimes deconstructed 
into equally slippery notions of beneficence and non-malfeasance. It is the ethical 
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rationale most often cited in discussion of CSD to support social workers trying 
to overtly influence, persuade, determine, limit, or coerce clients' belief , values, 
attitudes, relation hips, thought , emotions, and/or behaviors. Marcia Abramson 
(1985) said that paternalism "is a form of beneficence in which the helping 
person's concepts of benefit and harms differ from those of the client' and the 
helper's concepts prevail" (p. 389). Alison Murdach (1996) argued that the 
literature on CSD has "paid too little attention to the protective treatment efforts 
necessarily undertaken by practitioners for the good of client "(p. 31). However, 
Reamer (2006) cautioned that paternalism is an ethical problem when 
"interference" becomes normalized or is u ed to hide actions that benefit the 
individual worker or agency more than the client. He referred to the latter as 
"pseudopaternali m" (p. 109). Kristine Tower (1994) sugge ted that: 
[In] the real world of human services, the constraints of time and limited 
funding are exacerbated by the demands of increasing caseloads[;] as a 
result, self-determination is frequently the fust [ethical principle] to be 
violated in the name of expediency, protection, or co t containment" (p. 
191). 
Client capacity or competence discussions typically involve the social 
worker's overt or covert assessment, judgment, or diagnosi of client capacity or 
competence to appreciate her/his/their choice , to make self-directed decisions, 
and to realize the consequences of their decisions on themselves and/or others. 
The capacity or competency issue in ethical dilemmas often involves assessments 
of the perceived risk, imminent dangers, and/or verified harm to clients and/or 
others associated with the worker upholding or fostering CSD, or else restricting 
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it somehow. Abramson (1985) suggested that mo t social worker would agree 
that limiting CSD is justifiable if a client's actions would harm another person. 
However, he stated that it is much more complicated if other con ider a client's 
actions simply "foolish" (p. 388) or else "when the act in que tion is harmful only 
to the person performing the act" (p. 389). Confusing competency with a clash of 
values or culture is a theme often cited as a possible ethical trap for workers to 
not uphold CSD (Rothman, 2005). Barbara Nicholson and Gerald Maltross (1989) 
wrote that for professionals in health care "it often is easier to que tiona patient's 
competency than to recognize a legitimate conflict of values" (p. 235). Sharon 
Freedberg (1989) suggested that by imply "equating choice with virtuous, or at 
least approved, behavior, it is possible to discount client decisions" (p. 11). Other 
discussions in this area include: 
• Relativist approaches to titrating paternal/maternal limits ver us upholding 
CSD over time through workers' judgments of context- pecific client 
capacities and degrees of risk (e.g., Murdach, 1996). 
• The appropriate degree of worker directiveness or influence within a 
"helping" therapeutic relation hip and specific context (e.g., Rothman et 
al, 1996). 
• The risk to fostering CSD capacity over the long run if the client is 
consistently subjected to persuasion by the worker (e.g., Rothman et al, 
1996). 
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Saul Bernstein (1960) wrote that supporting CSD based on a person's 
unexamined impulses is more a "surrender to instinctive drives than the 
ex pre sion of mature self-determination" (p. 39). However, Bertha Reynolds 
( 1934) questioned "whether avoidance of the natural consequences of the client's 
choice really aids her development...to be free to choose mean to incur risk (p. 
105). Again echoing humanistic and existential beliefs, David Seyer (1963) 
argued that the experiential learning of clients was the key reason why CSD is so 
important in social work: 
There are two reasons for supporting the self-determined a pirations of the 
client, even when they may seem farfetched. The fust reason i simple: the 
client might be right, the worker wrong ... The econd reason for backing 
the client's aspirations is that only through life itself can the client really 
try, test, and temper his abilities, his fantasies, and his goals ... This is how 
all people grow (p. 73). 
Seyer acknowledged that there are time when certain constraints or 
limitations on client freedoms may need to be applied. However, the dictionary 
meaning of the term "aspiration" is related to hope (Soanes & Stevenson, 2006) 
and hope is a core theme of recovery for mental health self-advocates (see below). 
Seyer' meaning of CSD in relation to social workers upholding clients' 
experiential learning in relation to elf-determined aspirations or hope may be one 
potential bridge to mental health self-advocates' vision of recovery. 
Malcolm Payne (2005) defined advocacy as seeking to "represent the 
interests of powerle s clients to powerful individuals and social structures" (p. 
266). He identified advocacy and empowerment as "increasingly being u ed as a 
terminology to reflect client self-determination and openness in other theories of 
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social work" (p. 266). However, advocacy by workers on behalf of clients is 
increasingly being questioned and, instead, there is growing support for workers 
to collaboratively advocate with clients or facilitate client self-advocacy. Reasons 
for the shift include: greater appreciation of the risk to clients by the worker 
influencing or overriding the client in determining the best course of action in 
advocacy (Biestek & Gehrig, 1978); differences between workers and clients in 
terms of their values and standpoints (e.g., differences in gender, ethnicity/race, 
class, and age) which may inappropriately affect advocacy efforts and outcomes 
for clients (Hodge, 2003); and the risk of workers focusing on clients' individual 
problems and solutions, while ignoring or avoiding tackling political/structural 
oppressive forces and processes (Spieker, 1990). 
Different absolutist CSD ethical perspectives in relation to means and 
ends, paternalism/ maternalism, competency and capacity, and advocacy typically 
challenge one another in texts. However, relativist views that have to recognize 
context -specific idiosyncrasies of ethical dilemmas are typical in texts concerned 
with actually applying social work ethics in practice (e.g., Rothman, 2005). Many 
ethical responsibilities are shared and reciprocal; they may be seen as resting with 
the worker(s), the client(s), members of a health care team, an agency, family, 
and/or society. Nevertheless, the ethical onus is on the professional social worker 
to be reflexive, to be transparent, and to be prepared to defend the decisions they 
make, including those decisions that promote, uphold, or limit CSD. 
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2.3.3.3 Client-centered CSD. These discussions focus les on professional 
ethics and more on the client or the front-line worker in terms of the clinically 
therapeutic potential of CSD in social work practice. Weick and Pope (1988) help 
illustrate the distinction between client- and worker-focused viewpoints: "much of 
the current literature on this topic [CSD] has deflected attention from the 
recognition of client capacity for growth and instead has emphasized the decisions 
of the social worker. This shift in attention is crucial for the practice of social 
work, because it establishes a worker-focused rather than a client-focused 
perspective for practice" (p. 10). There are three subcategories of client-focused 
CSD views: practice knowledge, client empowerment, and client choice. 
William Reid (2002) wrote that the most striking trend in social work 
practice knowledge over the past quarter-decade is the growing diversity of 
practice methods. Reid suggested that the postmodern discourse in social work is 
a main feature of the trend towards more strengths-based, multi-cultural, 
empowerment, anti-oppressive, solution-focused, and narrative approaches in 
mental health. He said that another trend associated with these approaches 
involves reformulations of the worker-client relationship that enhances CSD. Thjs 
included generally seeing persons as having greater strengths and resources to be 
self-directing and as "full collaborators who contribute expert knowledge of 
themselves and their situations to the intervention process" (p. 9). 
Francis Turner (1996a) compared 28 major social work practice theories 
and methods across 52 attributes. One attribute he exarruned was where each 
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theory stood on a "Freewill-Determination Continuum." Turner thought that four 
of the eleven theories and methods that he identified as strongly suppo11ing 
freewill had solid social work beginnings: client-centered; functional theory; 
problem-solving theory, and task-centered theory. At the same time, he judged the 
traditionally influential general systems theory in social work as strongly 
weighted towards workers being deterministic with clients. Fifteen of the theories 
were judged to be either "about equal" (10) or "strongly determined" (5). Overall, 
Turner's analysis suggests that social work practice models do not lean towards 
being deterministic with clients. Nevertheless, the findings are omewhat mixed. 
Client empowerment within the client-worker relation hip is often cited as 
an exemplar of CSD therapeutically in practice. Judith Lee (1996) said that 
historical precedents for empowerment practice in social work include the 
settlement house movement, women's clubs, minority groups, early group work 
theorists, and the work of Bertha Reynolds. Molly Hancock (1997) stated that 
empowerment in social work: "is closely related to - but is more than simply an 
application of- the principles of client self-determination" (p. 229). Barbara 
Simon (1990), writing from a feminist perspective, argued that social workers 
interested in client empowerment can at best only "aid and abet" those who seek 
their own "power of self-determination" (p. 32). Concepts of empowerment in 
relation to SD in mental health recovery point to social work theory, practice, and 
research aligning with the interests and aspirations of people with mental health 
issues or mental illness. Kristine Tower ( 1994) wrote: 
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If practitioners align themselves with the interests of consumers, including 
consumer input and control, the result will be greater self-determination 
among clients and less ethical discord regarding paternalism within the 
helping professions" (p. 196). 
The client choice and decision making subcategory is the most commonly 
referred to example of upholding CSD in practice. Felix Biestek (1957) developed 
the first widely accepted definition of CSD. He placed client choice and decision 
making as the primary proposition that defined CSD in social work: 
The principle of client self-determination is the practical recognition of the 
right and need of clients to freedom in making their own choices and 
decisions in the casework process. Caseworkers have a corresponding duty 
to respect that right, recognize that need, stimulate and help activate that 
potential for self-direction (p. 103). 
Biestek went on to say that the client's right to SD "is limited by the 
client's capacity for positive and constructive decision-making, by the framework 
of civil and moral law, and by the function of the agency" (p. 103). His definition 
was critiqued by some because the broad limitations rendered CSD as 
meaningless (Keith-Lucas, 1963; McDermott, 1975). 
The voluntary client-worker relationship has been held up as an example 
of supporting CSD in practice since Bertha Reynolds. Yaheskel Hasenfeld (1987) 
stated: "much of the emphasis in social work practice theory is on the formation 
of this relationship that is voluntary, mutual, reciprocal, and trusting" (p. 469). 
However, he went on to argue that social work is largely agency-based, that 
worker-client relationships are often involuntarily formed by many of these 
agencies, and that practice theory does not adequately acknowledge the power the 
agency has over the worker and, in tum, over the worker-client relationship. 
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Few social work practice models organized around CSD have been 
suggested. The few proposed have not been empirically developed and tested 
(e.g., Petr, 1988). I was able to find only one graphic representation of a CSD 
model to guide practice. Stephen Gilson and Elizabeth DePoy (2004) proposed a 
hypothetical model that they said helped contextually clarify constructs such as 
SD, choice, empowerment, and self-advocacy. The authors noted that they refer to 
their conceptualization as SD and not CSD because they deduced their model 
from the perspective of the disability consumer rather than from the perspective of 
the social work profession or the social worker in direct practice. The model 
consisted of three axes in the form of an equal sided triangle. Each axis is a 
continuum. One axis represented foundational knowledge and skills that a person 
has, another axis represented "thinking" in relation to decision making (ranging 
from external control over choices and decision making to autonomous decision 
making), and the third was "action" (ranging from silence at one end, through 
need identification, to advocacy, and self-advocacy at the other end) (p. 6-9). 
2.3.3.4 Summary. Social work has traditionally been more of an applied 
discipline than a theoretical one. Scholarly discussions of CSD in social work are 
characterized by attempts to develop idealized goals to influence the profession 
and ethical principles that can provide guidance and comparative references for 
operationalizing ideals in practice. Ethics can also help protect clients. However, 
there is no agreement on the operational meaning of CSD in social work practice 
Idealistic and ethical discussions of CSD circle around 
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compatibilist/incompatibilist views of the self in terms of free will or determinism 
and absolutist/relativist standpoints towards practice. The literature includes many 
references to the importance of understanding CSD in terms of clients' meanings, 
experiences, and outcomes. What is striking, however, is that there is virtually no 
research into the meaning(s) or purpose of SD from the viewpoint of clients. 
2.3.4 CSD Research in Social Work 
Using a variety of literature search methods, I found twenty-three research 
studies on CSD using qualitative, quantitative, or mixed methods that were 
publi hed over the past thirty years. The overwhelming majority of these studies 
examined social workers' beliefs, values, and/or behaviors in relation to deduced 
notions of CSD. For example, Jack Rothman, Wendy Smith, John Nakashima, 
Mary Anne Paterson, and Jean Mustin (1996) examined social workers' 
directiveness with clients among 35 experienced social workers in different 
practice fields that were randomly sampled from the field instructor pool of the 
UCLA School of Social Welfare. The first part of the study used in-depth 
interviews to examine the range of directiveness that participants used with their 
clients. The authors found there were four modes of worker directiveness with 
clients, ranging from least controlling to most controlling: reflective, suggestive, 
prescriptive, and determinative (i.e. , coercive). Case vignette were then elicited 
directly from the interviews. The second part of the study had an expert panel 
review the case vignettes and rate the ethical suitability of the degree of 
directiveness of workers in the vignettes. The study found that mo t workers 
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regularly used all four modes in their interactions with clients and that they were 
just as likely to be determinative with clients as reflective. The expert panel found 
that almost all the vignettes that involved reflective, suggestive, and determinative 
approaches were ethically suitable. The determinative mode was said to be clear-
cut because it involved cases where there were discemable risks to "health, safety, 
and welfare or legal prescriptions to act, as in abuse situation " (p. 402). 
However, they found that 17.6% of the cases where workers used a prescriptive 
mode were ethically unsuitable. I found no similar study that looked at the 
directiveness of social workers who had little or no experience in the field. 
2.3.4.1 SD research in mental health or addiction. Four of the twenty-
three CSD studies that I found concerned practice in mental health while only one 
concerned substance use or addiction (tobacco smoking). All ~he mental health 
studies explored social workers' attitudes towards supporting CSD in relation to 
involuntary hospitalization (i.e., involuntary commitment). The addiction study 
explored workers' attitudes towards CSD in relation to nursing home residents' 
choosing to smoke. 
Rita Wilk (1994) and Melissa Taylor (2006) randomly surveyed U.S. 
social workers who registered with the NASW as specializing in mental health. 
Wilk used a quantitative approach with Likert-item questions. Taylor used a 
mixed methodology approach with both Likert-item and open-ended questions. 
So-han Yip (2003) surveyed social workers and physicians involved in 
involuntary commitment review panels in British Columbia (also using Likert-
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item questions). The fourth mental health study used qualitative grounded theory 
methodology to explore mental health caseworkers' views of CSD in relation to 
their role in involuntary committing their clients to hospital (EncandeJa, Korr, 
Lidz, Mulvey, & Slawinski, 1999). Geri Adler, Michael Greeman, Holly Parker, 
and Michael Kuskowski (2002) randomly surveyed attitudes of nursing home 
social workers' in two U.S. states towards residents' choice to smoke. Again, they 
used Likert-item questions. 
All of the survey studies operationally defined CSD differently. Wilk 
focused on hospitalized psychiatric patient ' rights in five areas: involuntary 
commitment, environment and daily living choices, the right to treatment, the 
right to refuse treatment, and the presumption of legal incompetence. The degree 
of support for these rights was assumed to measure the degree of support for 
CSD. Taylor defined CSD in terms of client behavior emanating from his or her 
own "wishes, choices, and decisions" (p. 3). Her questions related to workers' 
attitudes towards CSD's utility and importance in practice, ethical conflicts 
involving CSD, and attitudinal changes towards CSD over time. Yip (2003) 
defined CSD in terms of autonomy and empowerment. Adler et al. (2002) defined 
CSD in relation to client rights to choose (in this case, to smoke in their 
residential "home"). They were interested in workers' support for such a right and 
workers' ethical concerns when client choice conflicted with some facilities' 
smoke-free policies. 
57 
Wilk found there was substantial support for the rights of the mentally ill 
among the social workers surveyed (N = 216). Overall, she found that the more 
abstract the CSD-related right was, the more respondents supported it; the more 
the right might directly impact on the social worker in some way, the less support 
it received (e.g., patients being able to examine his or her own records). Taylor 
found 97% (N = 320) rated CSD as important or very important in daily practice. 
There was not a high degree of distress reported by participants when practice 
situations seemed at odds with CSD, and they thought more about CSD in daily 
practice over time than when they first tarted in the field. Yip hypothesized that 
social work values of CSD would lead to more reports of ethical dilemmas among 
social workers than the physicians in relation to their respective involvement in 
panels that recommended continued involuntary hospitalization. Yip found that 
both social workers and physicians (N=39) had similar mixed feelings regarding 
autonomy and empowerment with respect to their panel involvement in coercive 
decisions. Adler et al. found that most social workers thought that residents did 
not have the right to choose to smoke and less than 14% (N = 113) ethically 
struggled with this position. Workers ' own smoking behaviors were found to 
significantly influence their attitudes, such as those who smoked were more likely 
to support residents ' right to decide in this area, or vice versa. 
The mental health study that used qualitative grounded theory 
methodology drew client data from a larger study looking into involuntary 
psychiatric hospitalizations in a U.S. state. From the subset of data, eleven 
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involuntary hospitalized clients' social work case managers were purposively 
interviewed about their discretionary use of power. John Encandela, Wayne Korr, 
Charles Lidz, Edward Mulvey, and Tonya Slawinski (1999) found that the case 
managers thought that CSD was a central practice value. However, there were 
widely divergent views as to how they should help clients be self-determining. No 
actual grounded theory was generated. The authors concluded that CSD was too 
broad to be consistently translated into practice. 
The studies share a number of traits. They include: defining CSD 
differently; focusing on professionals' attitudes and experiences in relation to 
CSD; focusing on most-restrictive environments and practices; and finding that 
attitudes largely supported CSD although its application in practice was of some 
concern due to the concept's vagueness or the perceived impact that upholding 
CSD might have on the worker. The Encandela et al. (1999) study's conclusion 
that CSD was too broad a concept to be consistently translated into practice is 
noteworthy because they do not consider the possibility that the clients could have 
helped clarify the value of CSD in practice. 
The fact that I found only one CSD study concerning addictive substance 
use in some way was surprising. It may be that CSD studies by social workers in 
the field of addiction are published in journal that I did not review. It may also 
reflect the low participation of social workers in this field or, arguably, a potential 
bias in the profession of some kind towards this field of practice. However, it is 
just as surprising that there are so few CSD studies in the mental health field 
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given the large numbers of social workers practicing in the area. Although I found 
no CSD studies that focused on CDs there was one that did appear to have some 
relevancy to this review. Sharon Lawn, Rene Pols and James Barber (2002) 
explored the meanings of cigarette smoking among people with a serious mental 
illness who were involved with one Australian community mental health agency. 
Grounded theory was used to guide interviews and the analysis of transcripts. The 
study did not report that there was an immediate health risk from smoking for any 
of the participants. One theme was that smoking was a means for participants to 
feel more in control of their lives. Participants also reported that giving or 
withholding cigarettes was sometimes used by professionals to control them. 
2.4 SD and the Mental Health Consumer/Survivor Movement 
Mental health typically refers to the emotional, behavioral, and cognitive 
functioning aspects of our lives. Mental illness or mental health disorders refer to 
a broad range of conditions involving emotions, behaviors, and cognitions that 
can negatively impact on us and/or others. Severe mental illness generally refers 
to conditions that persist over time and have a severe functional impact. A formal 
medical illness or disorder diagnosis is identified by symptom classification. The 
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Health Disorders, Fourth Edition, 
Text Revised or DSM-IV-TR (American Psychiatric Association, 2000) is an 
authoritative source of criteria for symptom classification and categorical or 
differential diagnosis in North America. 
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There are many controversies associated with the concept and diagnosis of 
mental illness. At the most basic level is the question of whether mental illness 
exists at all or if it is a socially constructed designation or "label" that is based 
mostly on the subjectivity of the observer of the person and observer-subjectivity 
encompasses risks of biases as ociated with prejudice, stigma, and superstition 
(e.g., Szasz, 1974). Nevertheless, most people accept that we can be challenged 
in many ways, and that our lives could be potentially at risk, with conditions 
associated with conceptualizations of mental illness or mental health disorders. 
The classifications typically have some validity for social workers who, in the 
final analysis, are concerned with personal and social functioning of individuals, 
families, various social groups and other collectives. 
Defining substance use issues or problems as a "disease" is also 
controversial (e.g., Peele, 1989). As with issues of mental illness, biased 
judgments and the stigma experienced by people with addiction issues can focus 
on an individual's responsibility for developing problems in the first place, and/or 
make an association between addiction and immorality (Barber, 1994). 
Nevertheless, substance use disorders and other behaviors associated with the 
notion of addiction are recognized as being often unhealthy and can put a person's 
life at risk. People tend to use non-medical terms like "addiction", "alcoholic" or 
"addict" to describe persistent and compulsive behaviors, psychoactive substance 
use, significant negative experiences (e.g., withdrawal) occurring when substance 
use is suddenly cut down significantly or stopped, and/or the progressive and 
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pervasive impacts on personal and social functioning associated with continued 
use. This designation is roughly the same as the DSM-IV-TR medical 
classification of a substance dependence disorder. The DSM-IV-TR also identifies 
substance abuse disorder where problematic symptoms are less severe or 
verifiable but can be interpreted as problematic or putting the person and/or others 
at some future risk. Addiction may also be used to refer to some patterns of 
behaviors that do not involve substances but are still similar in terms of their 
impulsivity, compulsiveness, and negative consequences (e.g., some eating 
disorders, problem gambling, and obsessive sexual, internet, or shopping 
behaviors). As previously stated, addiction issues have not been historically 
treated within most primary health care and/or mental health programs and 
services. This situation has persisted despite substance dependence being affirmed 
as a disease by North American medical associations. 
As stated in Chapter 1, research suggests that people with mental health 
disorders are more at risk of developing substance use disorders than the general 
population (Meuser, Drake, & Wallach, 1998; Health Canada, 2001). 
Consequently, pressure is mounting on various health care, mental health care, 
and addiction systems, programs, and practitioners across North America to 
improve CDs treatment. Changes called for include treatment providers in both 
systems to work more directly with both issues, and to work less independently or 
in isolation from each other (Health Canada, 2001). 
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SD is not a term that is typically used, historically, in addictions theory, 
practice, or among people who self-identify being in recovery from substance use 
problems. However, notions of SD are important for many historically 
marginalized and oppressed groups in North America. This includes individual 
and collective self-advocacy activities by people with physical disabilities, 
developmental disabilities, and mental illness. Collectively, these groups are often 
considered under the umbrella of the disabled rights movement (Stroman, 2003). 
Mental health self-advocates may refer to themselves as "consumer/survivors." 
This term is not necessarily a comfortable one for all self-advocates in mental 
health but it is often used in writings in this area. Generally speaking, 
"consumers" are considered to include people who tend to work collaboratively 
with family advocates, professionals, policy and program developers and so forth 
while the term "survivors" originally referred to those who saw themselves as 
having survived the treatment system as much as surviving the illness itself. 
Survivors tend to work outside the system and emphasize the recognition and 
upholding of basic civil rights for people with mental illness (Stroman, 2003). The 
consumer/survivor movement often refers to SD and self-direction as part of 
peoples' subjective vision of recovery that is not defined, directed, and evaluated 
solely by experts and authorities (Tomes, 2006). 
A mental health self-advocacy recovery vision arose in the last twenty 
years amid a renewed emphasis on deinstitutionalization and recognition of the 
rights of the disabled. William Anthony (1993) described this recovery as "the 
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development of new meaning and purpose in one's life as one grows beyond the 
catastrophic effects of mental illness" (p. 11). Nancy Tomes (2006) saw the 
consumer/survivor movement as highly diverse and often divided over many 
issues. For example, some self-advocates might argue that involuntary treatment 
or compulsory medication programs lessen suffering in some cases while others 
argue they sabotage SD, channel public funds into corporate profits and 
professional salaries, and direct resources away from quality of life approaches 
that include affordable housing, fostering employment, and other social services. 
Despite the diversity of opinion, Tomes suggested that there is substantial 
consensus around a number of key ideas, including: "self-determination is a core 
principle of treatment" (p. 727). 
Judith Cook and Jessica Jonikas (2002) saw mental illness recovery as not 
being about symptom cure or control. Instead it is about "learning to cope .. .in a 
way that allows the individual dignity, maximal self-determination, and the 
highest level of role functioning possible" (p. 311). Ruth Ralph (2000) discussed 
the role of empowerment and SD in recovery. She suggested that empowerment is 
a matter of SD and it occurs when the person can freely choose her or his own 
path to recovery and well-being. The Self-Direction Education Project (2004) 
stated that self-direction operationalizes five principles of a recovery-based 
philosophy of SD: (1) the freedom to decide how to live one's life; (2) the 
authority to control dollars that are available to purchase services and supports; 
(3) the supports needed to make informed decisions; (4) the responsible use of 
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supports and assistance; and (5) the participation of people with mental illness in 
the design, implementation, and evaluation of programs and systems (p. 1). 
There is no single meaning of SD in the recovery movement. The 
ambiguity is consistent with the movement's emphasis on peoples' subjective 
perceptions of recovery, seeing people with mental illness as individually unique, 
and respecting their experiential knowledge (Stroman, 2003). However, this 
means that defining and operationalizing the concept of SD beyond general 
principles and values may be just as challenging within the mental health self-
advocacy movement as it is in social work, psychology, and philosophy. 
Nevertheless, self-advocates are increasingly able to meaningfully participate in 
the debate on the meaning(s) of SD and bow it is or is not integrated into 
treatment and recovery activities. 
2.4.1 Consumer Focused Research and CDs 
One of the important changes in the mental health treatment arena over the 
past decade has been the growing awareness of, and respect being given to, the 
voices of mental health self-advocates, patients, or clients (Tomes, 2006). A 
growing number of professionals, including many social workers, are aligning 
with self-advocates and calling for greater collaborative relationships with clients 
in treatment (Anthony, 1993; Bentley, 1993; Tower, 1994; Munetz & Frese, 
2001) and research (Sullivan, 1994; Wilson & Beresford, 2000; Jacobson & 
Greenley, 2001; Tumer-Crowson & Wallcraft, 2002). Of particular importance to 
this view of practice and research is the demand that professionals respectfully 
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include the experiential knowledge that people gain through living with a mental 
illness, creating their own vision of recovery, and being on the receiving end of 
treatment. Consumer/survivor self-advocates are generally supportive of research 
concerned with better helping people with mental health issues or symptoms of 
mental illness. However, they reject non-disabled professionals and academics 
monopolizing the meanings of technical knowledge, commanding how public 
funds for services are spent, pre-determining recovery goals, controlling 
·evaluations of treatment and recovery outcomes (Stroman, 2003), and ignoring 
the damage that negative labeling can cause in association with being diagnosed 
with a mental illness (Frese, 1998; Munetz & Frese, 2001). 
A few qualitative studies of people's experiences and meanings of 
recovery have been published (e.g., Deegan, 2003; Jenkins & Carpenter-Song, 
2006; Deegan, 2007). For example, Patricia Ridgway (2001) used a 
phenomenological approach to analyze texts of four self-advocates who had 
written extensively about their experiences. Key recovery themes identified in 
these texts included: rekindling hope not despair; achieving acceptance and 
understanding of symptoms within a positive sense of self; reengaging and 
actively participating in life; recognizing recovery is complex, individually 
unique, non-predictive, and non-linear; and recovery is not accomplished alone. I 
found no studies that focused on SD and CDs from a mental health 
consumer/survivor perspective. 
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The self-help Alcoholics Anonymous (AA) movement has referred to 
recovery since its inception in the nineteen-thirties (White, 2005). AA avoids 
scientific definitions. For example, its view of alcoholism or addiction as an 
expression of a "disease" associated with an external agent, much like an allergy, 
is not defended to others in scientific terms and the movement maintains an arms-
length relationship with treatment professionals and researchers. Recovery's 
meaning is personal to each member and is revealed within a personal exploration 
of themselves through the program's twelve principles or "steps" (AA, 1988). AA 
participation is voluntary, is structured, and directive. Abstinence is one pre-
determined goal of recovery. AA is not associated with political calls for greater 
SD in addiction treatment. There are 12 step programs emerging that are geared 
specifically to people with CDs (Evans & Sullivan, 2000). 
2.4.2 Summary 
There is a trend towards valuing and incorporating client knowledge in 
mental health treatment and research. The consumer/survivor movement's valuing 
peoples' subjectivity and SD in mental health recovery appears to allow for 
people to make self-determined and self-directed decisions about addiction issues. 
There are similarities between the mental health self-advocacy movement and AA 
views of recovery. However, one major difference may be AA's emphasis on 
abstinence as a pre-determined goal of recovery whereas mental health self-
advocates appear to avoid pre-determined goals beyond improved quality of life 
and safety. Perhaps most important is that people living with, and recovering 
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from, mental illness have greater opportunities to meaningfully participate in the 
larger debate over evolving treatment services and supports. This includes people 
living with and recovering from CDs, given the fact that CDs are, arguably, a 
typical rather than atypical issue for people with mental illness. 
2.5 Conclusion 
There are other important conceptualizations of the self and/or SD such as 
those found in sociology, politics, and health care bioethics. For example, 
sociologist Erving Goffman ( 1922-1982) studied and wrote about how each 
individual self is socially affected and is expected to act or play a specific social 
role that changes in different micro-environmental contexts or spaces, including 
"patient" roles in psychiatric hospitals or asylums (1961). Another sociologist, 
Norman Denzin, studied and wrote about the "alcoholic self' and the "recovering 
self' from the phenomenological perspective of AA members (1993). He defined 
the alcoholic self as: "a self divided against itself, trapped within the negative 
emotions that alcoholism produces" (p. 373). 
Political SD meanings surfaced in the early nineteen-hundreds. Woodrow 
Wilson linked SD with promoting international democratic practices and 
institutions after WW I (Lansing, 1921). Hitler subsequently referred to SD as 
justification to invade and "liberate" German-speaking people in Czechoslovakia, 
Austria, and Poland (Ronen, 1979). The United Nations Charter (1945) 
repatriated SD and it is now a significant political concept in international 
relations, law, and human rights (Kly & Kly, 2001). In Canada, political SD 
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meanings are an important part of the Quebec sovereignty movement and 
advancing the collective rights of First Nations people (Kly & Kly, 2001). 
Finally, concepts of SD have emerged in U.S. health care in association 
with "right to die" directives and euthanasia debates (Ulrich, 1999). Autonomy is 
often a SD ynonym in bioethics with respect to patients' right to be educated 
about their illness, patient rights to be informed of treatment choices, and patients' 
treatment decision-making powers being supported and facilitated (Beauchan1p & 
Childress, 2001). In this context, SD includes the use of advance directives in the 
event of incapacitation due to injury or physical/mental illnes es. A number of 
health care researchers have investigated many aspects and notions of patient SD 
over the last 15 years (e.g., Sansone & Phillips, 1995; Blondeau, Valois, 
Keyserlingk, & Lavoie, 1998; Eisemann & Richter, 1999; Srebnick et al., 2003). 
Nursing in particular has promoted the idea of patient SD in health care (e.g., 
Gadow, 1989) and nurse researchers have qualitatively explored mental health or 
addiction patients' meanings and expressions of SD (e.g., Valimaki & Leino-
Kilpi, 1998; Boyd & Mackey, 2000; McCann & Clark, 2004). Common themes 
among these studies' fmdings include SD being a multi-faceted concept and 
participants valuing SD despite negative consequences sometime arising from 
exercising it. However, the meaning of SD in nursing was described by Maritta 
Valimaki (1998) as "slippery and complex" and patients' views are often not 
included in defining and operationalizing it in practice (p. 59). 
69 
There are also key "stakeholders" that have not been discussed but are 
important to meanings of SD in CDs treatment. Most important are families and 
loved ones of people living with, and recovering from, CD (Health Canada, 
2001). The fact that there are many other important view of the self and SD 
supports the main theme underlying this literature review: meaning of self and/or 
SD have been, and continue to be, highly subjective, highly contested, and highly 
confu ing within and between academic fields and applied practice disciplines. 
Deduced, abstract meanings of SD show no traction in enhancing understanding 
of the concept in CDs treatment and recovery. The main theme of the literature 
review underlies my choice to employ qualitative grounded theory re earch to 
inductively explore the meanings of SD among people living with, and recovering 
from, CD . Giving people with CD opportunitie to meaningfully contribute to 
discussions about SD in treatment and recovery seems reasonable, long overdue, 
and potentially critical to better under tanding the concept. 
Interest in CSD appears to be strong among mental health social workers 
(Taylor, 2006). However, as already mentioned, its meaning in social work is 
complex, typically vague, and continuously debated. Despite my belief that there 
is something very important held somewhere within the concept in ocial work; 
nevertheless, the scholarly debate have led me personally to feel frustrated with 
all the arbitrarily deduced meanings vying to influence me, and, in turn clients, in 
practice. This ha fueled my intere t in better understanding the concept through 
my doctoral studies and dissertation research. 
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Finally, mental health self-advocates give SD prominence in their 
subjective vision of recovery (Deegan, 2007). There may be a potential nexus 
between mental health self-advocates' meanings of SD and CSD in social work. 
This nexus could offer opportunities (and challenges) for social workers to better 
assist people with mental health difficulties. However, it appears to require social 
workers to seek to understand and work with clients' own meaning(s) of SD in 
relation to recovery rather than define it for them. Further, addiction issues need 
to be integrated because of the prevalence of CDs among people living with and 
recovering from mental illnesses. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
Methodology and Methods 
3.1 Introduction 
Thomas Kuhn (1970) described scientific paradigms as worldviews 
through which all knowledge is filtered. An anti-metaphysical positivist or logical 
positivist paradigm has tended to dominate empirical research in the natural and 
social sciences over the last fifty years (Bloom, 1995; Guba & Lincoln, 2004). A 
positivist paradigm emphasizes the verification of a priori cause-effect 
relationships among variables considered to be objective, and their mathematical 
representation. Recently, there have been other empirical research paradigms 
gaining acceptance. Egon Guba and Yvonne Lincoln (2004) compared four 
currently important research paradigms in sociology across different variables: 
positivism, where an independent reality is "real" and can only be captured 
through certain research methods; "post-positivism," where there is an 
independent reality but it can only be understood imperfectly; critical theories, 
where reality is "virtual" and shaped by social, political, cultural, economic, 
ethnic, and/or gender values; and constructivism, where realities are local, 
personally subjective, and transactional or co-constructed in social interactions. In 
social work, many argue that using a variety of empirical research methods and 
methodologies can potentially contribute to a deeper, richer body of knowledge 
and understanding of a phenomenon (Patton, 2002). However, choosing an 
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appropriate research methodology depends on it being logically defendable as an 
optimal approach to answering the research question. 
3.2 Choice of Research Design 
Inductive methodologies are conducive to exploring socio-behavioral 
phenomena that are poorly understood because the goal is to increa e 
understanding, especially in terms of identifying patterns that may point to some 
larger principles (Babbie & Benaquisto, 2002). These principles can then be 
further explored and tested through subsequent qualitative and/or quantitative 
research approaches. In this way, a body of knowledge can be systematically built 
up that is empirically grounded. Francis Bacon (1939 [1620]) characterized the 
epistemology of science as a series of inductive steps from the experiential (i.e., 
empirical) "particulars" to a series of higher level "axiom" generalizations or 
conceptualizations of the phenomena being studied (p. 71). Inductive empirical 
inquiry is optimally suited to re earch into under tanding the treatment and 
recovery experiences for people with CDs because assisting people with CDs is 
an area that is newly emerging, poorly understood, complex, and interdisciplinary 
(Co-occurring Center of Excellence, 2006a). As was noted in the previous 
chapter, notions of SD are consistently referred to in the literature as multi-
dimensional in nature. Janice Morse and Seung Eun Chung (2003) noted that 
multi-dimensional abstract concepts are suited to inductive empirical inquiry that 
includes using qualitative methods. Qualitative methods are also considered to be 
particularly suited for exploring subjective experiences (O'Connor, 2001). 
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Consequently, I have concluded that qualitative methodology and methods are 
appropriate to answer this study's research question: How are meanings of SD, 
among sampled people in the south-eastern region of Ontario who self-report 
living with CDs, perceived in their treatment and recovery experience? 
3.3 Qualitative Grounded Theory 
My research interest in an inductive approach included remaining clo e to 
the subjective perspectives of participants. A number of qualitative research 
approaches are conducive to studying subjective lived experience and meanings. 
Narrative (e.g., Hurwitz, Grenhalgh, & Skultans, 2003) and phenomenological 
designs (e.g., van Manen, 1990; Moustakas, 1994) were considered. However, my 
interest also included the consideration of building bridges between peoples' own 
SD meanings, the concept of CSD in social work, and CSD enhancements as 
expressed in the understandings of people who are personally experienced in 
living with CDs, receiving treatment services, and in recovery. This bridge-
building could help to improve social work practice that aims to help people with 
CDs recover in ways that are more respectful to their rights and needs. This 
interest moved me away from solely describing subjective meanings of SD. 
Another consideration was my interest in the systematic development of 
understandings that would include future examinations of other relevant views of 
SD in CDs treatment and recovery, such as family members and loved ones. 
Exploring and describing the meanings of SD in treatment and recovery 
experiences among various stakeholders directly involved or affected by 
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symptoms of CDs could help social workers, whose professional values include 
CSD, better understand the client experience, clients' relationships, and ultimately 
inform more comprehensive recovery-oriented CDs theory and practice. 
Consequently, qualitative grounded theory methodology was chosen due to its 
inductive approach to understanding the experiential meanings of research 
participants, while also facilitating systematic theory development. The 
approach's attention to dynamic themes of process in analysis is an added benefit. 
Mental health self-advocates favor the argument that treatment and recovery are 
linked to dynamic processes of improving quality of life rather than static views 
of symptomatic states. 
The grounded theory approach was developed by Barney Glaser and 
Anselm Strauss (1967). Grounded theory methodology and methods have been 
used by social workers to investigate a wide array of issues and concerns. 
Deborah O'Connor (2001) positioned qualitative grounded theory as an inductive 
methodology that is representative of the interpretive perspective in social work 
research. This perspective sees any theoretical statements as an interpretive 
portrayal of what is studied but not an objective universally "true" picture of an 
independent reality. O'Connor described grounded theory as representative of a 
bridge or a "middle ground" that rejects many aspects of cia sic positivism but 
maintains the position that researchers "need to avoid the subjectivity and error of 
na1ve inquiry through the judicious use of method" (p. 140). Kathy Charmaz 
(2004) also saw qualitative grounded theory as providing a bridge among research 
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methodologies. She emphasized that grounded theory is a systematic 
interpretative view of the research process that begins with and develops analyses 
from the viewpoint of the experiencing person. Charmaz (2006) further delineated 
constructivist interpretive qualitative grounded theory methodology; this view 
suggested that theory is not so much discovered as constructed. Consequently, 
researcher reflexivity is important with respect to their own interpretative paths 
and products, as well reflecting upon those of research participants. 
This study seeks to explore, describe, and systematically organize data in 
such a way as to generate concepts of SD that remain grounded in participants' 
retrospective experiences of CDs treatment and recovery. Through statements of 
relationship, the concepts are organized into an integrated theory that can be used 
to account for participants' meanings of SD. The results are not generalizable 
beyond the people, time, and place of the study. The results hope to offer heuristic 
value to social work research and practice in relation to enhancing understanding 
of SD in CDs treatment and recovery (i.e., heuristic in the sense that it serves to 
indicate or stimulate investigation as well as potentially helping solve problems in 
practice but there is no guarantee of success). Ultimately, this study hopes to 
contribute to the systematic development of further research questions and inquiry 
that aims to better understand and assist people facing the challenges of CDs. 
3.3.1 Application of Grounded Theory Methodology 
Methods are a set of procedures and techniques for gathering and 
analyzing data. Qualitative methods include sampling and analyzing observations, 
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interviews, and/or written texts (Berg, 2001). Interviewing is a form of directed 
conversation that facilitates the in-depth exploration of participants' meanings of 
experiences (Charmaz, 2006). In this study, in-depth interviewing was the 
primary means of data collection. In-depth interviewing was chosen to allow for 
issues and meanings associated with SD to emerge, be explored, and clarified 
(Babbie & Benaquisto, 2002). The researcher was the primary data gathering 
instrument. Data analysis followed procedures and principles outlined by Strauss 
and Corbin (1998) and Charmaz (2006). 
3.3.1.1 Approach to the literature. As mentioned in Chapter Two, the use 
of the literature in a qualitative grounded theory study is different than in 
quantitative studies. For example, one purpose of the literature review in 
quantitative studies is to describe and support the deductive hypothesis to be 
tested. Except for editing, the review is usually completed prior to data collection. 
The literature review here was written in concert with the findings and discussion 
chapters. Literature is used in this study to: orient the reader to relevant concepts, 
issues, and debates in the literature; provide transparency to the reader of my 
perspective of the area of enquiry that led to the choice of research methodology; 
set the stage for the presentation of the analysis of the findings; and to discuss in 
relation to the findings (Strauss & Corbin, 1998; Charmaz, 2006). 
3.3.1.2 Researcher preconceptions. As much as possible, being reflexive 
or critically aware of my preconceptions to the area of study is important because 
of the potential for such preconceptions to drift the analysis away from remaining 
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grounded in the data (Strauss & Corbin, 1998). Reflexivity, as well as 
transparency with the reader, can help minimize the harm of such preconceptions 
on the research process and data interpretation. As mentioned in Chapter One, a 
major potential source of preconceptions is associated with my CDs clinical 
experience or location. My experience may help sensitize me to the participants 
and the research area but it may also influence my direction of questioning, 
management of the interview process, analysis, and/or interpretation. Another 
potential source is my past exposure to social work meanings of CSD and debates 
as to its meaning in the social work literature. This background could help me 
appreciate the challenges people with CDs face in relation to SD and treatment, 
but it could also influence my conceptualizations of participants' meanings. For 
example, my personal experience as a practicing social worker in health care 
includes exposure to the common bioethical assumption that SD means individual 
autonomy. I found myself often assuming this meaning when I was writing. A 
third major source is associated with my social location as a "white and middle 
class", middle-aged male who has not personally experienced being a client of 
addiction or mental illness treatment services, or having a disability. Despite my 
attempts to remain reflexive to my social location in relation to theory building; 
nevertheless, readers of the findings and discussion are encouraged to keep my 
social location in mind. Researcher reflexivity is one way of attending to 
researcher preconceptions influencing the research process. Other aspects of 
ensuring research rigor are discussed below. 
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3.3.1.3 Sampling. Strauss and Corbin (1998) stated that when building 
theory inductively, the sampling concern is with "the representativeness of 
concepts and how concepts vary dimensionally" (p. 214). They referred to 
purposive "theoretical sampling" as completed when categories of concepts are 
saturated (i.e., no new substantive concepts or categories are emerging with 
further sampling). The authors go on to say that the number of participants needed 
to fulfill theoretical sampling cannot be arbitrarily determined with certainty 
before beginning a study. I estimated that between eight and sixteen participants 
would be needed based on the experiences reported in other publi hed research 
studies using this method. Eight adults subsequently participated in this study. 
Purposive sampling was used to recruit participants. Purposive sampling 
reflects the non-representative selection of a sample based on my knowledge of 
the population and the purpose of the study (Babbie & Benaquisto, 2002). This 
study's purposive sampling approach reflected the inclusion of participants who 
represented negative case examples, such as two participants' non-substance 
related addictions. Another participant did not agree with his professional 
diagnoses and did not identify himself as having a mental illness or substance use 
problem per se, although he was engaged in monitoring and managing both his 
mental health in relation to "stress" and alcohol use. The purposive sampling 
approach also included identifying a certain geographical location and means of 
accessing potential participants that needed to be distant from where I worked 
professionally for ethical reasons. Consequently, a peer support program was 
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contacted in a locale that was separate and distant from where I lived and worked. 
The peer support program had a number of satellite drop-in centers across a large 
geographical area. There was a combination of rural and mall urban environs in 
the sampling area. I met with the program's administrators, gave a presentation to 
the peer support staff, visited satellite drop-in centers across their region, and 
provided written materials explaining the study in more detail and how to contact 
me. The program supported my inquiry, let people know about the study, and 
helped potential participants to get in touch with me. Sampling occurred in 3 
separate locales: a medium sized city and two small towns. 
Participation criteria were ethically necessary to ensure participant safety. 
Criteria were broad and inclusive: (1) any person over 21 years of age and who 
was comfortable speaking English; (2) who self-identified as having experienced 
symptoms of CDs; and (3) who was not currently experiencing symptoms of 
suicide ideation, homicidal behavior, paranoia, or any other potential symptoms 
or circumstances that could have impacted on their ability, at that time, to safely 
participate. I met in person or spoke on the phone with potential participants to 
discuss the criteria, explain the study further, answer any questions, and give the 
person a chance to know me. An explanatory letter was provided (Appendix I) 
and a consent form to participate was reviewed (Appendix II). Participation was 
voluntary and based on mutual agreement. Consent forms were signed and copies 
given to each person prior to interviewing. 
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Participants chose the locations where initial and follow-up interviews 
were conducted. Their convenience of time, place, and comfort level were 
primary considerations. Interviews were done in a manner designed to protect the 
confidentiality and anonymity of those interviewed. Three people requested both 
interviews be done in a private space at one of the peer support program's 
locations. One of these three chose to also have a support person be with her 
during the follow-up interview. After the first interview was at a peer support 
program location, one person requested that the follow-up interview occur at 
another location. Two requested to meet for both interviews in neutral office 
locations. Two asked for both interviews to occur in their home. 
Permission was granted for all but one interview to be digitally recorded. 
One participant wanted to do the initial interview in a written format. This was 
done in four staggered sections of questions from the interview guide (Appendix 
ill) that facilitated the que tioning unfolding based on the responses of each 
previous set. The person agreed to meet and have the follow-up interview 
recorded. Follow-up interviews were scheduled within three weeks of initial 
interviews. One follow-up interview occurred outside this time period due to 
weather and the physical health of the participant. The digitally recorded 
interviews were transferred onto my personal computer. I transcribed all 
interviews. The staggered written responses from the one initial non-recorded 
interview were combined into a single transcript for analysis. The transcriptions 
provided the raw data for analysis. Six participants requested to keep a copy of 
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their first interview transcript after reviewing it. All but one participant requested 
a copy of the findings summary. I was unable to reach one person who had 
requested a summary. The remaining six received a summary. 
3.3.1.4 Participants. Three males and five female participated. Ages 
ranged from twenty-seven to fifty-nine. No participants identified themselves as 
being part of a particular ethnic or cultural group outside of being "Canadian". 
Mental health and substance use disorder diagnoses varied a great deal in relation 
to symptom and different substance being a problem. Mo t participants also had 
a broader view of what could be a problem or addictive substance for an 
individual in recovery than what is generally discussed in the literature. For 
example, one person identified "pop" as the only substance she had ever been 
addicted to but she had been treated for a non-substance addiction is ue associated 
with sexual behaviors (she was included in the study). Another participant spoke 
of needing to avoid "red dye" in proce ed food because it worsened hi attention 
deficit symptoms. 
3.3.1.5 Saturation. Saturation was considered to have been achieved after 
eight participants. Charmaz (2006) said that saturation occurs when "fresh data no 
longer sparks new theoretical insight , nor reveals new propertie of your core 
theoretical categories" (p. 113). Strau and Corbin (1998) referred to aturation 
as "reaching the point in the research where collecting additional data seems 
counterproductive; the 'new' that is uncovered does not add that much more to 
82 
the explanation at this time" (p. 136). Both note that determining saturation is 
somewhat arbitrary and evaluating the value of "new" is a matter of degree. 
Sampling was considered to be saturated after eight participants. The 
grounded theory was supported by existing data analysis and was found to be able 
to accommodate participants' unique ubjective meanings of SD. The grounded 
theory encompasses a fusion of interrelated elements, processes, and power that 
uniquely and subjectively contribute to a person's meaning of SD in relation to 
CDs. An attempt was made to theoretically sample another male to explore and 
compare in more detail potential gender differences and similarities in meanings 
of SD. Two males subsequently expressed interest. Through discu sion of the 
research project, one male did not feel safe with discussing a pects of his past and 
the other male' work situation suddenly made it a problem to meet. Theoretically 
sampling more male participants was not pursued for feasibility reasons as it 
could have required going to a new geographical region, making linkage with a 
different peer support program, and gaining approval for changes from Memorial 
University's research ethics committee. Exploring possible differences in 
meanings of SD in terms of gender and other characteristics, including 
ethnicity/race and age is recommended in Chapter Six. 
3.3.1.6 Research interviews. The emphasis on understanding participants' 
meanings and the complex nature of SD as a concept led to designing the study 
with an initial interview focused on exploration and a subsequent follow-up 
interview for participant confirmation, clarification, and augmentation of 
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meanings in the initial interview transcript (i.e. , "member checking"). The second 
interview also gave me the opportunity to ask follow-up and clarification 
questions to expand and advance my understanding based on an analysis of the 
first interview text. This allowed me to question emerging theoretical categories 
and dimen ions based on the analysis of previous participants' data as the 
interviewing of new participants progressed. The average recorded length of the 
first interview was 85 minutes. The follow-up interview average was 68 minute . 
A semi-structured interview guide was used because of the ambiguous, 
abstract nature of SD meanings in the literature and SD not being a term generally 
used by people in every-day language. Open-ended questions were developed 
(Appendix ITI). Questions were based on my practice experience, conversations 
with consumer/survivor self-advocates, and sampling of the literature - especially 
texts associated with social work and the consumer/survivor movement. 
Three mental health consumer staff members of a mental health peer 
support program in a locale separate and distant from the participant sampling 
locale agreed to sit on a Peer Support Advisory Committee. The committee 
represented another attempt to mitigate researcher bias. The questions were 
reviewed by this committee for bias and refinement. The list was used as a 
common pool of possible questions I could draw from as initial interviews 
unfolded. Questions attempted to cast as wide a net as possible in terms of giving 
participants open-ended opportunities to respond. This included giving people 
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opportunities to comment on their meanings of SD in relation to gender, the 
physical environment, urban-rural locales, and cultural considerations. 
3.3.1.7 Data analysis. Strauss and Corbin (1998) suggested that qualitative 
grounded theory data analysis methods involve a series of discrete coding 
activities or procedures. The authors emphasized that coding, in action, is a 
"dynamic and fluid process" that involves repeated comparisons and questioning 
between new raw data and the data already analyzed into conceptual themes and 
categories (p. 101). The interaction between collection and analysis occurs 
throughout the sampling process until a full range of categories are identified and 
relationships are established between them that contribute to the theoretical 
whole. Charmaz's (2006) description of coding is similarly outlined. Printed 
transcripts texts were open coded using the traditional "cut and paste" method. 
Computer software packages automate the coding, indexing, retrieving, and 
storing of qualitative data. There is some concern that their use can sacrifice in-
depth analysis of data despite their potential advantages (Hesse-Biber, 2004). 
Computer coding software was considered and rejected as I was looking for the 
fullest immersion in the data as possible. 
The first participant reviewed his initial interview transcript and answered 
further questions in February, 2007. Getting information out about the study, 
connecting with potential participants, and interviewing continued until 
November 2007 when saturation was considered to be achieved. Data analysis 
continued until the dissertation thesis was completed and submitted. The initial 
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semi-structured interview guide remained the primary pool of questions used in 
initial interviews. Reflexive memos were written about issue and ideas arising 
throughout the interviewing proces , including possible way to improve the 
interviewing process with subsequent participants, my clinical and ocial location 
potentially impacting on interpretations, obvious "in vivo" code words arising in 
the early tran cripts, and early ideas of potential categories and ub-categories. 
I came to understand the dynamic nature and fluidity of data analysi right 
through to the i completion. For example, I wrote a literature review draft prior 
to beginning the study. The draft did not highlight the importance of the meaning 
of the "self' to meanings of SD; I apparently saw SD more as a conceptual whole. 
It was only after the second participant spoke of how adding her meaning of 
"self' onto "determination" had dramatically affected her under tanding that I 
started to con ider the primary importance of subjective meaning of the elf in 
relation to meanings of SD. This led me to re-examine meaning of SD in the 
literature. I found that scholarly texts and re earch findings in social work also 
appeared to overlook the potential importance of subjective meanings of "self' in 
under tanding what SD (or CSD) might mean. The importance of meanings of 
self in under tanding SD was confirmed and enriched with further ampling. 
Participant ' sense of self became the initial organizing concept in data analysis. 
Microanalysis begins immediately in grounded theory with the first 
transcribed interview. It involves open or non-selective identification of discrete 
concepts (i.e., each concept as a labeled phenomenon), reported actions, or 
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reported events through line-by-line examination of words, phrases, and/or 
sentences in the raw data interview transcript. Sampling was paused after follow-
up interviews for the first three interviews were completed. Pausing allowed for 
focusing more on microanalysis after consultation with members of the thesis and 
advisory committees. 
Conceptualizing is the first step in theory building and involves the 
grouping of similar "events, happenings, and objects under a common heading or 
classification" (Strauss & Corbin, p. 103). An example from this study involved 
the first two participants making references to the importance of notions of 
"stubbornness", "being determined", and "commitment" in relation to meanings 
of SD. These notions eventually were incorporated into one of three components 
making up subjective meanings of SD. It is referred to as being determined (the 
other components are the standpoint of self and determining processes). 
As interviewing and analysis was resumed, rough written notes were often 
developed into memos to help generate, and further question, potential groupings. 
Comparisons were continuously made between the tentative categories of like-
concepts (i.e., codes) already being considered and newly emerging phenomena. 
If newly emerging phenomena shared some facet or characteristic with any 
existing category (e.g., "stubbornness" and "loyalty") then it was placed there. If 
not, then a new tentative classification was created; Charmaz (2006) referred to 
this stage of early coding as "focused coding" (p. 57). The identification of early 
categories leads to considering the range of their potential meanings, their 
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properties, and their associated dimensions. This helps re-examine the degree of 
"fit" among concepts placed within each category and the further specification of 
each category's sub-categories that denote such things as "where, when, why, and 
how a phenomenon is likely to occur" (Strauss & Corbin, 1998, p. 121). 
The naming of categories also begins to occur, often associated with 
researcher knowledge, researcher insight, or words/phrases within the raw data 
that are particularly striking. For example, "will" was initially considered as the 
name for the component that eventually became "being determined." Will was not 
ultimately chosen because only one participant referred to it specifically (in 
relation to "will power") and also because of the potential influence of 
preconceptions associated with this historically powerful but vague Western term 
on the reader. 
Microanalysis often involves axial coding. This method focuses on 
identifying and understanding how sub-categories relate to the category they have 
been grouped into. Strauss and Corbin (1998) suggested that axial coding helps 
reassemble the broken down raw data categories and their subcategories into 
some early sense of the whole. Diagramming can help map out their connections. 
They also suggested that axial coding adds to the record of the analytic process, 
thereby helping make the interpretive process more transparent and accountable. 
However, Charmaz (2006) suggested that axial coding can be risky in the coding 
process because it can cast "a technological overlay on the data" that may 
inappropriately influence the final analysis (p. 63). Axial coding was utilized to 
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develop illustrative figures in this thesis. For example, two figures in the findings 
(Figure 4. 7 and Figure 4.8) highlight relationships among and between the three 
components of SD meanings for two interrelated but discernible senses of self: the 
primary sense of self and the more nuanced sense of self in CDs recovery. I found 
that consciously maintaining a stance that the figures represented artificial 
"snapshots" of dynamic phenomena helped avoid the figures shaping rather than 
reflecting analysis. 
Data collection was paused again after six interview transcripts were 
collected to focus again on analysis. The emerging theoretical scheme was further 
refined and theoretical saturation was considered to have been achieved when 
data collection and analysis for two more participants (one female and one male) 
was completed. The theoretical scheme was shared with two members of the 
Advisory Committee (the third member had to withdraw from participation due to 
health reasons). Summaries of the findings were provided to six of the eight 
participants. There were no reported concerns with the findings generally or with 
how meanings were presented. Feedback included findings being "really 
interesting," participation was difficult at times in terms of sharing difficult 
memories, and that participation was overall a positive experience. The final stage 
of data analysis was integrated with the writing of this thesis. 
Charmaz (2006) suggested that theoretical coding occurs when the 
researcher begins to examine between-category relationships developed from the 
microanalysis of data. Hypotheses are developed that theoretically link two or 
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more of the categories together. Integrating the categories enables the 
construction of a larger, logically defendable theoretical scheme grounded in the 
data. The larger theoretical scheme distinguishes theory building from simply 
describing themes in the data analysis. Strauss and Corbin (1998) referred to a 
selective coding as the final step in the proces of analysis. They suggested that 
there needs to be a tentative central or core category grounded in the data. This 
central category pulls the other categories together to form a theory that explains 
the whole and can "account for considerable variation within categories" (p. 146). 
This study's analysis moved to include selective coding and testing the fit 
of possible core theoretical concepts that were emerging from the data during 
another pause after six participants had been sampled. The larger theoretical 
frame (i.e., the sense of self) emerged, theoretical saturation was being 
considered, and the thesis writing stage was initiated. One of the challenges at this 
stage was making sense of changes that participants were sharing about how they 
viewed their sense of self (and in turn meanings of SD) over the course of his or 
her life experiences. This observation and challenge led to the development of an 
organizing metaphor of an audio mixing board that digitally mixes different audio 
tracks into combined music outputs. The "mixing" process includes an 
experiential positive feedback loop. The mixing board metaphor helped highlight 
how the three SD components fused into participants' subjective meanings of SD. 
The positive feedback loop helped conceptualize how meanings of SD not only 
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differed among the participants at any point of time but how they also could shift 
for each person through the course of his or her life. 
Process coding occurs throughout an analysis. It helps identify and 
integrate a "series of evolving sequences of action/interaction that occur over time 
and space, change or sometimes remaining the same in response to the situation or 
context" (Strauss & Corbin, 1998, p.l65). In this study, process coding suggested 
that the experiential positive feedback loop was associated with a trend among 
participants over time to develop a greater attention to, and integration of, nuances 
of meaning in relation to his or her self, their ecosystem, mental health, mental 
illness, addiction, and CDs recovery. 
Strauss and Corbin (1998) also referred to the need to locate the developed 
theory in structural terms of the "macro and micro conditions in which it is 
embedded" and in process terms of the "actions/interactions" of the theory with 
its environmental context (p. 182). As previously mentioned in Chapter Two, the 
"person-in-environment" or "ecosystem" perspective is one of the distinguishing 
features of generalist social work (despite its critics). Consequently, grounded 
theory methodology and methods that integrate coding of processes and paying 
attention to the micro-macro context appears to be particularly suited to social 
work research. This facet of analysis contributed to the organizing concept being 
finalized as: the sense of self within his or her ecosystem. 
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3.4 Ethical Considerations 
The research followed ethical guidelines as outlined by the Tri-Council 
policy statement: Ethical conduct for research involving humans (Canadian 
Institutes of Health Research et al, 2005). Data collection and analysis was 
initiated following proposal approval by Memorial University's Interdisciplinary 
Committee on Ethics in Human Research (ICEHR) (Appendix IV). 
Voluntary participation was ensured through repeatedly informing 
participants that they could withdraw at any time; that the study was for 
dissertation research purposes; and reviewing steps for protecting anonymity, 
confidentiality, and potential harm. Consent forms (Appendix II) were discussed, 
signed, and copies given to participants. Distress arising for a participant through 
the interview process that was unanticipated or unexpected was considered to be 
one of the main risks to participants. To help address the risk, potential 
participants were made aware of this concern at initial contact, through reviewing 
an explanatory letter (Appendix I) and their consent form before signing, and, 
again, through reviewing the study's nature, purpose, and potential risks 
immediately before interviewing began (Appendix V). It was also discussed 
before commencing that if any distress was identified or expressed then the 
interview was to be paused and attention paid to supporting the participant. A 
safety plan (Appendix VI) was reviewed at the end of each interview. It included 
identifying people the person could reach out to and/or ways to contact me if they 
had any concerns develop later. I did not leave until the participant could foresee 
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no difficulties. As mentioned above, a couple of participants commented that the 
interview process was difficult at times in terms of memories associated with their 
experiences; nevertheless, all spoke of the experience being worthwhile and the 
opportunity to share their stories having value to them. One participant reported 
no difficulties with the first interview but did find seeing and reviewing the 
written transcript a bit overwhelming. Consequently, she invited a support person 
to be with her to review the transcript and answer any follow-up questions. 
A second potential major ethical risk involved ensuring anonymity and 
confidentiality. Ways of addressing tbis concern included: 
• Discussing ways participants may want to disguise themselves through 
using pseudonyms during interviews and/or in interview transcriptions. 
• I was the sole person transcribing the recorded interviews. 
• The computer used to transcribe, interview recordings, memos, and 
transcripts was kept in a locked location in my home office. 
• Interview transcriptions having uniquely identifying information removed 
and being given a unique random code number that only I could connect 
with the contact information and name of the participant. 
• Participants reviewing their coded and anonymity-protected transcript to 
ensure they were protected. 
• Members of advisory committee only having access to samples of 
anonymity-protected transcripts. 
• Persons having access to the raw research data were limited to me, and the 
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three members of the thesis committee should they so request. 
• Recordings, names, and contact information of participants are to be 
destroyed within one year of the completion of the thesis defense. 
• The advisory committee members signing agreements that they will 
ensure confidentiality (Appendix Vll). 
3.5 Research Rigor 
Some researchers argue for the adoption of different criteria to ensure 
rigor in qualitative research than traditional notions of reliability and validity 
associated more with positivist methodology and quantitative research methods. 
For example, Lincoln and Guba (1985) advocated for the adoption of 
"trustworthiness" criteria in terms of four dimensions: (1) credibility (i.e., the 
extent to which study findings and future interpretations reflect participants' point 
of view); (2) transferability (i.e., the applicability of the study's findings in other 
contexts); (3) dependability (i.e., reliability); and ( 4) confirmability (i.e., methods 
for establishing the accuracy of the data collected). 
Janet Morse et al (2002) argued that validity and reliability are used by 
qualitative researchers in Europe. They suggested that the evolution of 
trustworthiness criteria in North America has shifted from procedures that ensure 
validity during the course of inquiry to post hoc assessments that risk missing 
threats to rigor until it is too late to correct them. Post hoc assessments include 
audit trails, participantlmember checks, and using written reflexive memos. They 
suggested that poor "investigator responsiveness" (IR) is the greatest threat to 
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research rigor. Positive IR included: the investigator remaining as "open" as 
possible to interpretations of the data during collection and analysis; the 
researcher's use of sensitivity, creativity, and insight during data collection and 
analysis; and the researcher being willing to relinquish any ideas that are poorly 
supported, regardless of the excitement and the potential that the ideas may first 
appear to have. They argued that poor IRis not easily identified by post-hoc 
strategies and suggested ways to protect rigor from poor IR threats included: 
methodology and method congruence; theoretical sampling; seeking negative case 
examples; seeking saturation that ensured replication in categories; collecting and 
analyzing data concurrently, thinking theoretically (i.e., ideas emerging from the 
data are reconfirmed or verified in new data); and theory development (i.e., 
moving systematically between a micro perspective of the data and a macro 
conceptual or theoretical understanding). 
This study's research design and process reflects rigor in terms both IR and 
post hoc assessments. As described above, adhering to the structure and spirit of 
qualitative grounded theory studies as outlined by Strauss and Corbin (1998) and 
Charmaz (2006) addresses virtually all of the ways and means to insure good IR. 
Further, adding reflective pauses allowed for the sharing, reviewing, and gaining 
feedback on my decisions from members of the thesis committee and the advisory 
committee during the sampling and analysis process. Conceptual drafts were 
circulated to the thesis committee following both pauses that reflected 
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adjustments. Consequently, thesis committee members had texts that reflected 
analysis developments (including relinquishing ideas not supported by the data). 
Finally, Post hoc strategies incorporated into the research study to support 
trustworthiness included: 
• The maintenance of records and materials for audit trail. 
• Peer Advisory Committee briefings and bias checking. 
• Member checking by participants to ensure the accuracy of their 
meamngs. 
• Soliciting Thesis Committee reviews of analysis. 
• Sharing and discussing a summary of findings and a draft of the 
theoretical scheme with participants who wished feedback. 
• Presenting and discussing a draft of the theoretical scheme to the staff of 
the mental health peer support program that assisted me. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
Findings 
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter begins with a descriptive synopsis of the participants and an 
overview of the development and conceptualization of the grounded theory of 
participants' meanings of SD in CDs treatment and recovery experiences. 
Presentation of the SD categories, their sub-categories, important dimensions, and 
relationships that support and illuminate the grounded theory then follows. A 
summary concludes the chapter. Pseudonyms are used to protect the anonymity of 
the participants as well as to personalize their words. 
4.2 Descriptive Overview of Participants 
Participants' ages ranged from 27 to 59 years of age. The average age was 
42. Three males and five females were interviewed. Male participants' ages were: 
32 (Brian), 45 (Malcolm), and 56 (Sam). Female participants' ages were: 27 
(Alexis), 36 (Colleen), 40 (Susan), 42 (Carmen), and 59 (Teresa). When asked, 
participants did not identify themselves as being associated with any specific 
ethnic, cultural, or racial group. 
All participants except Alexis and Sam had been married; however, no one 
was living with a spouse at the time of interviewing. All but Alexis, Brian, and 
Colleen had children and all but two participants' children were adult-aged. One 
participant who had young children shared their care with her parents and an ex-
partner. The other participant's young children lived primarily with his ex-partner. 
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Susan, Colleen, Alexis, Sam, and Brian completed high chool. Susan had also 
taken coJJege courses. Brian was working on his Bachelor's degree and Sam had 
completed a university program. All participants had worked full-time at some 
point in his or her life. All participants were receiving disability benefits at the 
time of interviewing and four also had some form of paid employment. Seven of 
the eight participants were actively volunteering in a variety of interest areas, 
including helping others with mental illness and/or addiction issue . 
4.2.1 Mental Health, Mental Illness, and Treatment Contact 
Brian, Malcolm, Susan, and Carmen had brief contacts with professionals 
around mental health issues when they were 12 or under but they had no further 
contact for the next five to ten years. Alexis and Colleen had their first contact in 
their early twentie , during a "breakdown" or crisis. Teresa bad her first contact in 
her late thirties, again associated with a crisis or "breakdown." Sam briefly stayed 
voluntarily at a psychiatric hospital in his first year of university. He had no 
further contact until a forced treatment experience occurred in his late twenties 
(he had two other similar experiences since). All but Alexis reported that their 
first contact with mental health services occurred prior to any regular substance 
use. Alexis said she first started regularly using psychoactive substances at age 12 
and then became aware of "whispers" in her mind two years later. 
All participants except Sam were involved with professional mental health 
treatment services at the time of being interviewed. All but Sam and Alexis 
regularly met with a psychiatrist and took prescribed psychiatric medication. 
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Alexis was working on emotional self-management with a psychologist but not 
using prescription medication. Teresa and Colleen were involved with "assertive" 
community treatment programs which are intensive "wrap-around" case 
management and treatment programs provided in the community for people with 
serious functional difficulties associated with severe mental illness. Carmen was 
the only participant who had not ever had any involvement with mental health 
peer support ervices, programs, or supports. 
Table 4.1 shows mental health and substance use disorders that 
participants self-reported being diagnosed with (by gender). Bi-polar disorder 
(including Cyclothymia) was the most common diagnosis. Receiving multiple 
diagnoses was the norm. The average number of non-substance use diagnoses was 
four for each female participant and three for each male. All but Susan and Teresa 
said they had received an initial mental health disorder diagnosis when they were 
a youth or young adult (i.e., under 25). Susan and Teresa said they were first 
diagnosed in their thirties. All but Susan and Sam said that their early diagnoses 
changed or were added to, and treatments changed, with subsequent contacts with 
different physicians and/or psychiatrists. For example, Alexis and Teresa were 
diagnosed initially with a form of schizophrenia based on crisis contacts with 
mental health services. Both said that the diagnosis was later changed by other 
psychiatrists. Sam said he was involuntarily diagnosed with schizophrenia in his 
late twenties. He has avoided contact with mental health professionals since that 
time. 
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4.2.2 Substance Use, Misuse, and Addiction 
No participants were involved with addiction-specific professional 
programs or practitioners at the time of being interviewed. Brian, Malcolm, 
Colleen, and Alexis had previous direct dealings with addiction-specific treatment 
services. Sam and Colleen had occasionally attended community 12 step 
addiction-related meetings. 
Susan reported having problems consuming too many soft drinks or "pop" 
and she had been diagnosed with an impulse control disorder associated with 
sexual behavior in her thirties. She said she had not ever misused psychoactive 
substances typically associated with addiction. Carmen self-diagnosed herself 
with a binge eating disorder that she thought was a form of addiction. She said the 
behavior started in her late teens and lasted until her late twenties. Although she 
had smoked cigarettes since her teens, Carmen did not use other drugs or alcohol 
until her early thirties. She experienced substance dependence issues with alcohol 
and then crack in her early thirties (after she had stopped binge eating). 
References to addiction in the grounded theory are inclusive of substance 
dependence, Susan's problems with soft drinks, her impulsive behaviors 
associated with sexual activity, and Carmen's binge eating behavior. 
Table 4.2 shows substances reported as most misused, abused, and/or 
being dependent on by gender and pharmaceutical drug group. All but Susan 
smoked cigarettes. As stated above, Carmen did not use substances other than 
cigarettes until she was an adult. Teresa reported no substance use other than 
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Table 4.1: Participants' Reported Mental Illness Diagnoses by Gender 
Diagnoses Male (N=3) Female (N=5) Total (N=8) 
Bipolar Disorders 1 4 
Major Depressive Disorder 2 2 
ADD/ADHD 2 2 
Schizophrenia 1* 2** 
General Anxiety Disorder 2 
Posttraumatic Stress Disorder (Abuse) 2 
Impulse Control Disorder 1 (anger) 1 (sexual behavior) 
Borderline Personality Disorder 2 
Differentiated Identity Disorder I 
Eating Disorder 1 
Obsessive-Compulsive Disorder 
Schizoid Affective Disorder 1 
Seasonal Affective Di order 1 
Sleeping Disorder I 
Substance Abuse/Dependence 3 4 
*Diagnosis not viewed as valid by person - assessed under duress of forced hospitalization. 
**Initial diagnosis during fust crisis/contact with psychiatry - sub equently changed. 
5 
4 
4 
3 
2 
2 
2 
2 
1 
1 
I 
1 
1 
1 
7 
(More than one mental health issue or diagnosis may be reported by an individual; diagnoses not 
necessarily viewed as legitimate or accurate by individuals) 
Table 4.2: Substances Reported a Problematic and/or Associated with a Substance U e 
Disorder Diagnosis, by Pharmaceutical Drug Group and by Gender 
Substance Pharmacological Drug Group Male (N=3) Female (N=5) Total (N=8) 
Cigarettes Nicotine: stimulant 3 4 7 
Alcohol Central Nervous System 
(CNS) Sedative-hypnotic 3 2 5 
Cannabis Hallucinogen, sedative, 
stimulant properties 2 3 5 
Cocaine/Crack CNS stimulant 1 (cocaine) 2 (crack) 3 
Oxazapam CNS sedative: tranquilizer 1 
Tal win CNS sedative: narcotic analgesic 
Heroin CNS sedative: narcotic analgesic 
Ritalin CNS stimulant 
Soft Drinks Caffeine/sugar: CNS stimulant 
"Red Dye" Food additive 
(More than one substance may be reported by an individual; person may not agree with current or 
past use being identified as a substance use disorder or major problem) 
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trying a few cigarettes in her teens. She had her first ever drink of alcohol in her 
mid-twenties, she did not begin to smoke cigarettes until her late thirties, and she 
drank alcohol problematically for about 3 years in her early forties. The remaining 
five first used alcohol and/or cannabis as a child or youth. Colleen was 
encouraged to use cannabis by some family members as early as age 9. Malcolm 
and Alexis were around 11 or 12 when they first used alcohol and/or cannabis 
with friends. Sam and Brian began to try drinking and/or smoking cannabis in 
their mid- to late-teens. Malcolm, Alexis, and Brian reported experimenting with 
a variety of psychoactive substances such as ecstasy, "magic mushrooms", and/or 
"acid" in their youth; however, they said that these substances did not become 
problems. No participant identified problems associated with drinking too much 
coffee (although all said at some point they have had to manage how much coffee 
they drink). Malcolm found that "red dye" food additives had a seriously negative 
effect on his hypomania symptoms and his ability to focus his thoughts. 
4.3 Theory Development and Conceptual Overview 
Understanding participants' meanings of SD typically started with an 
open-ended question early in the first interview (e.g., "what does self-
determination mean to you?"). Three of the first responses were highly tentative: 
Malcolm: 
Colleen: 
Teresa: 
As in what? Determined to stay the way I am? 
Self-determination - what does that mean? 
I really don' t know. 
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Although tentative, Malcolm's use of "determined" and "the way I am" shared 
connotations with the other five participants' first statement of meaning for SD: 
Carmen: I automatically think of my stubbornness. 
Sam: WeiJ, it has a lot of different meanings, you know. 
Determine, determination, hard determinism, soft 
determinism, vote NDP, making up your own mind- not 
manifest destiny or destiny, being responsible for oneself. 
Susan: Control! 
Brian: Basically that people will achieve what they set out to [do]. 
Alexis: I am done with this [previous way of life] forever. 
Participants agreed that SD was not a term that they would generally use in their 
everyday life. They initially focused on meanings of "determination" However, 
Carmen said at one pojnt in her follow-up interview (underlining represents an 
emphasizing tone): 
I think that is the intimidating part of it [self-determination], right there-
the first word ... I have so much trouble taking care of my self and 
respecting my self. I did not respect my self for a very long time. I think 
the self is what totally threw me off. Because determination- I have used 
that word a million times. But as soon as you throw that self on there it 
totally seemed to have changed .. . it made it more personal ... there are so 
many words that could come off of this and so many feelings and 
emotions and moods that could come from this. But it is that word self. .. I 
am a determined person- who isn't? But throw that word self on there and 
it just changes everything. 
From these initial statements and further exploration, three broad categories of 
meanings of SD were interpretively generated. Two categories are rooted in 
meanings of "determination" (being determined and determining). Susan 
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expressed these two categories succinctly in terms of substance use: "I am 
determining not to use the drugs and alcohol and I am determined not to use 
them." The third category is rooted in meanings of "self' (standpoint of self). It is 
captured by Susan in her statement that SD "just defines who I am!" 
Microanalysis of the first three interviews, and with each subsequent 
participant's transcript, suggested that the categories are ftJndamentally 
interrelated and together contribute to uniquely subjective, multi-faceted 
meanings of SD. For example, Brian referred to "conditions conducive" to SD: 
I believe that self-determination involves an interaction of factors. Setting 
- not all options are available at all times. Past experience shapes current 
perspectives and future behavior. .. There can only be a choice if two or 
more options exist. Conditions conducive means absence of limitations; it 
also depends on the individual's appraisal. 
Analysis identified five interrelated standpoint of self subcategories: 
beliefs and values; attitudes towards self; attitudes towards ecosystem; sense of 
control; and aspirations. The sub-categories are the key elements of SD 
meanings. Element is defined as "a basic constituent part ... a group of a particular 
kind within a larger group" (Soanes & Stevenson, 2006, p. 462). Determining 
encompasses key processes of participants' meanings of SD. There are two 
interrelated process sub-categories: decision making and knowledge building. The 
being determined category represents the dynamic energy, force, or power that 
permeated participants' meanings of SD and, in turn, powered self-directed 
actions. Figure 4.1 shows the early mapping of categories and their respective 
sub-categories. 
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SELF-DETERMINATION / i ._____ 
Standpoint of Self Being Determined Determining 
Elements: Power Proces es: 
Beliefs & values Decision 
Attitudes toward self making 
Attitudes toward ecosystem Knowledge 
Sense of control building 
Aspirations 
Figure 4.1: Self-Determination Meanings: Initial categories and ub-categories 
4.3.1 Organizing Concept and Metaphor of SD Meanings 
The categories (and respective sub-categories) were organized into a 
grounded theory of participants' subjective meanings of SD in CD treatment and 
recovery experiences. The organizing concept is: a person's sense of self within 
his or her ecosystem. Here, "sense" refers to: "an awareness of something or 
feeling that something is the case ... a way in which an expression or situation can 
be interpreted; a meaning ... be vaguely or indefinably aware of' (Soanes & 
Stevenson, 2006, p. 1310). Synonyms include: feeling, awarene s, consciousness, 
sensation, intelligence, intuition, judgment, coherence, and meaning (Oxford, 
2001). Each participant's sense of self within his or her ecosystem encompasses 
the dynamic interplay between the self and his or her physical, socio-cultural, 
spiritual, and psychological environmental context, from participant fir t-person 
points of view. Figure 4.2 shows the components of SD meanings within an 
ecosystem that highlights bio-psycho-social-spiritual dimen ions. As mentioned 
in Chapter Two, social work critics of the term "ecosystem" argue that it can 
intentionally or unintentionally symbolize a self separate from the ecosystem and 
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imply that the two transact but are not integrated. Participants were found to 
discern distinct aspects of his or her self from his or her ecosystem and its 
dimensions; however, an outright separation was never evident in relation to 
recovery. Consequently, a broken dash/dot line around "SELF-
DETERMINATION" in Figure 4.2 symbolizes the "open" boundaries of a 
discernable self integrated with his or her ecosystem. Critics also argue that 
"ecosystem" implies a neutral concept that does not integrate issues of 
asymmetrical structural power issues in relationships. This inductive grounded 
theory's use of "ecosystem" attempts to be inclusive of but not limited to 
asymmetrical power issues in personal and/or structural interactions and 
relationships. Figure 4.2 attempts to symbolically integrate asymmetrical power 
issues through the arrows' different shapes and sizes. Two-way arrows symbolize 
influence reciprocities. One-way dashed arrows from the self symbolize the selfs 
capacity to asymmetrically influence aspects of the ecosystem (e.g., some other 
individual; advocating for systemic service reforms). In turn, one-way arrows 
from an ecosystem dimension symbolize its capacities (e.g., other people; 
structural beliefs, values, and processes in society) to asymmetrically influence or 
assert control over aspects of a participant's life or self. Asymmetrical structural 
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Ecosystem powers/influence 
on self 
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ecosystem 
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between a discernable self 
within an ecosystem 
Socio-
cultural 
World 
Psycho-
Logical 
World 
Figure 4.2: Self-determination within the ecosystem 
Spiritual 
World 
powers are suggested by the greater width of one-way arrows originating in the 
ecosystem. 
Grasping the dynamic nature of the interrelated SD element , processes, 
and animating power is aided by use of an organizing metaphor. For example, an 
audio mixer or mixing board is a device that can adjust or sculpt (e.g., balance, 
position, effect, equalize, and so forth) different audio channels into a uniquely 
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combined audio output or sound image called the mix (e.g., music). The SD 
standpoint elements represent the different routers and sliding level controls of a 
mixing board. The SD processes are the selfs "hands" that set, maintain, or adjust 
the mix by establishing and potentially adjusting the various controls reactively 
and/or proactively. "Being determined" powers both the mixing itself and the 
content of the mix. The combined mix is a person's unique and subjective 
meaning of SD. Each person's SD mix guides, supports, and energizes his or her 
self-directed actions through deci ion making (which is not restricted solely to 
"conscious" decision making). The elements, power, and the processes are the 
contributing components of each person 's unique SD meaning mix (Figure 4.3). 
Being Detfined (powa) ~ 
SELF-DETERMINATION 
/ (meanings "mix") ' 
Standpoint of Self Determining 
(elements) (processes) 
Figure 4.3: Self-Determination Meanings: Fusion of components 
Sense of self relationships and interactions within his or her ecosystem 
integrates the potential for other people and/or ecosystem-based "forces" (e.g. 
social structures; weather) to, at any potential moment, impact on a participant's 
SD components (e.g., support or oppose; inform or direct; challenge or provide 
opportunity). As a result, participants' SD mixes were always potentially in some 
108 
sort of tension or flux, internally and within integrated relationships/interactions, 
with his or her equally dynamic ecosystem. 
The organizing metaphor also incorporates a knowledge-building positive 
feedback loop potential. Experience with the mixing board controls, 
internal/external influences, and outputs or outcomes provide cumulative 
knowledge to actively shape and direct processes and outputs over time. Positive 
feedback loops in systems are "deviation amplifying" and drive shifts towards 
growth and change, while negative feedback loops reduce deviation and thus 
drive shifts towards equilibrium (Hudson, 2000, p. 218). The positive feedback 
loop is associated with participant descriptions associated with developing a more 
"nuanced" sense of self over time which, in turn, affected their subjective SD 
mixes. The feedback loop potential provided participants with opportunities for 
increasing their skill and knowledge in relation to understanding, maintaining, 
and/or adjusting aspects of SD components and, in turn, his or her SD mix. This 
self-knowledge positive feedback loop (as well as negative loops that defend SD 
meanings) suggest that regulating needed degrees of relative stability or balance 
of the sense of self within growth and change represents a key potential function 
of participants' SD meanings in CDs treatment and recovery experiences. This 
self-knowledge positive feedback potential is best described as a form of 
hermeneutic circle because: 
• The gaining of self-knowledge has no determinate endpoints. 
• It involves a continuing potential for examination of the discernable self's 
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"parts" (e.g., SD components) in relation to the "whole" (i.e., the sense of 
self within his or her ecosystem) and vice versa. 
• It also involves an ongoing potential for awareness, critically questioning, 
and reinterpreting meanings ofthe past and future (e.g., one's subjective 
narrative) with continuously new elf-ecosystem experiences in the 
present and vice versa. 
4.3.2 Temporal Changes 
SD meanings were a unique mix of the three components of the theory at 
the time of interviewing. Each person's SD meanings had also changed over his 
or her lifetime, in relation to his or her sense of self. Initially, the participants 
established what is being called a relatively stable primary sense of self within his 
or her ecosystem. Over time, participants developed a more nuanced sense of self 
within his or her ecosystem associated with consciously pursuing CDs recovery. 
Meanings of SD defended or maintained the respective sense of self and/or 
changing aspects of it. Changes to the primary sense of self were associated with 
a general trend evident among participants towards developing greater attention 
to, and integration of, "nuances" of meaning. The term, "nuance", refers to subtle 
difference in or shades of meaning and expression (Soanes & Stevenson, 2006, 
p. 979). This trend towards more nuanced views and meanings was particularly 
identifiable in relation to self-standpoint shifts. Overall, the standpoint elements in 
CDs recovery were described as becoming more situationally relative, 
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compatible, and discerning. Primary self standpoints typically held and defended 
more absolutist, generalized, incompatible, and indiscriminate views. 
4.3.2.1 Relativistic. More situationally relative tandpoint views associated 
with CDs recovery were exemplified by a common refrain in interviews: 
"everybody is different." Relativistic views also prevailed in the meaning of 
"recovery" for participants. People focused more on improving their experience 
of living rather than envisioning recovery in absolutist terms, such as being 
"cured" of mental illness symptoms, being completely abstinent from all 
substances perceived as potentially problematic (although some did choose 
abstinence for themselves), or being completely compliant with prescription 
medication use (although they were usually willing to consider it with 
recommendations from people they trusted). 
4.3.2.2 Compatible. More compatible standpoint views (i.e., holding 
coherent mixtures of relativistic and absolutist views) were exemplified by 
peoples' understandings of SD as a "right." They saw SD as more of a oft or 
conditional right for everyone and needed to be mediated by each per on, as well 
as socially, due to its subjective nature and, consequently, its potential to drive 
destructive conflicts. However, they said that this view was different from how 
they might have answered the question in the past. Alexi , for example, said: "to 
get money for drugs I was definitely self-determining but I did not have a right to 
do 99 percent of the stuff I was doing." Carmen saw SD as a soft right generally 
but it was absolute for her specifically in terms of survival: "I think of it [SD] as 
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survival. We have a right to survive." Subsequent interviews confirmed this view 
of SD in recovery as generally conditional but also absolute in relation to survivaL 
4.3.2.3 Discerning. A dictionary definition of the verb "discern" includes 
"recognize or find out" and "to see or hear with difficulty" (Soanes & Stevenson, 
2006, p. 408). More discerning standpoint views in CDs recovery were 
exemplified by expressed views of mental illness and substance use/misuse. 
Mental health, mental illness symptoms, substance use, or non-substance 
addictions often had no discerning meanings to participants when they were 
young (i.e., their primary sense of self). Malcolm stated: "you didn't sit down 
[with friends] and talk about illnesses. You sat down to talk about music .. . we 
were not thinking about abusing it [drugs and alcohol]. The thought of abusing it 
-you did not think that way." Colleen saw her mental health, illness symptoms, 
and drug issues as a young adult as: "[It] fitted in together. All just like a ball." 
Mental illness came to be seen as more located as a part of the self among the 
majority of participants and substance use/misuse as located as more a part of the 
ecosystem in association with pursuing recovery. Developing more discerning 
views seemed to help people see more ways that they could try to better deal with 
both issues separately and together. For Alexis, she came to see her substance 
use/misuse as involving more of a self-determined "choice." Although she 
emphasized that this did not equal a greater "easiness" to address them, it did help 
her develop more effective targeted strategies to tackle them, many of which were 
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different than how she worked with her illness symptoms. She saw no "choice" in 
terms of her mental illness symptoms (only in how she managed them): 
Drinking or using is a choice. You don't have a choice to hear voices, you 
don't have a choice to have mood swings or whatever, you know ... Like, I 
do believe in the fact that some people have that addictive personality ... 
The choice [to not drink or use] is a lot harder for some people to make 
and when some people start doing something it is harder for them to quit 
than maybe others, but it is still a choice. 
The trend towards nuanced meanings pertained to the other two SD 
components as well. For example, the primary sense of selfs power associated 
with being determined often was not really "seen" by the participant or else very 
value-laden generalized meanings were attached to it (e.g., tubbornness was seen 
as all "bad" and commitment all "good" regardless of the context). In contrast, 
this Power of the self came later to be seen by people as involving combinations 
of features associated with meanings of stubbornness, commitment, persistence, 
dedication, and loyalty. As well, the power came to be seen as more neutral in 
nature and then judged situationally in relation to a particular context, issue, or 
goal. 
Overall, the awareness and integration of greater nuances of meaning 
occurred like stones dropping into a pool of water - the stones caused waves that 
rippled through the interrelated SD components, potentially affecting the sense of 
self and, in turn, meanings of SD. Stones tossed into the pool could be of different 
sizes and cause different sizes of waves. Some "waves" appeared to be absorbed 
or resisted without apparently causing a significant shift or change. Some 
appeared to have some impact that cumulatively contributed to a gradual shifting 
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over time. Still others were like boulders hitting the water and whose waves had 
an immediate significant effect. These catalytic experiences were often associated 
with what participants described as sudden standpoint shifts (e.g., "waking up" to 
some aspect of their self and/or their ecosystem such as an addiction being in 
control of his or her self). One element of the standpoint (e.g., the sense of 
control) might be particularly "hit" and cascade through the other elements, SD 
components, and the sense of self as a whole. 
As mentioned above, the knowledge-building positive (hermeneutic) 
feedback loop is thought to be behind the trend towards developing greater 
attention to, and integration of, nuances of meaning. Generally, programs or 
professionals that pushed pre-determined absolutist, incompatible, and 
indiscriminate views of the self, the ecosystem, treatment, mental illness, 
addiction, or recovery were not highly trusted by participants with a nuanced 
sense of self in CDs recovery. In contrast, professionals who worked 
collaboratively with participants and respected their "nuanced" views, even if 
there was not always agreement, were more trusted and valued. 
4.3.3 The Components of SD Meanings 
The following sections present in more detail the standpoint of self 
elements, determining processes, and the power of determination of a grounded 
theory of SD meanings in CDs treatment and recovery experiences. Presenting the 
three components, their respective sub-categories, dimensions, and relationships 
separately is not only complex to do in a coherent manner but it also is artificial. 
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The grounded theory conceptualizes the components as fundamentally 
synthesized into participants' SD meanings that exhibit temporal change and are 
expressed within dynamic self-ecosystem relationships that are integrated and 
reciprocal (but not necessarily symmetrical in terms of power issues). 
Nevertheless, presenting them separately helps support their place in the theory, 
highlight key contributions that they make to the grounded theory, and set the 
stage for discussing different facets of the grounded theory in the next chapter. 
The summary at the end of this chapter attempts to "re-mix" or fuse the 
components back together again. The summary includes two figures. Figure 4.7 
provides a visual representation of the components and relationship interpreted 
as important to the primary sense of self. Figure 4.8 doe the same for the more 
nuanced sense of elf associated with CDs recovery. 
4.4 SD: Standpoint of Self Elements 
Each self-standpoint element usually emerged and was under tood only in 
relation to one or more of the other elements. For example, an attitude towards his 
or her self often was formed only in relation to interpretations of experiences that 
also contributed to attitudes towards other people, groups, or society in general. 
Greater discernment (but not a complete separation) between the elements 
occurred over time. For example, Susan stated: "the more I get healthier and get 
to know more about my illness and stuff, the more I see in my own family, and 
I'm like, 'you're not normal - I'm normal!"' Figure 4.4 highlights the self-
standpoint elements that are the focus of this next section. 
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Being Determined (power) 
~LF-DETERMINATI00. ~ ~ (meanings) ,1 ~ ~ 
Standpoint of Self (elements) Determining 
• Beliefs & values (processes) 
• Attitudes towards self 
• Attitudes toward ecosystem 
• Sense of control 
• Aspirations 
Figure 4.4: Self-Determination Meanings: Standpoint of self elements 
4.4.1 Beliefs and Values 
Beliefs involve: "the emotional acceptance of some proposition, statement 
or doctrine" (Reber & Reber, 2001, p. 86). Here, they refer to participants' 
spiritual/religious beliefs. Values are abstract principles concerning behavior 
within a particular family, culture or society, "which, through the process of 
socialization, the members of that [family], culture or society hold in high 
regard ... [and] to hold something in esteem based upon one's evaluation of self' 
(Reber & Reber, p. 783). Beliefs/values contributed to each SD mix in ways that 
included: providing a guiding framework for decision making; providing 
evaluative references for the setting and adjusting of the other standpoint 
elements; and being a source of power associated with being determined about 
someone (including the self) or something. Primary beliefs/values were 
established in childhood and tended to be absolutist in nature. Participants' 
recovery was associated with a greater awareness of these primary beliefs/values 
and questioning their utility. Questioning could lead to re-affirming primary 
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beliefs/values, discarding them, or adjusting them in ways that were more 
situationally relative, compatible, and discerning in association with CDs 
recovery. Examples are presented below. 
4.4.1.1 Spiritual/religious beliefs. Teresa and Susan's religious beliefs 
involved a Christian religion. Both attended church as children, did not attend for 
a period as adults, and then returned to their church in recovery. Alexis was not a 
member of a religious group but spoke of having strong spiritual beliefs. Carmen 
integrated a spiritual belief in nature with a belief in God while Malcolm chose to 
follow spiritual principles of a Central American indigenous belief system. The 
remaining three did not have strong beliefs. Sam and Brian viewed religion as 
socially learned cultural or family values. Colleen said she attended church but for 
social reasons and to enjoy the music rather than because of having strong beliefs. 
Four people related religious/spiritual beliefs to SD in terms of making 
decisions. Susan said: "just believing that someone is out there beyond us and that 
no matter what happens he is right there guiding me to make the right decisions." 
Four participants' beliefs also supported or energized their being determined. 
Carmen said: "I believe in 'Ma Nature.' I believe that she is a big healer ... it 
recharges me. It's like a battery recharger." Alexis said her beliefs gave her 
energy to carry on through life-threatening experiences: "I think there is 
something out there, you know, like I think things happen for a reason and kind of 
everybody has a purpose and there's some reason why I am alive .. .I am alive and 
I didn't die when there were so many times when I really should have been dead." 
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4.4.1.2 Values associated with responsibility, freedom, caring, and 
compassion. All participants referred at some point to "responsibility" and 
meanings of SD. All but Sam said that they used to associate responsibility 
mainly with guilt, failure, and being responsible to, and for, others. Carmen spoke 
of a how her recovery has been aided by a change in her meaning of 
responsibility: 
[I've learned that] it wasn't that I felt responsible; it was the things I was 
responsible for. And what a difference that is. A whole new take because 
once you know what you are doing and that you are responsible for this 
happening because you actually are- not because somebody makes you 
feel that way or you make yourself feel that way. Because it is something 
you are doing and you are responsible for it and you can stop it. It's when 
you use responsibility for things you can't control. You can struggle for 
the rest of your life if you keep that thought pattern. 
Susan said her responsibility in recovery included taking care of her daily 
living (e.g., "paying your bills") and managing her mental health: "putting my 
own thoughts and feelings and stuff into control and not having them spurt out." 
Teresa and Susan also spoke of their meaning of responsibility in recovery 
included taking better care of their self rather than focusing mostly on being 
responsible for, and to, others. Teresa said: 
I was forced to be, how do you say, to be a woman that had to work real 
hard at doing things and I didn't get my teenage years in because 
somebody always needed me and I was always there but I need something 
else now . .. I am going to try [to take care of myself]. It is hard but I am 
going to try. 
Six people spoke of freedom, individualism, or independence and SD 
(autonomy was not mentioned). Freedom, individualism, and independence were 
related to responsibility and SD, but their meanings were not the same. For 
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example, Sam said that SD meant people could self-determine the degree of 
personal freedom versus externally-determining structure in their life that works 
best for them: 
A lot of people don't want to be totally free, you know, a lot of people like 
some structure in their lives ... some people do like being told what to do 
by someone they particularly trust or respect, you see. 
He referred to people who choose to have little structure in their lives as 
"individualists" (he described himself as a "semi-individualist). Carmen also said 
that freedom and SD were close but not the same: "I would see freedom as one of 
the tag words that you would draw a line from [SD] ... and put freedom and self-
respect and independence." 
All spoke of their values in terms of the importance of helping, caring, 
being loyal to, or having compassion for other people while expressing their SD. 
Sam and Brian referred to this view in terms of reciprocal responsibilities. 
Essential to this value was seeing, respecting, and caring for others as worthy 
human beings, as participants in recovery increasingly demanded others to see 
them. Five participants' primary sense of self reflected a view of compassion or 
caring that emphasized caring for others such as partners or children (Carmen, 
Teresa, Susan, Brian, and Colleen). While Sam was unsure, Malcolm and Alexis 
said they focused more on meeting their own needs (especially when substance 
dependence was at its height). In contrast, the nuanced sense of self in CDs 
recovery was characterized by all participants valuing caring for, and about, 
others while balancing this with caring for his or her self in compassionate ways. 
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4.4.1.3 Stigma and CDs. Open-ended questions offered people a chance to 
share their meaning of SD in relation to beliefs, values, stigma, prejudice, and 
CDs. Stigma is a social designation; "a mark of disgrace associated with a 
particular circumstance, quality, or person" (Soanes & Stevenson, 2006, p. 1417). 
Prejudice is a: "preconceived opinion that is not based on reason or actual 
behavior" (Soanes & Stevenson, p. 1132). 
Racial/ethnic/cultural differences and gender were probed. No participants 
identified themselves as being part of a specific racial, ethnic, or cultural group 
beyond seeing themselves as "Canadian." None felt their SD in treatment was 
limited in some way based on their racial/ethnic/cultural characteristics. 
Participants felt that there were obvious biological differences between the 
genders that could affect people holding different meanings of SD (e.g., women 
and pregnancy). However, all felt that religious beliefs and/or socio-cultural 
values unnecessarily created gender-related stigma and prejudice. They all 
thought that these socially constructed differences still existed and they had to 
deal with them on a day-to-day basis. They also shared the view that gender-based 
beliefs/values were no longer as powerful a they once were and that their 
personal meanings of SD were not qualitatively or fundamentally different based 
on gender. Carmen spoke of becoming more aware, and her perception shifting, in 
relation to gender-related values/beliefs: "I used to have those feelings [about 
gender differences and freedom]. . .! don ' t think it [SD] is gender related. I 
honestly don't think .. .I think that society made things gender related and it is not 
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supposed to be that way." Female participants felt that their SD wa not as 
negatively impacted in terms of gender once they became aware of, critically 
questioned, and adjusted certain self-limiting gender beliefs/values that they had 
absorbed in youth. 
Most participants were concerned with professionals having beliefs/values 
about substance use/misuse in relation to mental health or mental illness that were 
stigmatizing or prejudicial. Most participants also thought stigma and prejudice 
was improving for people with mental illness and this often supported their SD. 
However, five of the eight participants suggested that stigma or prejudice about 
addiction issues often "trumped" their mental illness symptoms being seen in a 
better light. Alexis said that while she had not experienced stigma associated with 
addiction among mental health "counselors" she does continue to run into it with 
psychiatrists: "from psychiatrists, definitely yes! Either they think you are an 
addict or you don't really have a mental health thing because it is just because of 
the drugs." Brian gave a structural example: 
I know of some people who were denied ODSP [Ontario Disability 
Support Program] benefits because of the existence of an addiction co-
occurring with the mental illness. So, if the mental illness was there and 
the person meets the criteria then great but if that criteria is there but the 
individual also uses or has been diagnosed [with a substance use disorder] 
then you are ineligible. 
4.4.2 Attitudes towards Self and Ecosystem 
A dictionary definition of "attitude" is "a settled way of thinking or 
feeling" (Soanes & Stevenson, 2006, p. 85). The concept of "attitude" is a central 
one in social psychology but, like CSD in social work, the denotative meaning is 
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not widely agreed upon. Still, the meaning of attitudes in psychology includes a 
number of common themes: a judgmental stance or intention towards someone or 
something (e.g., positive, negative, neutral, or ambivalent); they can be 
unconscious (i.e., "implicit") or conscious (i.e., "explicit"); they involve 
emotions, cognitions, and actions; they contribute to behavior (some argue more 
in terms of cause-effect than others), and they may be stable but they also 
hypothetically have the capacity to change (Reber & Reber, 2001). 
Participants' attitudes overlapped with the other SD elements, especially 
beliefs/values. Often attitudinal evaluations were described as being referenced 
against expectations based in their beliefs/values. Early attitudes settled and 
became ambient within participants' primary sense of self. They were ambient in 
terms of becoming automatic or normalized -they were described by participants 
as the only way they saw things at the time and other different views were either 
not considered or else automatically rejected. They generally were described as 
working in the background; like ambient room temperature that one is used to and 
so not really noticeable until becoming uncomfortably hotter or colder. 
Experiences often were interpreted in ways that reinforced already 
established attitudes. If experiences were contrary to primary attitudes in some 
way, then they were described as often being ignored or discounted. This 
appeared to avoid destabilizing primary attitudes. However, these contrary 
experiences are interpreted in this theory as having the capacity over time to 
gradually increase conscious awareness of established, ambient primary attitudes. 
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Increa ed awareness tended to lead participant to critically question certain 
attitudes and to potentially change them. One example involved people going 
from general positive or negative attitudes towards all professionals' 
trustworthiness to more ambivalent or neutral ones in recovery. This more neutral 
stance in recovery appeared to allow for more discrete positive or negative 
judgments based on direct experience with specific individuals that they 
interacted with. Some experiences were described as causing sudden rather than 
gradual shifts in awareness of primary attitudes, quickly critically questioning 
them, and potentially quickly adjusting them in some significant way. These 
"catalytic" self-ecosystem experiences are interpreted as being associated with 
knowledge-building processes and are discussed below. 
4.4.2.1 Formation of primary attitudes. These two attitudinal elements are 
presented together because this is the way that participants described them as 
forming when they were young. Unfortunately, some could be associated with 
what can best be described as horrific betrayals with devastating effects. For 
example, Carmen kept running from home to escape abuse. At 12 she was put into 
a psychiatric hospital program. A male psychiatrist sided with the denials of abuse 
expressed by her mother and step-father, subjected Carmen to "mental criticisms," 
and subsequently abused her after sedating her with medication (he was later 
charged). Her primary attitudes, with respect to these early experiences, included 
both an attitudinal fear of the social world around her (e.g., specific people and 
also social structures including "family" and "treatment") and a highly 
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generalized negative attitude towards her self. At one point, she said: "I thought I 
was an evil person ... that I had these things happen to me." Her self-standpoint in 
recovery was associated with a movement towards greater relativistic attitudes 
overall about other people as she found some who were trustworthy and caring 
while still running into many others who were not. She also discerned more 
between her attitudes towards her self and facets or dimensions within her 
ecosystem and was more circumspect of her attitudes in relation to being 
determined in some way. 
In terms of CDs treatment experiences, all but Sam spoke of needing to 
regular! y assess the trustworthiness of authorities or experts on a person-by-
person basis in recovery (Sam avoided them all). This view wa arrived at from 
different primary attitude "settings" (e.g., highly distrustful or highly trustful). 
Sam remained most distrusting of authorities and experts. As mentioned 
previously, he had voluntarily stayed at a psychiatric hospital in his late teens for 
a couple of weeks due to difficulties with stress. However, he had been 
subsequently involuntarily hospitalized on psychiatric grounds and was the only 
participant to not perceive himself as dealing with some form of mental illne s per 
se. Still, he said that all professionals are not the same and some probably could 
be trusted, but he was not interested in the risk and effort to find them. 
4.4.2.2 An evaluating awareness of self and SD meanings. Participants 
described not having conscious awareness of attitudes towards their self when 
they were children. Attitudes appeared to arise through meaningful but 
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disconnected "jigsaw pieces" of self-awareness in their childhood, youth, and 
early adulthood. The pieces arose in relation to his or her interactions with the 
ecosystem, especially social interactions with parents, family members, peers, and 
adults associated with schools, child welfare, police, and medical professionals. 
Experiences appeared to be subjectively organized by participants into a 
generalized "picture," "story," or theory of both his or her self and the ecosystem 
that integrated value judgments (e.g., a subjective narrative). Missing pieces of 
the picture were simply filled in and alternative overall pictures that also might fit 
with pieces of experience were not considered or were rejected. As mentioned 
above, externally-based beliefs/values were often standards that participants 
compared his or her experiences with in order to generate their respective 
evaluations. Evaluations of personal experiences in relation to these external 
standards led to internalized self-appraisals. Once established or "set", these 
primary attitudes became integrated and ambient within the sense of self. 
Primary attitudes about the self were largely negative for Teresa, Colleen, 
Alexis, Carmen, Brian, and Malcolm. Early attitudes were more positive in nature 
for Sam and Susan. Participants' experiences of abuse, family losses, and/or peer 
conflicts in high school were found to be highly associated with negative views of 
his or her primary sense of self. Externally introduced notions of having mental 
health problems or addictions and directive interactions with professionals 
typically did not help counter any negative attitudes towards the self and often 
reinforced them. Brian, for example, felt socially marginalized for much of his 
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high school years. He saw himself as struggling with attention deficit disorder and 
compulsive tendencies, which he is now working on with a psychiatrist he trusts. 
He struggled with self-esteem as a youth and was diagnosed with depression. His 
attitudes included assuming that all authorities and experts knew what they were 
doing and were trustworthy. He then had a physician at university who arbitrarily 
reported his cannabis use to the government when he simply wanted to renew his 
driver's license and needed her signature. He said she "nicked him" as he did not 
understand the implications of sharing with her that he used cannabis. His license 
was not renewed based on the physician's report, he was subsequently caught 
driving, was charged, incarcerated, abused in jail, and tried to kill himself. He said 
the experience with the physician shocked him; he always trusted a doctor's 
judgment and yet felt there was no hard evidence he knew of that his use of 
cannabis wa associated with any clearly immediate problems with his health or 
operating a vehicle (although she clearly wanted him to stop). The experience 
reinforced his existing "tendency towards self-doubt, difficulty to grow, and 
problem solving." 
It was not clear if early experiences contrary to primary self-attitudes that 
appeared to be rejected or ignored still contributed to eventual shifting of 
attitudes. Nevertheless, the hermeneutic positive feedback loop uggests that 
subtle, gradual shifts are likely (as well as sudden ones discussed below); the 
metaphor of stones being tossed in the water and creating waves implies that even 
small ones could "erode" to some subtle degree what they impact against. Seven 
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of the eight participants' primary attitudes towards self/ecosystem were described 
as having shifted to varying degrees around the time when they reported pursuing 
CDs recovery. Carmen said her self attitude was changing within her over the past 
five years: "I have a lot to be proud about!" She is now more confident with 
professionals and will even share her decision-making processes on an issue-by-
issue basis with professionals she decides that she can trust. 
Part and parcel with participants' primary appraisals of self were early 
judgments of their self-knowledge and self-efficacy which, in tum, impacted on 
their determining processes of SD meanings. For example, Brian, Colleen, and 
Carmen said they saw others as knowing better about things than they did when 
they were young. Consequently, their meanings of SD were more covert, 
tentative, and defensively expressed. Susan' s statements were mixed. Sam did 
well in high school and worked in a biological research station before going to 
university. His primary attitude is interpreted as being positive about his own self-
efficacy and knowledge which, in tum, is interpreted as contributing to his 
meaning of SD being more overt and assertive. Alexis, Teresa, and Malcolm held 
primary stances that they "knew best" or they were "out to prove something" to 
others but this was not so much in a positive sense but more in relation to feelings 
of anger against self and others, a general "stubbornness" with authority, and a 
generalized "distrust" of others after traumatic experiences. Malcolm, for 
example, said that he took a drug for ADD that made him feel like a "zombie" 
when he was 9, at the insistence of his public school. His parents took him off it 
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after a few months due to the side effects but the school still in isted he take it. He 
was suspended, strapped, and the school brought in child welfare authorities who 
threatened to take him away if his parents did not keep giving him the medication. 
Malcolm's father then died when he was 12 and Malcolm said he tarted smoking 
cannabis regularly with friends at school shortly thereafter. The cannabis use 
appeased school authorities because he was now easygoing when he was high. He 
acknowledged that this suggested to him that he knew how to find his own 
solutions (including self-determining which substances worked for him) and not 
to trust authorities. An uncle subsequently coached him in hockey as a young teen 
and goaded him to be aggre sive and violent in order to be "a man." He reports: "I 
left home when I was 16 ... I ruled the world, I made the rules." 
All but Sam reported significant changes to their attitudes in terms of 
valuing their self-efficacy and knowledge in recovery. The movement was 
towards more generally balanced and situationally discerning attitudes. Those 
who thought others knew best developed more faith and confidence in their own 
personal knowledge and decision making while those who thought they knew best 
moved more towards seeing others as sometimes knowing helpful things too (and 
that they did not have to do everything alone). Malcolm stated it succinctly: "you 
say, 'hey, I am today's biggest next best thing to Wonderbread' only to find out 
you haven't gone through the batter yet." Sam's attitudes appear to have changed 
the least. He continues to generally distrust mental health professionals' 
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knowledge and intentions, at least as it applied to him. Nevertheless, he did not 
see professional help as always bad for others. 
4.4.2.3 Caring about his or her self This attitudinal dimension was often 
mentioned in relation to responsibility beliefs/values mentioned above. An 
awareness of the need to care for one's self, in terms of nurturing or compassion, 
often emerged in association with mental health or addiction-related crises in 
adulthood. Susan, for example, did not think that being a woman per se 
contributed to her not caring for her self before her crisis in her thirties; 
nevertheless, she did see this primary attitude as stemming from her family 
context that included gender roles: "I think we grew up seeing my mom please my 
dad, just in little things, so I think that is how we learned to put people first but 
not your self. My mom put us first and not herself so we grew up knowing we 
were last on the list." Her attitude towards caring more for her self in recovery 
included ending a relationship with a boyfriend while she was in an intensive 
treatment program: "before I would put the kids first or I would put my parents 
first or anybody that came in contact with me. It could be guys- I was there to 
please them and I didn't myself. Now it is me first. " 
Despite her "me first" statement, she now balances caring for her self and 
others in compassionate ways. For example, she regularly volunteers with her 
peer support center, her children are the "light of her life," and she hopes sharing 
her story might help other people in some way. In contrast, Alexis held more of a 
primary attitude along the lines of "me first." She said: "I didn't care about 
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friends. All I care about was getting money and getting high. I didn't care who I 
hurt." However, she went on to say in relation to her CDs recovery: "now I do. I 
care about myself and I care about everything." Brian, too, aid he emphasized 
taking care of others rather than himself in the past. His ex-wife also struggled 
with the effects of CDs. He said he looks back on his marriage and although he 
feels good about trying to help his ex-partner, he also feels he stayed in the 
relationship longer than was healthy for him and he is still recovering from the 
experience. Again, over time, participants' described how their attitudes in CDs 
recovery had shifted from caring primarily about others towards caring more 
about one's self or else caring more about others if they had tended to care 
primarily about his or her self. They were more situationally discerning between 
the two and they actively balanced both overall (often in relation to more nuanced 
interpretations of guiding beliefs/values). 
4.4.2.4 Negative attitudes and substance use. Five people aid that in 
hindsight their substance use/misuse was related to negative or "bad" attitudes 
towards themselves, their lack of caring about themselves, and/or not knowing 
any other way to take "good" care of his or her self. SD and self-direction was 
expressed accordingly. For example, Colleen was abused as a child. She shared 
that some family members introduced her to cannabis when she nine and that she 
enjoyed its effect: "when I started doing the pot - the weed - or the hash oil, I 
would do it and I would be stoned for 4 or 5 hours, and I wouldn't care what 
happened." She became a ward of child welfare when she wa 11. She 
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experienced various foster families and group homes. She said the experience left 
her wondering "who I really was" and she felt abandoned by all in this quandary, 
including child welfare authorities and experts. She finished high school and 
worked but at age 22 she had a "breakdown", attempted suicide, and was 
hospitalized. She did not report substance use problems as a teen. However, 
following her crisis she began to misuse a prescribed narcotic painkiller and a 
tranquilizer. Their effect echoed how she perceived the effects of cannabis when 
she was a young child: 
I used it [painkiller and/or tranquilizer] for numbing, a lot of numbing. I 
didn't want to think. I didn't want to see. I didn't want to hear what was 
going on ... I didn't want to deal with anything. I was tired of trying to deal 
with something, trying to figure it out. And you get to certain point and 
then you get let down -when you are trying ... you are thinking, 'hunh, I 
don't want to deal with this anymore. I am done. 
4.4.2.5 Distrusting/fearing the ecosystem. Most people held primary 
attitudes associated with not only seeing themselves negatively but also 
distrusting his or her self in many ways. This was a major issue for people when 
reconciling having chronic mental illness symptoms and/or addiction issues (e.g., 
self-determining that they had persistent biologically-based self-control issues 
often led them at first to distrust their thoughts and feelings even more). However, 
distrusting people or dimensions of the ecosystem were closely related, equally 
powerful if not more so, and particularly pertinent to SD meanings in CDs 
treatment. Again, a general distrust of the self versus a distrust of his or her 
ecosystem as an abstract whole (e.g., references to "society" or the "world") was 
not consciously discernable in relation to the primary standpoint. Again, over 
131 
time, the two were not so much separated from each other but different aspects of 
each became more discernable. A distrust of ecosystem forces and dimensions, 
based on real experiences of being harmed or betrayed, was the most consistent 
theme behind support for the importance of SD in CDs treatment and recovery. 
Participants agreed that as children they saw all adults collectively as 
"authority," regardless of the relationships they had with them (e.g., parents, 
teachers, police, and child welfare workers). They did not discern between 
"authorities" and "experts." Although distrustful beliefs and values of authority 
may have been picked up in childhood by some; nevertheless, primary distrustful 
attitudes towards authority were associated with them having experienced 
verifiable abuse, trauma, or indifference at a time of crisis that involving 
authorities/experts. A number of such experiences have been mentioned. 
The distrust of the ecosystem was a key primary attitude that endured for 
Carmen, Malcolm, Colleen, and Alexis well into their adulthood. In contrast, 
Brian reported that he generally trusted adults and authorities until he was 
eighteen (he originally went to college to become a police officer). As mentioned 
above, his attitudes shifted towards being more distrustful after the physician 
betrayed his confidence and a subsequent cascade of traumatic events. Sam and 
Susan are also interpreted as having generally positive attitudes towards others in 
relation to trust that shifted through experiences in their late twenties or early 
thirties. Sam's first forced hospitalization still weighs heavy on his mind. Susan's 
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distrust became pronounced after leaving her husband, becoming involved with a 
man who abused one of her children, and an arsonist lit her home on fire. 
Adjustments reflecting more relativist or situationally discerning attitudes 
towards authorities/experts occurred for all participants to varying degrees over 
time. Their attitudes in association with recovery typically viewed authority as not 
all good or all bad (including Sam). For example, the distinguishing 
characteristics that legitimized the use of authoritative powers among participants 
in recovery was whether it was applied in a way that they discerned to be 
balanced, thoughtful, saw the person as worthy and unique, and took into account 
the person's context. In other words, power and control was exercised in ways 
that they subjectively viewed (at least in hindsight) as "fair." Malcolm describes it 
as: "you're going to give me a fair shake in life." 
Participants in recovery also viewed professionals as sometimes being 
authorities, but not always. Susan saw that difference in terms of power and 
control: "an authority is just like a parent being an authority with their kids -boss 
them around. You are taking that control from the child. A professional has the 
education to know what they are talking about." She went on to say that experts 
help a person gain back greater control. Participants agreed that authorities used 
some sort of power or threat to determine or coerce you in some way, whether or 
not they knew what they were talking about or had good intentions. Participants 
tried to avoid, ignore, or suffer through people who presented themselves as 
experts but who acted primarily as authorities in treatment contexts. However, 
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recovery from CDs was seen as requiring "partnerships" with professionals and/or 
peers that were discerned to be trustworthy "experts" in relation to: 
• Being caring, careful, and respectful to the client. 
• Being knowledgeable about what they were talking about (especially 
through personal and/or clinical experience). 
• Being willing to share their knowledge with the client. 
• Being willing to learn from the participant. 
• Being able to consider relativistic views of mental illness, addiction, and 
treatment decisions. 
• Being willing to work collaboratively with the participant (especially 
when views and decisions do not always agree). 
• Being supportive of his or her SD except at times when they and/or others 
were seriously in some kind of risk. 
People sometimes "shared" or even temporarily "delegated" aspects of their SD in 
terms of decision making with experts that they trusted. For example, Malcolm 
now delegated decisions about medication to his psychiatrist despite his earlier 
attitudes: "I'll go with his decision right now because this guy, he's been fair with 
me." Overall, participants spoke of recovery being assisted through a respectful 
and supportive context that promoted shared professional-client expertise. 
These trust/distrust attitudes towards authorities/experts were consistent 
among all the different types of professionals that participants encountered. In 
terms of social workers, Susan had contact with social workers in relation to her 
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parents having custody of her children. She described these social workers as 
"authority." She also had social workers working with her in the intensive mental 
health treatment program. She described these social workers as "experts." She 
said they were experts rather than authorities because "they were more caring 
towards you than they were trying to take the power away from you. They were 
trying to give you power so you could handle it- solely." Carmen, Malcolm, and 
Sam (who worked in a social work role in a jail) were neutral to the profession. 
Some helped and some did not. Only Alexis did not remember having any contact 
with social workers per se. Role and/or agency context was not a deciding factor 
in how people in recovery saw social workers or other professionals as either 
authorities or experts. Instead, these discernments in recovery were made on a 
person-by-person basis. 
It should be noted that health care professionals and other authorities and 
social systems such as schools and child welfare, were not the only external 
influences that caused, contributed to, or reinforced fears of people within their 
ecosystem. For example, Carmen continued to be blamed by some family 
members for her behaviors as a child when she was in her twenties. Sam had a 
roommate who tried to kill him, and Susan's experiences after leaving her 
marriage were described above. However, negative experiences with treatment 
programs and practitioners were associated with many participants' primary 
distrustful/fearful attitudes and contributed to SD meanings reflecting and guiding 
people away from reaching out for help well into their future. 
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4.4.2.6 Connections. The importance of social connections and 
self/ecosystem attitudes was evident in relation to SD, the use/misuse of 
sub tances associated with the primary sense of self, and CDs recovery. For 
example, Carmen, Brian, Alexis, Sam, Teresa, and Malcolm all reported seeking 
and gaining greater acceptance or belonging (including "partying") among 
substance using peer , while still distrusting and feeling marginalized by the 
socio-cultural dimensions of ecosystem that they saw as a whole (e.g., "society"; 
"the world"). All reported holding these fearful, distrustful attitude towards this 
ecosystem dimension prior to using substances socially. Carmen and Teresa's 
problems with alcohol developed only after both started to use it socially 
following their marriages ending and feeling emotionally and socially adrift. 
Susan's sexual behavior issues also emerged after her marriage ended. Her 
decision to address her sexual addiction also involved a changed view of 
belonging in relation to her social world. Generally, substance misuse or 
addiction-related behavior came to be seen as no longer so important socially 
because attitudes towards this dimension of the ecosystem were less black-or-
white in terms of its distrustful nature and/or addictions came to be seen as no 
longer being a viable or "good" route to achieve a micro "bubble" of belonging 
within perceptions of a larger hostile world. 
Participants who decided to have an occasional beer or joint in recovery 
despite past problems did not speak of using them to find, in such de perate ways 
as in the past, connections with others or a sense of belonging. Sam was one 
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exception in terms of continuing to regularly use alcohol for strong social reasons. 
He expressed the difference for him between prescription medication and his use 
of alcohol: "you drink to excess because you need to be drunk, not to be 
sober. .. beer' s designed and marketed to be drank to relax, better than guzzling 
down valiums, and more sociable too." 
Most participants who described connecting with others around substance 
use/misuse said they eventually saw these people as not caring about them as a 
person and an important expression of connection with others was lost. This was 
often associated with the participant being in some sort of difficulty (e.g., to do 
with mental health crisis, substance-related issues, or legal problems) and their 
friends were no where to be found. However, another factor appeared to be 
important in relation to recovery and adjusting generalized distrusting attitudes 
towards his or her self- people who did not compassionately care about his or her 
self said that, for some reason, they suddenly began to. In the past, being betrayed 
or abandoned was almost to be expected if they did not care about his or her self. 
All participants said they were actively involved in finding a renewed 
sense of belonging with others in his or her recovery that did not revolve around 
substance use or addiction-related behaviors. All had reconnected to some degree 
with some family members, his or her children, old non-using friends, peer 
supports, trustworthy professionals, and more abstractly with society as a whole. 
Society as a whole was viewed by all but Sam in a more balanced or neutral way 
in terms of being hostile or trustworthy to the participant. SpirituaVreligious 
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beliefs appeared to help some participants to feel less socially threatened in 
recovery. Views in recovery were also more compatible- people held absolutist 
attitudes of what was dangerous to them (e.g., certain drugs or people) within a 
more relativistic or situationally discerning view of others overall. 
People self-determined limiting or avoiding people they "used with" in 
CDs recovery and actively sought new connections not organized around 
substance use. This included participants not organizing connections around 
formal 12-step addiction peer support participation. In contrast, six of the 
participants did organize some connections in CDs recovery around mental health 
peer support program . Professionals who were perceived as not caring were 
described negatively in a number of different ways. One example involved a 
number of participants referring to some professionals they had experienced as 
"pill pushers" in a tone similar to their references to past "drug dealers." These 
professionals were said to have pushed prescription drug use as the only hope for 
recovery in absolutist terms. However, experiencing authorities or experts who 
were caring, and who wanted to make a connection with them, sometimes 
cascaded through the standpoint of people who had primarily distrustful attitudes. 
Participants said a key part of this cascade occurring was that they wanted to 
make rather than reject such a connection with a professional. 
Wanting to make a connection in relation to CDs recovery was usually 
associated with at least four factors: ( 1) people were in some sort of different 
physical/social space; (2) they felt abandoned or betrayed by "status quo friends" 
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(e.g., substance using peers); (3) they said their stubbornness or commitment (i.e., 
their being determined) to stay the way they were was wavering; and (4) they felt 
their survival was in jeopardy figuratively or literally. Hoping to connect at these 
times and then being rejected, deferred, or harmed reinforced their primary 
negative attitudes towards authorities/experts or contributed to adjustments 
towards more distrustful attitudes among those whose primary attitudes were 
more neutral or positive to seeking help. Malcolm's connection was with a prison 
guard who said "hi" to him every day and treated him with respect, no matter how 
much Malcolm tried to insult him or ignore him. He began to think that the guard 
might know how Malcolm could "get out" quicker and so he gave him a 
"chance." The guard turned out to be trustworthy (e.g., he never used shackles on 
Malcolm), they keep in touch to this day, and Malcolm now determines whether 
treatment professionals are trustworthy on a person-by-person basis. 
Carmen's attitude began to change when she met the first professional, a 
female family physician, whom she felt finally "believed" her story of abuse and 
"believed in" her as a person. She subsequently saw an uncaring female 
psychiatrist who reinforced her distrustful attitudes and she backed off again. She 
eventually reached out again in a new rural area she had moved to. A female 
transportation coordinator went out of her way to help Carmen and this, she felt, 
contributed to a more sudden shift in her attitudes at that time. She can now make 
careful connections with males and females despite her fears. Alexis left an 
abusive boyfriend, was living in an abandoned van, and was caught stealing from 
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work for drugs. She ended up at a YWCA where she met a counselor with whom 
she still talks. Teresa became suicidal in her late thirties after her husband had 
left. She was hospitalized but did not experience a positive treatment connection 
until she was hospitalized again three years later and met a new psychiatrist. He 
helped her make her own sense of her mental health struggles. At the time of 
interviewing, Colleen had a new psychiatrist that she finds does not really listen to 
her. Fortunately, she has a good connection with her mental health caseworker. 
Brian eventually found a psychiatrist he now trusts and collaborates with. Finally, 
Susan remembers how she voluntarily agreed to stay in hospital after her series of 
tragedies. She sees herself as "lucky" that she got the psychiatrist she did: 
When his patients needed him he was always there- night or day .... he 
would sit and talk to you for an hour and usually appointments with 
psychiatrist are 5 or 10 minutes and you are out the door again .... the ones 
here that I have had- she's 10 or 15 minutes at the most and you are out, 
you are done ... that was a big thing for me- having somebody I would be 
able to trust- because most people I didn't. And it was one person I could 
and I could tell him anything, it didn't matter what it was, and he was 
always there ... a feeling of easiness and I knew that I was safe there . . . if I 
had a problem he would always look it up on the internet. And we would 
sit down and discuss what the internet said. Or, he would go to his 
colleague and tell his colleague that he had a question ... he never left you 
hanging- he always found some way to get you an answer. 
4.4.2. 7 Attitudes towards physical/social space. Open-ended questions 
probed participant meanings of SD in relation to attitudes towards the physical 
dimensions of their ecosystem. As mentioned above, Carmen viewed the physical 
world as a spiritual experience that helped re-energize her power of being 
determined and animated her SD and self-direction. She was the only one who 
referred to the physical world in a way that was independent of people and social 
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structures. The physical aspect of the social ecosystem was relevant to SD and 
recovery for more of the participants in relation to an integrated physical/social 
"space." For example, Alexis liked a lot of noise and people around her. She 
spoke of being energized by a cityscape in a way that was similar to Carmen's 
benefit from nature. Malcolm was neutral. Sam described "semi-rural" a his 
preference. The rest preferred rural or small towns because they felt less 
anonymous but not crowded. 
Four lived at some point in very large cities. They thought that the social 
pressure overwhelmed them and the anonymity was depersonalizing. Carmen 
thought that her impulsive move to the country after her marriage ended, and 
another bad experience with a psychiatrist was, in hindsight, critical for her 
recovery. "Isolating" herself in an area with fewer resources available left her 
actually feeling more validated with the professionals she was able to find there: 
"I wouldn't have made it if I had stayed in the city ... there has to be some sort of 
personal. You are talking about the most personal stuff in your life so you can' t be 
a number." Malcolm also found him elf in a different space when he said he first 
turned towards CDs recovery - solitary confinement. In hindsight, he found that 
being in the cell space alone started a change in his awareness of his self, mental 
health, addiction, and change: 
The freedom they give you is when they lock the door. .. your freedom to 
think ... free time away from alcohol or substance ... you' re using your 
brain instead of just saying, 'ok, if I put this up my nose or just swallow 
that' 11 answer today' s problems' . .. but now, opening your eyes and saying, 
'ok, hey, how do I deal with it?' Well, when you're in a 4 by 4 - and I'm 
not talking about a truck - yeah, you get to use your mind a lot. 
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However, as mentioned above, Brian was also incarcerated at one point. 
The impact of his experience was opposite in almost every way to Malcolm's and 
led him to integrate more distru t into his attitudes towards authorities/experts. 
Other people spoke of being in a different social/physical space prior to recovery 
that could just as easily have caused them to harm themselves or even be killed by 
others. Consequently, being in a different physical/social space alone is not 
interpreted as being predictive of a participant deciding to pursue recovery and 
could, unpredictably, be harmful to CDs recovery. 
4.4.3 Sense of Control and Aspirations 
Malcolm said: "kids have a dream, you know. Try to follow the dream." 
Control refers to ways or means of restraining, restricting, compelling, or 
regulating something or someone as well as the power to determine a certain 
course of events, (Soanes & Stevenson, 2006, p. 311). The term, aspiration, is 
future oriented and refers to "hope or ambition" (Soanes & Stevenson, 2006, p. 
79). The aspiration element was referred to in interviews by participant references 
to '"dreams", "hopes" and "goals.' They overlap with control in terms of what the 
purpose or desired outcome is behind controlling someone (including the self), 
something, or a desired course of events. 
Goals often represented steps within a larger pursuit of participants ' 
aspirations. Consequently, goals could change while aspirations remained the 
same. This was described by a number of participants in relation to his or her 
sense of control and substance use/misuse or addiction-related behaviors. For 
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example, aspirations of wanting to feel more in control for a number of 
participants was pursued via goals of using/misusing substances prior to pursuing 
CDs recovery. Goals of not misusing substances in CDs recovery were as ociated 
with, arguably, the same aspirations when participants perceived that addiction 
and/or mental health symptoms had taken control of his or her self, substance use 
was now more of a threat than a help, and he or she wanted to take back more 
control of his or her life. The two standpoint elements are pre en ted together as 
they were closely entwined in participants' statements of what SD meant to them 
in CDs treatment and recovery. 
4.4.3.1 Formation of sense of control and aspirations. People thought, in 
hindsight, that their early sense of control involved beliefs/values that people 
generally should be able to determine almost anything about their self and achieve 
their desired goals, no matter what. One primary standpoint "setting" that 
subsequently was established and that was especially evident among those who 
had been abused was that they had little or no ability to control or determine 
aspects of his or her self, the surrounding ecosystem, or a desired course of 
events. Other participants reported having early experiences that were as ociated 
with forming a sense that he or she did have control over his or her self, the 
surrounding ecosystem, and a desired course of events. These participants 
reported running later into aspects of their self and/or their ecosystem that they 
could not control, regardless of how determined they were. Over time, all 
participants developed more situationally relative, compatible, and discerning 
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standpoints in relation to SD, his or her self, the ecosystem, their sense of control, 
and their aspirations. 
As mentioned above, participants thought that they should have or gain 
control over his or self, the ecosystem generally, and what was necessary to 
achieve their aspirations. As with the formation processes of primary attitudes, 
discrete self-ecosystem interactions were subsequently organized, like the 
attitudinal jigsaw pieces discussed above, into a generalized image, theory, or 
personal narrative that reflected how they subjectively judged their abilities and 
expectations in relation to the standard belief. Some spoke of feeling that he or 
she had little or no ability or means to self-determine his or her self, the 
ecosystem, or their desired course of events and that this was "bad." For example, 
Carmen and Colleen reported concluding that they felt that they had failed 
somehow when they were children by not protecting themselves from abuse by 
adults. Both also said they believed, as young adults, that they had failed to 
protect others they cared about and were responsible for (e.g., Carmen's younger 
sister and Colleen's children). As mentioned above, expectations associated with 
a more positive primary sense of control were established and were defended by 
other participants who had experienced some early goal successes. 
Mental health crises were strongly associated with participants fearing 
they would, or had, failed in relation to achieving or maintaining their important 
goals and aspirations. Recovery from CDs was associated with people re-
adjusting or reorienting their self-determined goals to include more nuanced 
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aspirations of having a life worth living. A life worth living included needing to 
effectively manage one's mental health, mental illness, and addiction issues. 
People saw SD as fundamental to their sense of control, hope, goal setting, 
decision making associated with aspirations, maintaining goals achieved, or 
changing their goals. Typically, early substance use was perceived as either 
neutral to their control and aspirations or actually helped them feel more in 
control (Sam continued to hold this view in relation to managing "stress"). Self-
determining a goal of pursuing recovery from CDs was associated with the 
majority of participants' finding at some point that they had lost control to an 
addiction and/or mental illness symptoms. The value and use of prescription 
medications to the person in recovery was also evaluated very specifically to how 
well it supported a participants' aspirations, including helping enhance his or her 
sense of control. The treatment process vis-a-vis participants' aspirations in 
relation to being in control (e.g., coercive versus collaborative medication 
recommendations) were described by all participants as being just as important to 
recovery as the medicinal effect alone. 
4.4.3.2 Controlling versus influencing. CDs recovery was associated with 
people consciously adjusting their primary sense of control "setting" (often in 
concert with questioning their beliefs/values pertaining to meanings of 
responsibility and freedom). The sense of control associated with CDs recovery 
brought forward more situationally relative and discerning notions of control in 
relation to the self, the ecosystem, and the future. This shift led to different 
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decision making in recovery that valued more their attempts to influence rather 
than control his or her self, aspects of their ecosystem, and/or desired outcomes 
(i.e., they were less emotionally dependent on desired outcomes or trusting of 
"guarantees" of success). Unexpected or undesired outcomes appeared to be 
experienced as less traumatic or self-damning failures. More nuanced views of 
control were evident in many participants' statements that related SD to complex 
combinations of internal states, ecosystem contexts, and external asymmetrical 
powers they faced over their lifespan. Carmen stated: 
When we're not in control? When it is something that we have no control 
over. Oh, as chlldren we have none, as an employee, as a member of 
society. There are so many situations ... those are the key words- 'not 
allowed.' So, yeah, we are all entitled to it [SD]. We are all able to do it. 
But there is a cap on it...And are there reasons for that cap? ... Yeah, 
because self-determination is going to be different for every single human 
being .... Oh, there is so much you can play with that. There are just so 
many ways. But I would not have gotten as far as I am right now without 
it though. I think, I think the number one stopper; the number one thing 
that puts the cap on it though is ourselves. 
4.4.3.3 Substances, control, and goals. As mentioned above, people said 
that their substance use was initially benign or else it was positively related to 
their primary sense of control issues. In turn, this helped their pursuit or 
maintenance of important goals and aspirations. People said that, at that point, 
they were going to misuse substances no matter what anyone else might try to say 
or do. For example, Teresa only began to smoke cigarettes in her late thirties, 
shortly after her husband left her (she said she a tried a few as a teenager but did 
not like it). She said: "I decided I'd like to try it again and then when I tried it I 
liked it- it kept me under control ... yeah [like medication]." Her doctor continues 
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to try to get her to stop and she said she has cut down. However, she dared me -
she said "just try"- in anticipation of me suggesting she stop in our interview 
(which I was not about to do). Carmen did not start drinking until her early 
thirties. She said that it was helpful to her goals of needing more fun in her life. 
However, she emphasized that it was just as important in terms of her en e of 
control: "that is why we call it bottled courage- that is what it was all about. It 
was the only way that I had control." Malcolm used alcohol and cocaine heavily 
in his twenties and thirties. He indicated: "I didn't think I could go a day without 
it. This was my control of my life." Colleen's substance rnisu e helped her not 
care, think, or feel- which was her goal at the time. Brian continues to use 
cannabis and anti-depressants becau e he finds they help manage his depression 
and ADD; however, he abstains from alcohol and other non-prescription 
substance use because he knows from experience that they make managing things 
worse. Sam avoids cannabis and all other drugs except alcohol which he uses, at 
least partly, to manage stress: "I do enjoy the drink. This is more reasons than 
excuses but l have a lot of stress." Finally, Alexis said that the major reason she 
used was to party; however, she found that drugs had an added benefit for many 
years -they helped her manage the voices: 
It probably started when I guess like I was 14 and it tarted ... I kind of 
heard voices and it was just more of whisper- stuff that didn't really make 
sense. And I didn't know what to make of it. And I was also kind of 
getting into drugs at the same time and the drugs would kind of take that 
away ... every psychiatrist tells me, 'oh the drugs make the voices worse' 
but not true. 
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Non-substance addictions also were associated with control and 
aspirations. Carmen said she recently made sense of her binge eating as being all 
about gaining weight in order to limit men's advances after so many abuse 
experiences. Susan related her addiction-related sexual behavior partly to her 
needing someone: "I think it was more of contentment, having someone there 
constantly." 
Decisions to address substance use or addiction-related behaviors were 
associated with people self-determining that addictions had taken over control of 
their life and were now threatening their important goals (including survival). In 
other words, they had lost control and they now wanted control back. Alexis 
stated: "the substances were freeing [at first]- yeah ... [but later] they do, they 
totally control you, totally." She said that at age twenty-two, she risked talking 
"real" to a counselor at the "Y" despite her distrust of authority because she 
realized that "ok, you're just way out of control", that her life was in danger, and 
that she actually wanted to save herself. She later relapsed and avoided help again 
until last year when she decided suddenly to tum her life around again: "I totally 
lost control. I sunk to a whole new level." She wrote a poem entitled, Crack, 
which symbolizes how the drug took control and how she now views it (Appendix 
VIII). Teresa spoke of realizing suddenly at one point, and for no reason she can 
put her finger on, that she was out of control with her drinking: "I really don't 
know what made me stop but I just didn't want to drink no more. I thought, 'oh 
my, if you don't start doing something and take control of your life, you are going 
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to die." Malcolm said: "I just woke up one day and I said it is time to take control 
of me. The parole board, the guards- they just, 'this ain't the same guy. What 
happened?"' For Carmen, regaining control was associated with addressing her 
eating issues on her own. For Susan, it meant dealing with her sexual behaviors 
with profes ional and peer assistance. 
A number of participants ' decisions to avoid or stop mental health or 
addiction treatment were also associated with their sense of control and fears of 
failing to achieve goals or aspirations (including simply surviving). Teresa 
recounted how she felt during her first hospitalization in 1993: "that was terrible 
[in the hospital in 1993]. I thought I have to get out of here or I am going to die." 
People stopped or avoided medication when they subjectively determined 
that it did not help enhance their sense of control (this included the directive way 
that medications were prescribed and monitored). For example, Malcolm and 
Alexis said they felt like "zombies" on some medications. When there was little 
willingness on the part of a professional to adjust them or try to help them without 
medication, then they stopped taking them, overtly or covertly. Both described 
returning to using problem substances or they tried new substances that they then 
became addicted to. In CDs recovery, both sought new ways to cope and function 
without relapsing. Colleen also struggled with medication side effects. One 
prescription made her feel too sedated one part of the day and too agitated at 
another. She expressed her concern to her psychiatrist but he kept upping the 
dosage. She covertly stopped taking them. Teresa was heavily medicated when 
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fust hospitalized. She said: "my psychiatrist put me in the hospital for 3 Y2 months 
. .. and he just kept putting me on more pills and more pills and more pills. Finally 
I got, 'I'm going home. I am not staying another 3 months.' So, I went home and 
threw out all the pills he gives me." When participants thought that medication 
helped increase their hope associated with their aspirations (especially perception 
that medication helped their sense of control issues) then they valued taking them 
and "compliance" was less of an issue. 
4.4.3.4 Goa/failure, crises, and hope. Participants spoke of having many 
aspirations when they were young. Regardless of their sense of control, all had 
degrees of success in pursuing related goals and achieving them. Malcolm aspired 
to be a famous rock musician. He took lessons, found he had some talent, and 
played professionally for a number of years. Teresa said that her dream of family 
love and the goals to achieve it were clear to her by age 12: leave her mother's 
home as soon as possible, work, find a partner, have children, and raise a family -
which she did. Susan went to college for a year. Her goals included getting 
married and having children- which she did. Brian' s goal was to work in law 
enforcement and he completed a college degree in this area. He was married and 
attended university before his experience with the physician there and 
subsequently losing his license and being incarcerated contributed to him quitting 
university (he hopes to soon return to school). Alexis wanted to party but she was 
also determined to finish high school, which she did, and she has mostly worked 
since that time. Colleen too was determined to finish high school despite living in 
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group homes and constantly running away- she did graduate. She worked after 
high school until her breakdown in her twenties, but a few years later she fell in 
love and married. Although the marriage did not last she said it was good for the 
first few years. Sam worked at a biological research station in his last year of high 
school and then went to university where he continued to do research. He worked 
as a counselor after university and has an adult son with whom he keeps contact. 
Carmen survived her teens without being hospitalized again, married, had 
children, and worked as a chef. She had a good relationship with a man for 
number of years after moving to the rural location. They remain friends although 
they are not still together. 
However, important "failures" in relation to major goals and aspirations 
were profoundly felt life events for all participants and were closely intertwined 
with mental health crises, mental illness symptoms being exacerbated, and 
substance use problems developing or worsening. For example, Malcolm reported 
his substance use did become an issue at one point for the band he was with and 
they asked him to clean up. He said he tried to stop on his own but he found that 
what he now sees as symptoms of mental illness "got worse." He went back to 
using harder than before, quit music, and joined a gang engaged in crime. 
In relation to mental health and mental illness, people who had failed to 
achieve important goals or aspirations, or those whom had successfully attained 
something feared losing it somehow (e.g., marriage), were often at a point where 
their power associated with being determined was at risk of collapsing (e.g., why 
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care, keep trying, or keep going?). This experience was associated with feeling 
there was of "no hope" and they described how they typically plunged into a 
crisis. Suicide was often considered, and attempted by some. 
For some, their first experience with mental health symptoms significantly 
interfering in their ability to function personally and socially, and subsequent 
mental health diagnosis and treatment, followed major goal failures or losses. For 
example, Teresa discussed her experience of achieving her goals associated with 
being married, having a family, owning a home- and then losing them: "I guess I 
tried to live by rules to the fact that some day I am going to be out by myself in 
the whole world and my life is going to change and tum around- which it did. I 
made it turn around. And then in 1993 I couldn't do it." She was ftrst hospitalized 
in 1993, started drinking daily shortly thereafter for a number of years, and she 
has struggled with severe mental illness symptoms ever since. 
As analyzed above, the failure to achieve goals and aspirations, or hold on 
to those already attained, was also associated with people deciding at some point 
that they needed to change their substance use or non-substance addiction 
behaviors on their own. Eventually, all but Sam said they risked reaching out for 
help or else making a connection with treatment. Reaching out occurred despite 
many participants' attitudes of fear and distrust towards treatment professionals, 
programs, and systems - treatment was seen as the last chance, the best chance, or 
the only remaining chance of finding some hope. Carmen expressed her state 
before finally asking for help in the following way: "I was scared. I honestly 
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thought I was going to die ... this is what I felt was happening and whether it be 
literally or if it was just a figurative thing- I don't know what it was but I felt I 
had to get help." Although people reached out for help and most did find someone 
they could trust; nevertheless, SD and self-direction remained important. When 
SD was wiJlingly delegated to others, it was viewed as temporary by participants. 
Hope reenergized the "power" associated with being self-determined. 
Hope was often associated with attitudes shifting towards being more nurturing 
and compassionate towards the self. Hope was also found when a person was 
looking for help and ran into someone that the person felt cared and believed in 
them. For some, these people were associated with authoritative limits being 
placed on the participant (often at a time of crisis). Professionals who somehow 
tried to work with participants' aspirations rather than ignore or clash with them 
helped give them hope. Such people took the participants[' ] experiences into 
consideration, framed treatment as a means of better achieving goals, and 
demonstrated a willingness to adjust limits and goals over time. Finally, hope, 
was intrinsically linked to self-determined goal adjustments that were both 
important and perceived to be achievable, including non-absolutist goals of 
recovery that focused on improving quality of life. Non-absolutist recovery goals 
and aspirations occurred for most people in association with a deep acceptance 
that they should not expect to always be in complete control of his or her self, 
aspects of his or her ecosystem, or achieving a desired future goal of not having 
mental illness symptoms or be at risk for addiction problems. 
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People continue to pursue and achieve goals within a more nuanced sense 
of control in recovery. Alexis returned to working part-time and is looking at 
becoming a veterinarian technician. Sam was renovating his apartment and 
upgrading his computer despite very tight funds. Malcolm worked with people 
who have schizophrenia and speaks to young people in custody. He said that he 
had achieved his original goal of becoming a "somebody" - he said he was just 
going about it the wrong way before. Colleen was volunteering and taking course 
on managing her emotions. Susan was also volunteering, sharing the care of her 
children, and considering college. Brian was working and hoping return to 
university. Carmen started writing a book, was thinking of starting a self-help 
group for people with Fybromyalgia and histories of trauma, and was focused on 
nurturing relationships with good friends. Finally, Teresa was enjoying spending 
time with her friends and family, helping people whenever she can with a kind 
word or a prayer, and reminding herself that she is loved by many. 
4.4.3.5 Survival versus living. Participants agreed that aspirations and 
goals associated with "surviving" and "living" were different. All agreed that SD 
is basic to both but that SD was viewed as more of an absolute right in relation to 
his or her survival but it was conditional in relation to a less tenuous experience of 
living. A number acknowledged a perception of survival versus living was 
subjective, such as in terms of their changing view in relation to some moods such 
as depression and/or physical states such as opiate or cocaine withdrawal . Most 
also spoke of how others may view this right differently than they did, regardless 
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of mental illness or addiction. For example, Sam said that many of the gang 
members he knew would "make self-determination their [absolute] right, no 
matter what." 
Brian and Sam mentioned Mazlow's hierarchy of needs in terms of basic 
survival and mental health issues, using substances to cope with the effects of 
traumatic life experiences, using them to help them face perceived ecosystem 
dangers, and/or using to help them simply avoid withdrawal illness with 
dependence. Participants' other needs or goals, once survival was perceived as 
secure, were varied and collectively associated with "living" (i.e., no hierarchal 
structure was interpreted other than between surviving and living). Alexis said: 
"well, surviving is just, I don't know, staying alive, not being dead. Living 
is ... purpose in life and enjoying it." She added in the follow-up interview: 
"Living, you have your hopes and dreams." Carmen said: 
When you survive you have to struggle. It is a fight, it is a 
battle ... surviving is constantly having to prove that you deserve 
something or that you deserve to live ... surviving is totally different than 
living because surviving - you are always going through something. 
Suicide was mentioned by some. They saw it as a potentially self-
determined goal and a self-directed action, especially in relation to a failure of 
some sort to achieve or hold onto important goals/aspirations and the absence of 
hopes and dreams to gain, reclaim, or replace them. However, a more discerning 
view of suicide was typically associated with participants' recovery. The view 
often included critically questioning their suicide ideation as partly biologically 
generated and consequently not always or completely a trustworthy "message" to 
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act on. Many used substances to help blunt or numb suicidal ideation in the past. 
A number said that medication might help with these thoughts and feelings but 
they also have to challenge the "trustworthiness" of their suicidal 
thoughts/feelings in the moment. Using their personal "power" and actively being 
determined to push through the difficult time was also mentioned as part of 
managing suicidal ideation in recovery. This more nuanced view also appeared to 
contribute to people seeing more, or different, choices at these times. However, 
the knowledge they gained through experience with these times suggested to them 
that their thoughts and feelings cannot be "cured" or totally controlled. They said 
that reoccurrences could lead to relapses with substances in the future if they 
perceived that use (including misuse) was the only way to survive, despite risks 
such as becoming addicted again or overdosing. 
4.4.3.6 CDs recovery. CDs recovery involved participants self-
determining to pursue a goal of improving his or her quality of life through 
consciously managing mental health and/or substance use issues. SD meanings 
and self-direction in recovery reflected this orientation. In this way, there was a 
relationship with enhancing one's sense of control in new ways (e.g., given old 
ways such as substance use that no longer worked) and self-made decisions to 
focus on managing mental illness symptoms, not use/misuse substances, use/not 
use prescription drugs, and/or try other forms of treatment (e.g., psychotherapy; 
case management; physical exercise; acupuncture; peer supports). Mental illness 
symptom management goals were relativistic and focused on influencing 
156 
symptoms in ways that improved the person's subjective experience of living or 
quality of life. The shift in emphasis allowed them to look more to goals 
associated with "living" in spite of symptoms and/or substance use issues rather 
than just survive and wait for some external cure, merely engage in a vi ion of the 
future that involved desperate bids to achieve absolutist goals of recovery pre-
determined by others, just survive, give up, or die. As mentioned above, 
collaborative work with professionals who helped augment a person's sense of 
control in terms of both process and content of treatment interventions, including 
"fair" limit under certain circumstances, was highly valued. 
4.4.4 Standpoint: Summing Up 
The standpoint elements are interrelated with each other, with the 
ecosystem, and with the other two components of SD meanings. Participants 
appeared to value the relative "stability" of their standpoints within these dynamic 
interrelationships, whether associated with the primary or nuanced sense of self. 
However, it was also evident that they had experienced great growth, shifts or 
changes in their sense of self over time. SD meanings and self-direction may play 
an important role in regulating subjectively perceived needs for degrees of 
relative self-stability within growth and change. 
Most participants spoke of how they came to realize that they had largely 
automatically defended their SD and self-direction (or surrendered it) when 
younger (e.g., associated with the primary sense of self). In recovery, all spoke of 
a greater conscious awareness of self. All but Sam spoke of choosing to share or 
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temporarily delegate facets of their SD and self-direction in recovery spiritually 
and/or to people they "trusted." Consequently, SD meanings and self-direction did 
not simply point to "more" or "total" autonomy, freedom, or control of self in 
relation to the ecosystem. Instead, participants pursuing CDs recovery exercised 
SD in ways more characterized by selectively fostering their autonomy, upholding 
it, exercising it, sharing it, and selectively accepting limits on it or temporarily 
delegating it. The next two sections look more closely at the other two 
components of SD meanings: determining processes and being determined about 
someone (including the self) or something. 
4.5 SD: Determining Processes 
The major SD processes are knowledge building and decision making 
(Figure 4.5). Knowledge supports and guides decision making and helps organize 
the self-standpoint elements of SD meanings in ways that, arguably, contributed 
to regulating the relative stability, security, integration, coherence, and continuity 
of the sense of self simultaneously with experiencing if not pursuing self-growth, 
shifts, and changes; all within dynamic self-ecosystem contexts and 
interrelationships. Decision making includes reactive and proactive decisions, 
rational decision making skills, and intuitive or "gut" decisions. Decision making 
is the exchange point between SD meanings and self-directed actions. 
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Standpoint of Self (elements) 
~LF-DETERMINATI00 
/ ~ (meanings) 1 ~ ~ 
Determining (processes) 
• Knowledge building 
• Decision making 
Being Determined 
(power) 
Figure 4.5: Self-Determination Meanings: Determining processes. 
4.5.1 Knowledge and Knowledge Building 
The grounded theory conceptualize two knowledge base . One i 
generalized, rooted in the ecosystem, and not based on the personal experiences of 
the participant. The second is rooted internally in each person and is gained 
through meaningful personal experiences (i.e., experiential learning). 
Participants described knowledge based in the ecosystem as having two 
branches specific to this theory of SD meanings. One was the religious or spiritual 
beliefs and socio-cultural values discussed earlier that participants were educated 
or socialized into through family, schools, and other socio-cultural interactions 
with individuals and structures or institutions. The other was "expert" or 
"technical" information about the self, the ecosystem, mental health, mental 
illness, addictions, treatment, and recovery. The expert/technical information 
typically was associated with professionals and scientific research (although it 
was sometimes also associated with peer or self-help movements and programs). 
It could be accessed through interactions with "experts" or "authorities" 
personally or else through information transfer via books, journals, magazines, the 
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internet, television, and radio. In contrast, experiential knowledge was gained 
through participants' cumulative memories and interpretations of important self-
ecosystem experiences and outcomes. 
The primary sense of self was characterized by knowledge that was 
primarily rooted in the ecosystem and whose utility to the person and his or her 
life experience was not actively questioned. Knowledge gained through 
experiential learning was generally described by participants as being subservient 
to externally-based knowledge and meanings when they were young. 
Expert/technical information was also not critically questioned but instead wa 
perceived as meaningless or else either generally adopted or generally rejected. In 
CDs recovery, participants more actively questioned their knowledge gained from 
past experience, their established primary beliefs/values that they were educated 
into at a young age, and how expert/technical information applied to them (i.e., 
experience-based knowledge had shifted towards no longer being viewed as 
subservient to externally-based knowledge). The knowledge-building 
(hermeneutic) positive feedback loop is interpreted in this grounded theory as the 
process by which knowledge is cumulatively gained, assessed, and used 
differently by the more nuanced sense of self in CDs recovery. 
4.5.1.1 External knowledge: Beliefs/values. As previously stated, the 
utility of a participant's primary beliefs and values was not found to be critically 
questioned when he or she was young. Malcolm referred to the external 
foundation of these early forms of knowledge in terms of being "programmed 
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when young," Susan spoke of it as being "essentially told what to do" when she 
was a child, and Teresa referred to it as "following the rules" of getting a job, 
getting married, having children, and building a house. When life experiences 
contrasted with expectations associated with their primary beliefs/values then 
participants became confused and often distressed. This "dissonance" was most 
clearly associated with experiences involving trauma and abuse, rejection by 
peers, grief and loss, the failure to achieve or maintain goals, an inability to 
control symptoms of mental illness, and/or an inability to control or stop patterns 
associated with addictions. The trend in recovery towards a greater attention to, 
and integration of, nuances of meaning was associated with participants gaining 
critical awareness of previously unquestioned beliefs/values. Recovery was 
characterized by participants rejecting certain primary beliefs or values, re-
committing to others, or, more typically, adjusting them in ways that fit better 
with the experiential knowledge they had gained over time and were found to 
simply work better vis-a-vis CDs recovery. Adjustments could reverberate 
through standpoint elements and influence subsequent standpoint realignments, 
SD meanings, and the sense of self overall. 
4.5.1.2 External knowledge: Expert/technical. Most people said that 
expert/technical information about mental illness and/or addiction was inherently 
negative and had no practical use to them prior to their deciding to pursue 
recovery. Malcolm said "what did I know, I was a kid?" when asked what ADD 
meant to him when he was young. Carmen spoke about watching expert on a 
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television talk show talk about how people who were abused were more likely to 
turn around and abuse their children. This information reinforced her negative 
attitudes towards herself and contributed to her decision to not pursue joint 
custody of her children when she left her marriage. 
However, recovery included participants actively seeking out externally-
based experUtechnical information (for Sam it was primarily to protect his rights). 
This self-determined pursuit of experUtechnical information was incorporated into 
the knowledge building positive (hermeneutic) feedback loop. Participants made 
personal and subjective sense of experUtechnical information through 
synthesizing it with, or grounding it in, their personal knowledge. In other words, 
they more actively self-determined the personal meaning(s) they took from the 
generalized experUtechnical information. Used this way, the expert/technical 
information also could contribute to a greater understanding of the self and/or 
contributed to critically examining and potentially adjusting the meaning(s) of life 
experiences and personal knowledge (which could then influence self-standpoint 
elements and, in turn, the sense of self overall). The expert/technical knowledge 
was also actively worked with in recovery in ways that appeared to help 
participants regulate the relative stability of their sense of self in relation to 
growth and change, all integrated within his or her ecosystem. For example, all 
but Sam had chosen to take courses or programs that educated them about their 
diagnosed mental illnesses and different ways to manage them. Even Sam 
expressed an interest in an assessment; however, he was not sure he could trust 
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anyone's opinion at this point. Brian, Malcolm, Colleen, and Alexis had also 
taken courses or programs on substance misu e. Susan attended a program that 
included learning more about her behavioral addiction and how she might deal 
with it. It seemed that the longer a person was actively engaged in CDs recovery, 
the more he or she self-determined personal meanings of expert/technical 
information about mental illness and addiction. Tran lating into personal 
meanings or making personal sense of expert/technical information mirrored 
participants questioning externally-based primary beliefs/values and internally-
ba ed knowledge associated with past experiences discussed below. In turn, they 
more consciously determined meanings that they perceived as facilitating their 
CDs recovery. 
Examples of making personal meanings or sense of expert/technical 
information about mental illness and addiction in recovery included Alexi ' 
struggle to make sense of her different diagnoses. She has decided for her elf that: 
"I think it should just be called mental illness ... ! don't think you can group a 
bunch of people and say all these people have bi-polar or all these people are 
schizophrenic. I think everybody might have a little bit of each thing." Based on 
this self-knowledge, she chose to take a course on the self-management of 
emotions. Teresa provided another example. She was first told she had 
schizophrenia and then bi-polar in her early forties. She was heavily medicated, 
left hospital, and threw out all the pills. She started using alcohol and had orne 
enjoyable times until it got out of hand. She was hospitalized again three years 
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later and met a psychiatrist who helped her make her own sense of her symptoms 
and suffering; she said he told her that she simply was "very sick girl with a case 
of bad nerves." She added that she was "living with a broken heart." This 
interpretation of expert/technical information associated with mental illness made 
sense to her and helped her integrate her symptoms into her sense of self in a way 
that helped her cope and helped her grow in ways that improved her quality of 
life. Malcolm connected his addiction issues experientially with consistently 
causing his anger to become uncontrollable "for no good reason" (regardless of 
expert/technical explanations). He said liquor did this but not the occasional beer. 
Consequently, he abstains from all liquor and has a beer "once in a blue moon." 
Susan has to manage her tendency to have other differentiated sides of her 
personality "take over" under stress, especially the personality a sociated with her 
addictive behaviors in the past. She avoids non-prescription substances because 
she fears that use would hinder her ability to maintain the re-constituted coherent 
sense of self that she had lost. 
4.5.1.3 Internal knowledge: Experiential learning. Personal experience 
can be thought of as always occurring. However, people related only certain 
experiences that were integrated into their self-knowledge. Externally-based 
knowledge that was internalized, together with knowledge building through 
experiential learning, is interpreted here as being synthesized into each person's 
unique and subjective self-knowledge library of meanings. This body of 
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knowledge provided a base for each person's meaning of SD. The person's 
subjective self-narrative reflected or helped to organize this self-knowledge. 
The positive (hermeneutic) feedback loop of knowledge building infers 
that new knowledge can, potentially, be added to the existing body of personal 
knowledge or "library" through interpreting ongoing experiences, through 
reinterpretations of past meanings and experiences, and/or through the 
interpretation/reinterpretation of externally-based beliefs/values and 
expert/technical information. Building new knowledge replaced or, more typically 
among participants, adjusted, enriched, or adapted existing knowledge and skills. 
4.5.1.4/ntemal knowledge: The hermeneutic circle. Knowledge building 
was hermeneutic in the sense that knowledge associated with a participant's 
primary sense of self was found to be more consciously known to participants 
over time and more likely to be critically questioned. Critical questioning could 
lead to new understandings that shifted the person's overall self-knowledge. At 
the same time, accumulating new self-knowledge had the potential to continually 
inform or stress already interpreted past experiences, established beliefs/values, 
already internalized expert/technical information, and established goals and 
aspirations. Hermeneutics assumes that this circular or spiral process can continue 
with no endpoint. 
4.5.1.5 Seeing patterns. Participants critically working with their self-
knowledge in recovery often referred to seeing important patterns in relation to 
their self and/or those in their ecosystem. Carmen, for example, stated: "I used to 
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be a runner. I have a saying up on my wall now that says, 'if running is not the 
answer then that leaves deal with it! '" Teresa found Chri tmas to be very painful. 
She now plans carefully how she spends this time and with whom. Colleen said 
she realize part of her difficultie with interacting with other i he grew up 
relying on tone of voices to try to avoid abuse: "the way my family works is 
tones [of voice]. We were never allowed to show emotion or anything .. . so I go by 
your tone and if your tone is elevated then I am going to fight with you because I 
know you are ready to fight with me." Finally, Malcolm aw an important pattern 
in his use of ub tances over the year and his anger: "the alcohol - I thought it 
was helping. It was bringing the anger. Then the anger gets a hold . .. even today I 
know if I drink the hard stuff, yeah, like one minute we are talking, the next 
minute we are on the floor acting like it is WWF." Another example of 
participants' seeing patterns in the eco ystem is the prejudice many spoke of 
experiencing from professionals because of past or current ubstance use that 
could "trump" seeing their mental illness in a better light. Sam saw another 
pattern among treatment professional and programs that he deal with regularly -
many don 't recognize his knowledge and he knows that they are trying to be 
expert about thing when they "don't know what they are talking about." 
4.5.1.6 Catalytic self-ecosystem experiences. As mentioned before, 
expert/technical information, or alternative interpretations to participants' 
interpretation of experiences, that somehow conflicted with the established 
primary sense of self were often described as being ignored, attacked, or viewed 
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as meaningless before pursuing CDs recovery. However, they may still have had 
an effect. The grounded theory assumes that the hermeneutic positive feedback 
loop is always active to different degrees. The person and/or others may not be 
aware of subtle "erosions" in the foundation of his or her primary self-standpoint 
that could cumulatively contribute to gradual or sudden shifts. Catalytic self-
ecosystem experiences were distinguished by particularly dramatic descriptions of 
sudden changes in perspective by participants. These experiences often disrupted 
or challenged self-standpoint elements in ways that were immediately noticeable 
to the person, for "good or for bad." They stand out as a dimension of 
participants' knowledge building by references to: "waking up," "shocked", "a 
light bulb going on," "opening my eyes," "deciding one night to go to detox," 
"throwing out the pills," and "a fog lifting." Brian had one negative catalytic 
experience mentioned above that led to his greater distrust of authorities/experts. 
He related another positive one when he went to college: 
In terms of public school and high school... I didn't fit in and people 
would make fun of me or some people would rumor that I was gay and 
stuff like that.. .that...and at the time, you know, 'holy shit, I am hated by 
everybody' . . . I guess one of the shocks was when I went to college ... you 
don't see fistfights, you don't see people doing that disrespective behavior 
that you do in public school...they' re more accepting of people's choice or 
status or functioning ... so that was a shock ... going to college was a shock. 
Catalytic self-ecosystem interactions were unique and uniquely 
unpredictable. Many of these experiences were key milestones, good or bad, of 
the primary sense of self. Others were interpreted as contributing to a shift to a 
more nuanced sense of self in CDs recovery. For example, Malcolm remembered 
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seeing the Beatles on the Ed Sullivan Show when he was little and it was the 
catalyst for him to pursue becoming a famous musician. His determination was 
engaged for the next fifteen years in pursuing this goal and giving it up was one of 
the most traumatic and difficult experiences of his life. The psychiatrist abusing 
Carmen when she was a child was the catalyst for her to avoid all mental health or 
addiction treatment professionals for over twenty years. She was tenacious in this 
pursuit and a profound fear of dying was her only reason to finally reach out for 
help in her thirties. Sam's forced hospitalization had a catalytic effect on his trust 
of mental health programs and professionals that continues to drive him to avoid 
all treatment connections. 
Catalytic experiences were consistently associated with six participants' 
reports of when they remembered becoming highly motivated or determined, and 
determining or planning to act in some way that involved pursuing CDs recovery. 
These particular catalytic experiences are interpreted as kick-starting or shifting 
the person in a way that contributed to a move towards developing a more 
nuanced sense of self. They seemed to trigger a person becoming more aware of 
ambient primary self-standpoint elements and dimensions, questioning them, and 
potentially adjusting them in ways characterized by their being more situationally 
relative, compatible, and discerning. They also were associated with people 
becoming more critically evaluative of outcomes associated with their power to 
be determined about someone (including the self) or something (e.g., discerning 
more between helpful and unhelpful facets of their stubbornness or loyalties). As 
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mentioned previously, a number of common factors were associated with 
recovery oriented catalytic experiences, such as: people were not able or willing 
to maintain primary SD self-standpoint element "setting "or views (e.g., their 
determination to stay the way he or she was wavered or collapsed); they feared 
they could not survive without changing or finding help; they were somehow 
distanced from normal micro-ecosystem influences (e.g., being abandoned or 
betrayed by established friends and family); addiction and/or mental health issues 
were seen as having taken control and threatened important goals (including 
survival); at least one "new" person at this moment was perceived as caring and 
wanting to help; and the participant instinctively felt that he or she needed to 
"connect" with someone. 
Brian, Teresa, and Colleen's recovery-associated catalytic experiences 
involved experiencing psychiatrists who they felt saw them as unique and worthy 
people, educated them about their symptoms in ways they could understand, 
treated them collaboratively, and respected their self-knowledge. Susan's 
psychiatrist who, as mentioned above, was catalytic to her in terms of trust 
referred her to an intensive 3 month treatment program. She stayed at the program 
during the week and with a boyfriend on weekends. She remembered 
experiencing a sudden change at the program in terms of men in her life: 
I was dating a guy while I was in the intensive program during the week . 
. .. Ijust woke up one day at the inten ive program and I'm like, 'I don 't 
like him. Why am I living here? ' So, I just went back on the weekend and 
packed up and went back to my parents. 
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Colleen's catalytic change associated with recovery included stopping all 
drugs (including medications). She said she stopped all substances because she 
suddenly decided that she wanted to think again after years of wanting/needing to 
be numb: "I was so out of it most of the time that I did not know what was going 
on and after doing that for 3 or 4 years I said, 'forget it, I don't want to do this 
anymore, I want to be able to think on my own.' And then I started realizing, 'ok, 
stop this drug and start thinking.'" Carmen, Alexis, and Malcolm's catalytic 
experiences have already been mentioned. Carmen's occurred after she had 
moved to a rural locale and had reached a point where she believed that her 
survival was at risk if she did not find some outside help; she felt fearful. She 
found a transportation coordinator who went out of her way to help her access 
professional services. Alexis ended up at a YWCA after being charged with 
stealing. There she met a counselor with whom she still has periodic 
communication. Finally, Malcolm's catalytic experience occurred in solitary 
confinement where a guard kept trying to connect with him until Malcolm finally 
gave m. 
4.5.2 Decision making 
Participants agreed that decision making was another critical process of 
SD meanings. Carmen said that we are self-determining "in every choice we 
make." Decision making and experiential learning were closely related. 
Participants spoke of learning by doing it as the way to ultimately know how to 
make decisions that are right for you. Alexis stated: "you gotta make the right 
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ones. I think you learn over time." Most participants held uniquely relativistic 
and internally compatible views of making right decisions in recovery. For 
example, experiential learning appeared to inform participants that sometimes 
"right" decisions for one person were not right for another. Also, the majority 
spoke of how "right" decisions at the time turned out not to be so right later on 
(and vice versa). This inability to often know when a decision was right or wrong 
until well into the future appeared to contribute to participants' sense of control 
becoming more situationally relative and their determination to see decisions 
through to be more contextually discerning in CDs recovery. Another feature of 
this SD process associated with recovery from CDs was the greater type and 
range of choices they often could "see." Finally, the process of decision-making is 
also interpreted as the point when participants' SD meanings are translated into 
self-directed behaviors. The self-directed behaviors are the only part of the 
grounded theory that can be observed. 
4.5.2.1 Seeing choices. On one hand, all participants agreed that there is 
always a potential limit to the number and type of choices people may have, 
depending on the internal/external situation or context. This was true in terms of 
their physical body, aspects of their sense of self they may or may not be aware of 
(e.g., primary standpoint elements' "settings"), and in terms of interrelationships 
with his or her ecosystem. However, "seeing" choices was also uniquely 
subjective. Carmen spoke of the subjective experience of not seeing choices 
before recovery in terms of having people around her who drank, used other 
171 
,--------------------------------------·---- --
substances, and did not treat her with respect: "I didn ' t have a choice- I did have 
a choice but you choose to surround yourself with familiar things." Greater 
recognition of available choices in recovery was associated with less absolutist 
and more relativistic, compatible, and discerning standpoints. Discerning more 
choices led people to believe that they had more space in which to exercise SD 
and self-direction. Professionals who helped participants see more choices and 
generally supported their decision making were highly valued. Arguably, the 
range of choices associated with more nuanced views afforded participants greater 
opportunities to regulate needed degrees of self-stability within growth and 
change. 
The majority of participants in recovery spoke of being more "tuned in" to 
trying to see more choices than in the past. A number said that limits associated 
with some aspect of the ecosystem were bad enough and that many were 
perceived as inappropriate, abusive, unethical, or unfair. These sorts of limits 
needed to be addressed personally and structurally. However, prior to CDs 
recovery, most said that their view of external limits was often highly generalized 
- they were believed to be "too big" or complicated -and so they tried to either 
follow them or avoid dealing with them. In recovery, many spoke of seeing more 
choices in how to deal, or when to not deal, with external limits. 
Another area of growth in recovery was becoming more aware of how 
they might also be unnecessarily adding even more limits onto themselves than 
aspects of the ecosystem were already potentially applying (e.g., through gender-
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related religious beliefs or socio-cultural values that they had uncritically 
absorbed and integrated into their self-standpoint when younger). Adjusting 
aspects of their self-standpoint elements so as to be able to discern more between 
their self-imposed limits, relevant external limits, and what might be done about 
them was associated with participants seeing more choices. Seeing more choices, 
in turn, was described as contributing to feeling able to be more self-determining 
overall. This, in tum, appeared to facilitate more positive attitudes towards his or 
her self, which, in turn, nurtured a more positive sense of self overall in recovery. 
Participants agreed that helping people see different treatment choices and 
giving them every possible opportunity to make independent or collaborative 
decisions, except under exceptional circumstances, was essential for people to 
learn to make their own "right" decisions, build trust with helpers, and pursue his 
or her own CDs recovery. For those who recognized that they wanted to 
automatically delegate their decision making to others then collaborative, shared 
decision-making helped more than being persuaded or coerced to make 
autonomous decisions. Carmen thought that offering real choices and independent 
or collaborative decision making opportunities not only supported SD ethically 
and built trust in treatment relationships but it may also be helpful clinically: "see 
how we take those choices and see what kind of choices we make because it could 
be an old pattern. It could be a venture- trying something new. I just know that as 
soon as you tell somebody they don't have a choice- things change [negatively]." 
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As mentioned previously, a number of participants spoke about how 
discerning between aspects of his or her substance misuse, abuse, or dependence 
and his or her unique experiences with symptoms of mental illness was important 
to their recovery. The discernment was often discussed in relation to seeing 
problem substances (or medication prescriptions) as more of something external 
to his or her self or located more within a facet of their ecosystem, while 
symptoms of mental illnesses were viewed as more of an internal and 
fundamental aspect of his or her self. As already presented, Alexis stated: 
Drinking or using is a choice. You don't have a choice to hear voices, you 
don't have a choice to have mood swings or whatever, you know ... the 
choice [to not drink or use] is a lot harder for some people to make, and 
when some people start doing something it is harder for them to quit than 
maybe others, but it is still a choice. 
Brian spoke of choosing to see and deal with his mental health issues in 
terms of acceptance: "I am free to accept my illness and symptoms or to deny the 
same." He has come to know that accepting them helps him work with symptom 
rather than either always ignore them, constantly fight (and lose) against them, or 
simply surrender his sense of self to them. However, he was able to "push away" 
substances in a way different that his mental illness symptoms. A number 
described how such discernments helped them to see more ways to possibly tackle 
their problem with mental health and addictions separately and/or together. 
The value of seeing addiction as an "illness" or "disease" was mixed, 
especially in relation to seeing choices and making decisions. Some thought that 
seeing addiction as an illness helped them accept addiction issues in ways that 
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lessened their expectation that they should be able to control their use or 
behaviors (and experiencing failure if they could not). Others, in contrast, thought 
that seeing an addiction as a disease limited or weakened their determination to 
not relapse. This was because the disease view did not fit with their experiential 
knowledge of not misusing substances in the past or else seeing an addiction a a 
disease made it a core negative part of his or her self and that, consequently, they 
would face not just relapse risks but actual relapses forever. 
4.5.2.2 Making "right" decisions. As noted above, seeing more choices, if 
a participant had little confidence that he or she could make the "right" pick or 
else he or she feared any outcome, could be traumatic. Colleen said she felt 
pressured by her treatment program to make her own decisions but she also feared 
not only damaging her recovery (which could lead to suicide ideation for her) but 
al o their reactions if things did not turn out well. She said she thought thi fear of 
treatment in recovery may be related to her experiences as a child but the fear 
remained strong, regardless of her insight. Her difficulties with making right 
decisions were shared by mo t of the other participants to varying degrees, 
especially in the past. 
Some participants related their lack of confidence with making "right" 
decisions more to symptoms of their mental illness, such as impulsiveness, than a 
lack of experience in decision making or self-efficacy per se (Sam was the 
exception as he rejected being labeled as having an illness per se). All participants 
in recovery saw decision-making difficulties as more normal or to be expected in 
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recovery than when they were younger because their expectations became more 
nuanced. They had learned that what constitutes a right decision is highly 
subjective. They also learned that this was true not just for them or people with 
mental illnesses or addictions but for everyone. Alexis said: "everybody i 
different. I can't make the right choices for anybody except myself." She applied 
this same rule with professionals who tried to decide things for her and judged 
them accordingly. Brian used an example of deciding how to do yard work to 
emphasize the complexity of possible motivations behind making a right decision 
to a goal: "the first benefit is the clean yard, the second is the physical exercise, 
and the third is the sense of accomplishment. Therefore, someone could get the 
same results plus more by selecting ' how' they wish to [get the yard work done]." 
A closely related but slightly different aspect of seeing choices and 
making the right decisions involved dilemmas. Dilemmas are defined here as 
situations where a difficult choice has to be made among two or more alternatives 
and where no one choice stands out as the best or most desirable. Dilemmas are 
often associated with feeling of an1bivalence. Logical cognitive problem solving 
and decision making processes were found to be of limited utility for participants 
when they faced true dilemmas. Often emotions were important in dealing with 
these situations in CDs recovery. For example, prior to Carmen's more recent 
decision to reach out for help, she felt she had exhausted her own knowledge and 
skills to get well. She felt she needed help and support to survive but she had been 
abused, threatened, and depersonalized by many people, including some treatment 
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practitioners and programs. Thus asking for professional help represented a 
dilemma for her of the highest order. She subsequently, impulsively rather than 
thoughtfully or rationally, reached out for help at a time of crisis to the 
transportation coordinator in her new community. Indeed, her past negative 
treatment experiences would, arguably, have led her to logically decide not to 
engage in professional treatment again. 
Colleen spoke of dilemmas as "crossroads." She felt she had always been 
controlled as a child and youth, first by various family members who abused her 
and then by being a ward of the child welfare system. She said that she often feels 
that she is in a corner when facing choices in life: "I get to a corner. It is like, 'ok, 
what do I do now? Which way do I go?' You know there is a bad way and you 
know there is a good way but you don't know which one to take- which one is 
the safest?" Colleen said that she can see choices more now but her lack of trust in 
herself to make "right" decisions remains her greatest struggle. Seeing more 
choices often is more of a struggle for her now than when she saw fewer 
alternatives -it was simpler when she perceived she had fewer choices. Overall, 
seeking help was often viewed as a dilemma rather than a solution due to services 
being hard to access, not knowing the kind of person you might meet, knowing 
abusive treatment experiences can occur, and being trapped in a system that was 
perceived as often not caring and often did not take into account participants' 
individuality. Carmen stated: 
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Just because the treatment works for this person- that same treatment 
might be harmful to another. I can ' t stress to someone enough how much 
it takes to being yourself to go to those appointments. Just putting 
themselves out there. And for you to be put in a program that could 
possibly destroy you for the rest of your life. And that is more harmful 
than any drug. 
While recovery was characterized by greater attention to the rational 
weighing of positives and negatives among choices; nevertheless, emotions were 
also incorporated, such as in dilemmas mentioned above. Also, sudden catalytic 
experiences associated with decisions to pursue recovery were not carefully 
thought out. Susan's impulsive decision to give custody of her children to her 
parents in the midst of a mental health crisis is another example of a "right" 
decision for her was made without using a rational problem solving approach: 
I was pretty gone by then to really have any decisions- to make normal 
decisions. But I did make one that I was really proud of because it took a 
lot to say and that was I gave my mom custody, my parent custody of the 
[children] ... It was one of the best decisions I had made in years. 
Generally speaking, substance use/misuse or addiction-related behaviors 
were viewed as "right" decisions or at least neutral ones in CDs recovery. As 
already mentioned, substance use offered benefits to participants. Factors 
associated with decisions to address addiction have also been mentioned above. 
For example, deciding to address or stop substance use/addiction behaviors was 
"right" when the person self-determined that they had lost control of his or her 
self (and control was wanted back). Participants' descriptions of what constituted 
a "right" decision for them in their recovery with respect to use and/or abstinence 
from substances were highly diverse. Outside of impulsive acts, rationales 
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included: total abstinence from non-prescription substance u e, ab tinence from 
some non-prescription substances but the use of others, abstinence from all non-
prescription and prescription sub tances, and/or the use of some pre criptions. 
The influence of others in making "right" decisions was another important 
area of discussion in relation to SD in treatment and recovery. One a pect was 
balancing caring and compassion of others with caring about his or her self in 
relation to seeing choices and making "right" decisions. GeneraJly, "right" 
decisions in recovery included thought being given to balancing how deci ions 
the participant might make could negatively affect another person versus his or 
her self. Malcolm stated it as a case of: "if I do this, I blow it for me. If I don 't, 
I'm going to blow it for everyone else." 
Another aspect was in terms of the influence of treatment professionals. 
Again, trust was a key. For example, participants who were involved with 
professional services and supports that they trusted were generally appreciative of 
the professional's participation in making "right" decisions. Sometimes, he or she 
actively sought out the influence of other in his or her self-determined decision 
making (i.e., they wanted to temporarily delegate decision making or collaborate 
in certain areas or moments of their life). Malcolm said that: "I'm leaving it to 
him [psychiatrist recommendations] becau e he hasn't steered me wrong." 
However, if trust was betrayed in some way then these participants would 
counteract or suspend the influence directly, if possible, or covertly if there was 
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no other option. Alexis spoke of a recent experience she had with a mental health 
counselor around trust that led her to make a treatment decision: 
When I got out of the hospital in May they wanted me to [still] see this 
one mental health counselor and [also] a crisis counselor at the hospital 
just until I kind of got a little more stabilized . .. There was one thing in the 
3 months that I said, 'ok, I don't want you telling her [the crisis 
counselor]' ... she told me [later], 'I talked to your other counselor' and I 
said, 'did you tell her this?' She didn't lie to me about it, she said, 'you 
know what, I did' .. . it wasn't one of those [involving harm], no. After 
that. .. I said, 'you know I just kind of need a break from you to think about 
if I can still see you' . .. How am I supposed to trust her again with 
anything, you know? 
4.5.3 Determining Processes: Summing Up 
The determining component of SD meanings involved two key 
interrelated processes: knowledge building and decision making. Knowledge 
building was best described as a positive hermeneutic feedback loop behind 
participants developing a more nuanced ense of self, and, in turn, more nuanced 
SD meanings associated with CDs recovery. Seeing choices, patterns, and 
learning experientially to make "right" recovery decisions was important for 
participants in relation to making decisions. Again, regulating degrees of needed 
relative sense-of-self stability simultaneously with growth and change appeared to 
be an important theoretical consideration of these processes in relation to the 
overall role and purpose of SD meanings. 
4.6 SD: Being Determined 
As mentioned above, the being determined component is best understood 
in this grounded theory as a "power" that animated participants' meanings of SD 
(Figure 4.6). The term "power" can be used as a noun or a verb. General 
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meanings of "power" as a noun include the "ability to do something or act in a 
certain way [and] ... the capacity to influence the behavior of others, the emotions, 
or the course of events" (Soanes & Stevenson, 2006, p. 1125). As a verb, "power" 
refers to a supply of energy or to "move or cause to move with speed or force" (p. 
1125). As mentioned in Chapter Two, John Locke referred to SD as a de facto 
"power" of all human beings stemming from an innate capacity for free will (to 
choose to sin or not), Foucault argued power permeated all social relationships, 
and Friedrich Nietzsche promoted the idea that peoples "will" aspired to expand 
personal power- "the will to power" (Blackburn, 2005). In contrast to Nietzsche, 
this theory's being determined reflects "the power to will." 
Being determined about someone (including the self) or something related 
to the conviction behind defending participants' standpoint element "settings" as 
well as their motivation to grow and change. It also related to the conviction they 
held in their own decision making or the degree of confidence or trust he or she 
had in the decision making of another person or group. Finally, it related to the 
degree of confidence the person had in his or her personal knowledge of self 
generally, in relation to substances (including medications) or mental health. 
Words like "stubborn", "dedication", "persistence", "loyalty", and "commitment" 
referred to this SD component. There were no sub-categories. Participants 
described it as simply "there" to varying degrees (or not). 
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Figure 4.6: Self-Determination Meanings: Being determined 
Carmen said that the first thing she thought of when asked what SD meant 
to her was: "My stubbornness. It is my survival tool. It means survival." The 
absence of being determined about something or someone was often associated 
with crises (e.g., "giving up") that included, for some, suicide ideation. In many 
ways, being determined in SD was spoken of as a fundamental force of life. It is 
interpreted as being rooted more in feeling sensations (e.g., emotion; mood) than 
with thoughts or behaviors. In this way, it was profoundly affected by orne 
mental illness symptoms (e.g., depression, mania, and anxiety). Its absence was 
strongly associated with hopelessness. This weakening or loss of power was also 
often associated with participant's descriptions of his or her survival being 
somehow in doubt. As with the other components of SD meanings, the trend in 
CDs recovery was to be determined in more situationally relativistic, compatible, 
and discerning ways than the primary sense of self's experience of it as innate and 
absolutist (e.g., "good" or "bad"; "there" in terms of motivation or "not"). 
Being determined was not present in relation to only "positive" 
aspirations. It was equally present in relation to participants' self-determining to 
stay the way he or she was (e.g., being dependent on substances) as it was in 
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relation to overcoming tremendous obstacle associated with self-determined 
growth and change (e.g., CDs recovery). Colleen spoke of being determined to 
finish high school: "I would run away from group homes, I would be gone for like 
3 weeks, I wouldn ' t get sleep, I would live on the street and I would still go to 
school." However, she also spoke of being determined to misuse substances in 
order to be "numb" in her twenties no matter what. Alexis also spoke of being 
determined to get drugs: "somehow I am going to make thi much money so I 
could do this tonight. And then I would end up doing something stupid but, you 
know, I would get what I wanted." Susan spoke about being determined to not let 
other people, or her mental illness, control her: "I am just more determined to 
make sure that my life stays on track no matter if I am bi-polar or not. And I don't 
let bi-polar ruin my life. I rule it. I control myself, my guidelines ... I don't let 
anybody else do it- or my illne ." 
Malcolm spoke of being determined to not use cocaine in recovery: 
"today, self-determination, what it means to me is that I have to make decisions 
and be very determined on my decisions to say, 'I'm not going to go and fill my 
nose full. I'm not going to end up with a nose bleed." Being determined was core 
to Carmen's early conviction to recover without professional treatment: "I did it 
all on my own. See, for me, the reason why I did my own self-diagnosis, and I do 
my own self-healing ... because I am petrified of anybody institutionalizing me in 
any way." Her determination was also essential to her subsequently being able to 
reach out for professional help: "People have to understand how hard it is for 
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people like me to even go to the appointment. And how much determination it 
takes to go there, to get there. Just to go to a regular doctor's appointment. Just to 
go to ... anything ... it can be the scariest thing ever." 
The primary sense of self was characterized by participants being 
determined without conscious awareness, or if they were aware, without critically 
questioning its presence or purpose. CDs recovery was associated with the 
participants' increased awarenes of their power to be determined, and with their 
capacity to consciously discern between how exercising their determination could 
both help them and/or limit them in some way. For example, "stubbornness" 
could help them reach their goals, while "stupid stubbornne s" might frustrate 
goal achievement or lose sight of aspirations. Ways that people tried to influence 
their power in COs recovery included attempting to nurture it in areas that 
supported or enhanced recovery (e.g., consciously talking to one elf in ways that 
pushed them to keep going despite depression symptoms; developing different 
ways of interpreting its contribution to outcomes) and to cope with it when it was 
pushing the person in ways that were viewed as risky to recovery (e.g., urges to 
misuse substances; acting manically or impulsively in association with mental 
illness symptoms; suicide ideation). Colleen explained the challenge for her to try 
to understand it and work with it in recovery: 
Sometimes when you are determined it is really, really good. When you 
have this kind of illness it is really, really good to be that way. But, on the 
other hand, you can be too determined because, ok, let's say you are 
determined to get to another town and be alone. Well, you worked towards 
that but when you get there then- is that what you really want? 
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People who were able to energize and channel their determination seemed 
to be empowered in treatment and advocacy. Being determined was also 
experienced as empowerment when participants joined with others in a shared 
quest to pursue certain aspirations (e.g., through shared church membership or 
mental health peer support involvement). At the same time, Brian and Sam also 
spoke of how other peoples' determination (including those embedded within 
social structures and institutions) could support, counter, or hinder their power of 
being determined. Brian stated: "it has prevented me being self determined if 
someone is equally as determined to quash me and my efforts at survival, let 
alone improvement of my situation." However, participants were relativistic, 
compatible, and discerning in this area as well. For example, although Brian 
emphasized the fewer the limits the better, he also believed that the freer that 
people were to be self-determined, the greater the potential for conflict that 
resulted in SD winners and losers. Finally, Alexis shared the following famous 
quote by Ralph Waldo Emerson. It is particularly prescient in regards to the 
importance of a power associated with being determined for her meaning of SD: 
"The task ahead of us is never as great as the power behind us. That to me - that 
would mean self-determination." 
4. 7 Theory Summary 
Participants' SD meanings encompassed three interrelated components: 
the standpoint of self; the processes of determining; and a power associated with 
being determined about something (including the self) or someone. These 
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components contributed to subjective meanings of SD at a particular time and 
context. The standpoint had five key elements: beliefs and values; attitudes 
towards elf; attitudes towards ecosystem; sense of control; and aspirations. There 
were two key processes of determining: knowledge building and decision making. 
Being determined animated the SD meanings (and self-direction). 
The organizing concept of the grounded theory is the person's overall 
sense of self within his or her ecosystem. The sense of self is conceptualized as 
being fundamentally interrelated or integrated with facets of his or her dynamic 
ecosystem. The ecosystem includes physical, socio-cultural, psychological, and 
spiritual dimensions. Self-ecosystem differences were discernable by participants, 
but the self was never discussed in terms of being completely cut off or 
completely separated from each other in CDs recovery. Instead, differences or 
discernments were a matter of degree, such as balancing respon ibilities to the 
self and others or the relationship between the sense of control and affecting an 
aspect of the ecosystem in some way. The interconnectedness incorporated 
structural issues where power was described as being supportive and/or 
oppressive to some people but not others in various ways, based on ce1tain 
characteristics and contexts. In relation to this research's primary focus on CDs, 
one expression of oppression reported was how government health care and social 
service policies were written or interpreted in ways that empowered agents to 
deny services or benefits relating to their mental illness symptoms when an 
addiction was believed to be co-occurring. As mentioned above, their current or 
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even past addiction issues could "trump" their mental illnesses being seen in a 
less socially stigmatizing way. 
Participants' sense of self and SD meanings changed over time. Two 
discernable senses of self were associated with the shifts or changes in SD 
meanings. The two senses of self were not static stages but instead are artificial 
"snapshots" of a dynamic phenomenon. A primary sense of self was established 
in childhood, youth, and into early adulthood. A more "nuanced" ense of self 
emerged in association with participants pursuing CDs recovery. Figure 4.7 
provides a visual representation of the components and relationships important to 
the primary sense of elf and Figure 4.8 does the same for the more nuanced sen e 
of self in CDs recovery. The primary sense of self's SD components are 
characterized by largely ambient standpoint of self "settings", determining 
processes, and power associated with being determined about someone (including 
the selt) or something. Recovery was characterized by a greater attention to, and 
integration of, "nuances" of meaning of mental health, mental illness, substance 
use and misuse (including prescription medication), addiction-related behaviors, 
treatment, authorities/experts, and CDs recovery. This trend was towards greater 
situationally relativistic, compatible, and discerning views in recovery (in contrast 
to more absolutist and incompatible views of the primary sense of selt). SD 
meanings and self-direction reflected participants' respective sense of self within 
his or her ecosystem. 
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Knowledge building in the form of a positive (hermeneutic) feedback loop 
is interpreted as driving the overall trend towards more nuanced views and 
meanings in recovery. Shifts occurred gradually or suddenly. Sudden shifts are 
referred to a "catalytic self-ecosystem experiences" that unexpectedly impacted 
on participants' ense of self. Some catalytic experiences were associated with the 
development of participant's primary sense of self, such as SD standpoint of self 
"settings" relating to distrusting his or self and/or professionals. Others were 
associated with many participants later experiencing a kind of sudden "kick-start" 
toward greater awareness, questioning, and potential shifting of meanings 
associated with developing a more nuanced sense of self and SD meanings in 
recovery. 
FinaJly, regulating degrees of relative "stability" of the sense of self 
simultaneously with growth and change appears to be an important consideration 
of the role and purpose of participants' SD meanings (and self-direction). 
Regulating stability may be a function of SD meanings in relation to defending or 
protecting the primary sense of self, even if aspects of it such as negative attitudes 
towards one's self, or a belief that it was wrong to care for one' s self, were 
deemed in hindsight to be faulty or harmful (i.e., negative feedback loops). 
However, the SD knowledge building positive (hermeneutic) feedback loop is a 
core feature of determining processes of participants' SD meanings. More 
situationally relative, compatible, and discerning meanings in relation to the 
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nuanced sense of self appeared to help participants regulate degree of relative 
self-stability in relation to recovery-oriented growth and change. 
Participants saw their substance misuse or other addiction-related 
behaviors as either neutral or a "right" decision at the time, such as when they 
connected substance use with enhancing their sense of control in relation to 
mental illness symptoms. Substances were described as providing benefits to 
participants in terms of: helping people not care, helping people have fun, helping 
people simply function with effects of mental illnes and/or traumatic experiences 
when they knew no other way (e.g., increase a sense of control), and/or helping 
people gain a sense of belonging with other people. The view of substance use or 
related behaviors changed as people became aware of various issues, especially in 
relation to negatively affecting their sense of control. For six participants, making 
self-determined decisions to change in relation to pursuing CDs recovery were 
catalytically experienced in association with: 
• Being determined to maintain the primary sense of self wavered or "broke 
down." 
• Addictions were no longer seen a benign or helping the ense of control 
but were in tead seen as now controlling the person, and the person 
wanted control back. 
• The majority of participants were in a crisis, often associated with 
hopelessness, failure in relation to goals and aspirations, and a fear of 
dying. 
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• The majority of participants were coincidentally in a different 
physical/social space away from status quo influences (and often feeling 
betrayed or abandoned by these influences). 
• At least one other human being was viewed as caring, trustworthy, and 
able to offer help in some way during these times. 
• The participant wanted to connect with someone for help at that time. 
CDs recovery for all but Sam (who did not identify himself as having mental 
illness symptoms per se) included focusing on improving personal and social 
functioning in terms of balancing caring about and for one's self and about and 
for other important people in his or her life. Overall, recovery was viewed by 
participants in relative and compatible ways and was not absolutist in terms of 
focusing on cures, abstaining from all potentially problematic substances (some 
abstained from all substances and others abstained from some but not all), or 
taking prescribed psychiatric medications (some abstained from all prescription 
drugs while others used them). Participants discerned differences, patterns, and 
relationships involving his or her self and the surrounding ecosystem in relation to 
substance use/addiction problems, mental health, and mental illnes symptoms in 
CDs recovery. Greater discernment appeared to help people to see different and 
more available choices to deal with addiction and/or mental health issues (and, in 
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turn, feel more self-determining). Treatment that helped a person regulate his or 
her subjectively perceived need for relative stability of self (through process and 
effect) within recovery-oriented growth and change was highly valued in relation 
to participants' SD in CDs treatment and recovery. Limits to SD were accepted 
and even supported, at least in hindsight, when they were judged to be "fair" , 
helped regulate self-stability, and were not perceived as being primarily punitive 
or in the best interest of those applying them. 
Another important part of CDs recovery among participants in relation to 
sense of self and SD meanings involved participants translating externally-based 
values/beliefs and expert/technical information associated with mental illness 
and/or addiction into personal meanings that "made sense" to the person, 
particularly in relation to his or her self-standpoint, experiential knowledge, and 
personally meaningful aspirations. Similarly, they often reinterpreted certain 
subjective meanings of past experiences in recovery that had been banked into his 
or her personal knowledge in association with their primary sense of self's 
narrative. Participants valued working with professionals and programs that saw 
people as unique and shared their more nuanced views of CDs treatment and 
recovery. Those who were perceived as being absolutist in relation to treatment 
and CDs recovery were not highly trusted by participants. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
Discussion 
5.1 Introduction 
This chapter discusses the findings in relation to the grounded theory' s 
organizing concept and the theory's key components of participants' SD 
meanings. The purpose of this study includes contributing to the systematic 
development of social work theory and practice knowledge that builds on 
understanding better the subjective meanings of SD for persons Jiving with and 
recovering from CDs. One CDs practice consideration arising from this theory is 
di cussed in more detaiL It concerns the potential importance and role of SD 
meanings in relation to participants' uniquely seeking and maintaining or 
regulating degrees of sense-of-self stability simultaneously with experiencing if 
not pursuing growth and change, all within his or her dynamic ecosystem. It also 
concerns how regulating self-stability with growth and change relates to mental 
health and mental illness, substance use/misuse or addiction issues, and CDs 
recovery. Other practice implications and possible areas of future research are 
mentioned throughout the discussion. The chapter concludes with a look at 
limitations of the study and its findings. 
5.2 The Sense of Self within His or Her Ecosystem 
Meanings of SD in CDs treatment and recovery experiences were found to 
hinge on the participant's subjective sense of self, at a particular time and within a 
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particular context. As Carmen tated: "The key word is 'self, right?!?" The 
defining characteristics of this grounded theory's organizing concept include: 
• It is subjective. 
• It is located relationally. 
• The self is neither Cartesian/Locke in nature (i.e., the conscious elf is not 
independent of the body and its space-time context) nor is it simply a 
product or function of some process or system separate from the person 
(e.g., radical anti-Cartesian behaviori m). 
• It is mutually interactive with the ecosystem at both the micro and the 
macro ocial/structural levels. 
• An important part of self-ecosystem interaction involve asymmetrical 
powers and forces. For example, the individual can express his or her 
power or influence in ways that can have an effect on people or aspects of 
his or her ecosystem while, at the same time, the self can be impacted by 
asymmetrical powers, forces, controls, and limitations located in 
dimensions of the ecosystem (including socio-cultural structure and 
institutions). 
• The initially established "primary" sense of self has the capacity for 
change. 
• Hermeneutic knowledge building describes the process associated 
with changes in the sense of self over time associated with pur uing CDs 
recovery. 
194 
• Changes in the sense of self over time reflected a trend towards a greater 
awareness of, and attention to, nuances of subjective meanings, including 
SD meanings. 
• The more nuanced sense of self associated with participants pursuing CDs 
recovery was characterized by more situationally relative, compatible, and 
discerning views of his or her self, environmental dimensions and forces, 
mental health, mental illness, addiction, and COs recovery. 
• SD meanings and self-direction are, at least partly, associated with 
participants' uniquely regulating the relative stability of the sense of self 
simultaneously with experiencing if not pursuing growth and change. 
5.2.1 Edward Deci's SDT 
SDT (Deci, 1980; Deci & Ryan, 2002) is perhaps the current most 
influential practice theory in mental health that is overtly related to notions of SD. 
Deci deduced an organic multi-dimensional view of the self and made it central to 
understanding SD (as a form of autonomy). This study's inductive grounded 
theory shares a number of similarities with SDT with respect to the self. For 
example, Deci identified trust as an important SO-related issue and an internal 
force or power- the will - as an important facet of the self in relation to SD. SDT 
also suggests that an environment perceived as more controlling or non-
responsive to one's needs is less conducive to people being able to optimally trust, 
grow, and achieve in areas such as athletics, education, and illness recovery 
(including mental health or addiction). Finally, SDT includes an interactive 
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feedback loop between the self and the environment. Deci (1980) stated: "it is an 
ongoing interactive process between the person and the environment that affects 
their behavior and the adjustment of their internal states" (p. 213). 
However, there are at least three significant differences between the 
deduced SDT and this study's inductively developed grounded theory derived 
from participants' re ponses and analysis. First, Deci does not refer to po itive 
hermeneutic knowledge building as best describing the interactive feedback loop 
processes involving the self and the environment that lead to personal 
adjustments, growth, or change. Second, this study's concept of a more "nuanced" 
sense of self in CDs recovery- characterized by more situationally relative, 
compatible, and discerning views of his or her self, ecosystem controls and 
powers, mental health, addictions, treatment, and recovery- does not easily 
match up with Deci's internal causality orientation category. SDT implies that thi 
category is most conducive to recovery. Instead, the more "nuanced" sense of self 
evident in this study appears to reflect more compatibility in terms of the majority 
of participants integrating or balancing all three of Deci' s loci of cau ali ty in their 
SD meanings in CDs recovery. Third, unpredictable catalytic self-ecosystem 
experiences found to be associated with significant shifts in participants' sense of 
self, and, in turn, meanings of SD and self-direction, challenge SDT assumption 
that the self and its loci of causality facet can be assumed to be stable. Deci 
( 1980) acknowledged that his theory is challenged to be predictive of behavior 
because "to make accurate predictions about behavior and internal states, one 
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must utilize the person's orientation at that time and the characteri tic of the 
environment at that time" (p. 313). However, he goes on to state that predicting is 
easier than it sounds because the person 's causality orientation is relatively stable 
and any changes that occur do so fairly slowly. This study did find that 
participants tried to maintain the relative stability of both their primary and 
nuanced sense of self. It may also be true that gradual change in the sense of self 
is more typical. However, the findings of this study include participants' 
descriptions of sudden unexpected "catalytic" experiences which suggest that the 
sense of self is inherently more dynamic and less predictable than SDT assumes. 
Further, the grounded theory's knowledge building positive (hermeneutic) 
feedback loop appears to be related to growth and change. Consequently, 
participants' SO meanings appeared to integrate and regulate both change and 
stability. 
Rather than assuming people have static self-stability states per se 
(inclusive of a loci of causality), participants are interpreted in this grounded 
theory as continually seeking and maintaining or "regulating" the relative stability 
of his or her self simultaneously with growth and change within a complex and 
somewhat unpredictable ecosystem and its dimensions. SD meanings are 
associated with, and may be critical to, this perceived need and/or goal of 
participants in relation to dynamic internal sensations, including those associated 
with mental illness and/or addiction. Simultaneously, participants are integrated 
with his or her dynamic ecosystem that may be influenced but not particularly 
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controlled. Consequently, it can unpredictably disrupt self-stability as much as 
support it. 
One possible explanation for the difference between SDT and this theory 
is that the relative stability of the sense of self was more uncertain, and regulating 
sense-of-self stability was a more pronounced daily need, for this study's 
participants than for the hypothetical "norm" that SDT refers to and tests against. 
Perhaps many people who have not been challenged by CDs, addiction, or mental 
illness (nor related ecosystem dimensions and forces associated with coerced 
treatment, stigma, and prejudice in these areas) could maintain the relative 
stability of their primary sense of self with growth and change throughout their 
lifetime. As a result, their sense of self may traverse a different path, or the 
occurrence of a more "nuanced" sense of self over time is different somehow in 
nature. Perhaps this trend can also be discerned among other samples of people, 
but it occurs with more difficulty or more gradually and without sudden shifts in 
self-awareness and meanings. Participants' experiences of abuse and its traumatic 
effects, especially trust, may also be an important factor associated with SD 
meanings among this study's participants. One line of future investigation could 
explore this issue of sense-of-self stability among people with CDs versus 
comparative controls, such as: people without having experienced mental illness 
symptoms, addiction, or abuse; people without mental illnesses but with 
experiences with abuse or addiction; and/or people with mental illnesses but 
without having experienced addiction or abuse. 
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5.2.2 The Sense of Self and CSD 
I analyzed over fifty social work journal articles and books that referred to 
CSD. The majority of texts over the past thirty years can best be described as 
implying that CSD referred to autonomy and hinged on an individual sense of self 
within brief idealistic statements about supporting clients' wishes, desires, rights, 
and decisions (McDermott, 1975; Reamer, 2006; Taylor 2006). The ecosystem 
was typically represented in these texts as a transactional factor as ociated with 
fostering, upholding, or, under certain broadly tated circumstances, limiting 
freedoms or the autonomy of individuals. The social worker is typically viewed as 
a part or agent of the ecosystem in relation to the client. A minority of texts 
argued for a CSD perspective that reflects a deeper synthesis of person(s) and 
ecosystem (e.g., Falck, 1988; Ramsay, 2003). 
A mall number of text denoted more specific meanings of the elf to 
CSD in social work ethics and/or practice. However, these notions of self in 
relation to CSD were not based on inductive empirical research and analysis. 
Instead, they were philosophical in nature or else they were deductively adopted 
or adapted from research studies and practice experience in other disciplines, 
especially sociology or psychology (e.g., Perlman, 1965; Abramson, 1985). 
Overall, the findings of this study suggest that inductively exploring client 
meanings of self in relation to SD is an underutilized research approach that could 
help social workers better understand and ethically operationalize CSD in 
practice. 
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5.2.3 Sense-of-Self Stability and SD in CDs practice 
Regulating degrees of self-stability simultaneously with experiencing if 
not pursuing growth and change, vis-a-vis the role and importance of participants' 
SD meanings in CDs treatment and recovery, may be one of this theory's most 
promising conceptualizations for fu1ther enquiry. The idea that physiological and 
psychological homeostasis, equilibrium, or self-stability is impo1tant to people' 
health and wellbeing is not new to social work and is particularly important to 
general systems theory (Hearn, 1979), ecosystems theory (Germaine & Gitterman, 
1980), and crisis theory (Roberts, 2006). Protecting relative self- tability related 
to participants ' references to the importance of SD as an absolute right in terms of 
pure survival. It also is consistent with participants defending a self-standpoint in 
CDs recovery that, at least from my perspective when interviewing them, 
included lingering self-harming, elf-limiting, or self-defeating attitudes, beliefs, 
and/or values. 
However, general systems and ecosystems theories are criticized in social 
work for assuming that people mostly seek equilibrium, that life can be reduced to 
a series of steady or balanced states driven by negative feedback loops, and that 
the social worker, as an expert if not an authority, should direct clients towards 
balance or homeostasis (Green & Blundo, 1999). Christopher Hudson (2000) 
suggested that emphasizing negative feedback loops associated with homeostasis 
in systems theories leads to promoting normalization over growth and change 
(including normalizing social structures that perpetuate stigma and oppression). 
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He argued that deviation-amplifying positive feedback loops promote growth and 
change and that emphasizing subjectivity, non-linear development, and positive 
feedback loops move social work models away from general or eco ystems 
theories and more towards complex or "chaos" systems theory. 
Chaos theory emerged from developments in phy ic and mathematics, 
notably mathematical equations that are iterative in nature. Iterative equations 
continuously feed equation results back into the equation, which produces new 
and unpredictable results. In other words, they are unsolvable. Chaos theory's 
major applications have been in understanding weather patterns, population 
growth, and astronomy. It is being considered in relation to psychology and ocial. 
work, at least metaphorically without mathematical support (Ayers, 1997; 
Hud on, 2000). David Scharff (2000) outlined six important principles that 
characterize dynamic non-linear chaos theories: (1) continuous feedback; (2) 
small differences in initial conditions produce completely different and 
unpredictable effects (i.e., the butterfly effect); (3) details are inherently 
unpredictable but at the same time they are not purely random; (4) there is a 
tendency for such systems to self-organize into non-random trends and patterns 
(called fractals); (5) pattern boundaries vary with degrees of magnification and 
measurement sensitivity (an illustrative example often cited is the widely 
disparate quantitative results found when measuring the same shoreline with a 
yard tick versus a micrometer); and (6) "strange attractors" that act as focal points 
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of trends or patterns. These focal points are produced by the system, but they also 
may be the very thing that organizes the system. 
Scharff discussed the sixth principle in relation to the human heartbeat. He 
cited studies that found that a chaotically irregular but not random heartbeat 
confers a greater potential for adaptability to changing needs of the body (e.g., 
rest versus exercise) and changing environments (e.g., threats). In contrast, the 
heartbeat's rhythm is most stable and quantitatively predictable in a diseased 
state. 
Negative feedback loops associated with homeostasis are a part of this 
theory in relation to participants defending or protecting degrees of his or her 
sense-of-self stability. Nevertheless, knowledge building positive (hermeneutic) 
feedback looping is a core process of participants' SD meanings associated with 
CDs recovery. Further, the trend or pattern towards a more nuanced sense of self 
and associated meanings was evident (at a higher level of magnification) but 
individual "details" of subjective SD meanings were uniquely unpredictable. 
Consequently, the emphasis in this theory on SD meanings having a function in 
regulating self-stability simultaneously with growth and change shifts it towards a 
more complex or chaos systems perspective. One area of consideration that arises 
is whether subjective perceptions of treatment options as generally trustworthy, 
generally untrustworthy, or a more case-by-case nuanced view might represent 
different strange attractors that help provide insight into trends or shifts in 
peoples' SD meanings in CDs treatment over time? 
202 
For example, one SD-related pattern or trend could organize around 
attitudes towards treatment being assumed to be trustworthy as a strange attractor 
and another could organize around treatment as untrustworthy attitudes. Direct 
experience could reinforce or maintain the general pattern of either trend. Some 
contrasting experiences to either established trend could perhaps have a gradual 
effect but not dramatically shift the general pattern or the respective organizing 
strange attractor. However, other contrasting experiences could potentially cause 
a sudden shift or cascade (see below) such as where the pattern organized around 
the trustworthy strange attractor becomes organized around the untrustworthy 
strange attractor, or vice versa. Another pattern from either original trend could 
emerge that is organized around a third strange attractor that reflected more 
nuanced case-by-case or person-by-person evaluations of treatment 
trustworthiness. Quantitative methods could potentially be used to explore this 
conceptualization but it would require extensive sampling, plotting, and 
mathematical modeling. 
One practice implication of an association between SD meanings and self-
stability regulation is that social workers who assume rather than try to understand 
each client's subjective perception of SD may unnecessarily if not unethically 
undermine, interfere, or conflict with clients needs to maintain a degree of relative 
self-stability and/or undermine, interfere, stifle, or conflict with clients' recovery-
orientep change and growth (if not be an outright risk to clients' safety). Risks 
could occur, for example, if client SD meanings lean towards autonomy and their 
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decision making was unnecessarily limited. At the same time, risks could also 
occur if client SD meanings lean towards wanting to share or delegate decision 
making to others (e.g., family members and/or professionals) and the client is left 
unnecessarily abandoned or directed to make autonomous decisions. 
Better understanding clients' subjective SD meanings could help workers 
not only better uphold CSD values in practice but also help clarify decisions 
around ethically limiting it. Participants acknowledged the need for there to be 
limits to SD and self-direction under certain circumstances. However, 
descriptions of treatment experiences suggested that many interactions which 
interfered or conflicted with participants' SD meanings were not always necessary 
and may have contributed to worsening mental health symptoms, addiction 
relapses, and/or instilling/reinforcing mistrust of treatment and professionals. 
There may be important connections to investigate between CDs treatment, SD 
meanings, and client self-stability regulation within growth and change that could 
reduce harm to clients, improve client-worker experiences in terms of trust, and 
improve many client outcomes. 
This grounded theory also suggests that there may be important linkages 
to further investigate in relation to people with CDs regulating sense-of-self 
stability, their SD meanings, prescription medication compliance, and decisions to 
use, misuse or abstain from other substances in treatment and recovery. Many 
participants' decisions to use/misuse substances and/or engage in non-substance 
addictive behaviors prior to pursuing CDs recovery was at least partly because 
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they perceived their use as either benign to their self-stability or it helped them 
defend or regulate it. Substance use helped regulate self-stability in ways that 
included numbing or minimizing issues associated with mental illness symptoms, 
aid managing issues associated with past trauma/abuse, defending his or her sense 
of control, and/or facilitating connections with others. 
Addressing addiction issues appeared to be a priority for most participants 
in relation to wanting to regain a greater relative sense of control. This occurred 
when these participants experienced substance use/misuse or non-substance 
addictive behaviors as not only no longer helping them regulate their relative self-
stability but becoming an outright risk to his or her life. In other words, addiction 
came to be perceived as gaining such as degree of control over the sense of self 
that it was a serious risk to his or her survival. An early decision to stop led seven 
to describe experiences that were characterized by greater immediate self-
instability associated with lost social connections with "using" friends or 
acquaintances, worsening mental illness symptoms, and/or worsening after-effects 
of past trauma/abuse experiences such as flashbacks, self-loathing, or nightmares. 
All returned to using, perhaps in an effort to regain a degree of self-stability. 
However, these attempts still involved or integrated change, such as using 
different substances or attempts to use previous substances in a more self-limiting 
way. Unfortunately, people reported losing control again with old or new 
substances and people tried again to deal with the addiction and/or mental illness 
symptoms. Eventually, all but Sam either became determined to pursue 
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professional treatment or willingly participated with it when it was imposed in 
some way. This willingness to participate in professional treatment was typically 
associated with viewing it as a last resort when survival was at risk. Rather than 
seek assistance, Sam said he actively self-regulated his continued use of alcohol. 
Recovery decisions associated with abstention, the controlled use of some 
substances but not all, prescription medication use or avoidance, psychotherapy 
participation, peer supports, and using other services and supports also appeared 
to be subjectively evaluated by participants at least partly in relation to the 
perceived risks and benefits to their relative self-stability. All participants 
expressed concern about how simply being involved with professional treatment 
services might negatively affect his or her self-stability in terms of both the 
process of treatment (e.g., losing control of decision making) and any specific 
intervention's impact (e.g., physically/psychologically destabilizing side effects). 
However, all had idiosyncratic reasons in this regard, and SD meanings did not 
simply equal freedom or autonomy when making decisions. Instead, most 
participants wanted some external guidance or support and structure, albeit 
temporarily, if they felt hopeless, confused, or were in a state of crisis. 
Participants also reported times when they chose to share or delegate some aspect 
of their decision making in treatment with practitioners that they trusted. In 
recovery, if trust was broken then participants took back their decision making 
either overtly or covertly. 
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Outside of crises, most participants consciously chose to sometimes 
delegate or share making treatment deci ions, and comply with professional 
recommendations, when they trusted the treatment program or practitioner(s). 
When trust was not there (either assumed prior to contact or not earned through 
their experience in interactions) all participants sought overtly or covertly to 
maximize their freedom and autonomy in treatment interactions and directions. 
The more experience participants had with treatment, the more trust needed to be 
"earned" by professionals and programs rather than it being assumed ahead of 
time. 
The findings suggest that matching unique SD meanings in CDs recovery 
with degrees of autonomy, collaboration, and external guidance and structure may 
be critically important to helping many people with CD recover. The findings 
support CSD practice models in social work that seek to match or "titrate" the 
effects of worker influence or external structure with client-directed self-
regulation or self-direction specifically in relation to safety and trust issues (e.g., 
Murdach, 1996). However, to achieve any sort of appropriate and ethical 
matching then ocial workers must first seek to understand client ' subjective 
meanings of SD rather than apply a personal and/or professional generalized 
assumption of what it is or should be. For example, some participants who wanted 
a high degree of external structure and guidance typically self-determined wanting 
less of it, less often, as they gained greater self-stability in recovery. Other 
participants who initially wanted a high degree of autonomy in association with a 
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high distrust of others often wanted to subsequently share more or temporarily 
delegate their decision making as they trusted more in nuanced ways in recovery. 
It bears repeating again that a key factor in the findings in relation to these SD 
changes was subjective perceptions of trust: being able to trust more his or her 
self, other people, social structures, and various dimensions and forces of the 
ecosystem. Findings suggest that social workers need to recognize the relationship 
between trust and CSD in therapeutic relationships and continue to recognize that 
this trust is something earned over time. 
Understanding clients SD meanings in practice and upholding them, 
except under exceptional circumstances, appears to naturally fit with a COs 
recovery process that focuses on people needing to regulate degrees of sense-of-
self stability simultaneously with experiencing if not pursuing growth and change. 
CSD in this context refers to helping people find their unique recovery-oriented 
balance or equilibrium with their shared responsibilities, their autonomy, their 
delegations of decision making, their treatment collaborations, and their 
interrelationships with other people, structures, and dimensions of his or her 
ecosystem. 
5.2.4 Regulating Self-Stability and CDs Etiology 
All participants except Alexis said that substance use problems or 
addiction came after mental health issues, such as those arising from experiencing 
trauma and abuse, or mental illness symptoms. The majority had contact with a 
mental health professional prior to addiction issues developing. This pattern fits 
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with addiction-secondary CDs epidemiological theories. Most research suggest 
that this addiction-secondary onset pattern reflects the experience of the majority 
of people with CDs (Kessler et al, 1994; Rassool, 2001; Meuser et al, 2003). 
The most inclusive addiction-secondary CDs theories are multiple risk or 
multiple factor theories. The multiple risk perspective can encompas most other 
addiction-secondary CDs theories that are more specific such as the super-
sensitivity theory (Meuser et al, 2003), the psychodynamic self-medication theory 
(Khantzian, 1985; 1997), and negative reinforcement or behavioral self-
medication theories (Eissenberg, 2004). As the name implies, the multiple risk 
perspective associates the development of addiction with a broad range of 
influential factors that could include the direct effects of mental illne s symptoms 
(e.g., depressive moods or per i tent debilitating anxiety), certain physiological 
sensitivities to the chemical effects of substances, and/or the effects of abuse, 
poverty, social isolation, and stigma- all of which are generally associated with 
mental illness. CDs multiple risk theories are concerned with how substance 
use/misuse or non-substance addiction behaviors may be an attempt to mitigate or 
mediate a broad range of potential direct and/or indirect effects associated with 
living with persisting mental health issues or mental illne s symptoms. 
I was unable to find any CDs theories that specifically linked notions of 
regulating sense-of-self stability among people with mental illness with the 
subsequent development of addictions. The closest example in the literature is 
perhaps Linda Najavits' work in the area of helping women with PTSD and 
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substance abuse issues that she organized around the concept of" eeking safety" 
(2002). Regulating self-stability may prove to be a useful concept to further 
investigate in relation to understanding CDs etiology and improving social work 
practice in this area. 
5.2.5 Sense-of-Self Stability and Adaptability 
This theory's "primary" sen e of self within his or her ecosystem and 
more "nuanced" one in CDs recovery are not static states. In tead, they are 
artificial "snapshots" of a dynamic phenomenon. Shifts in the perceived sense of 
self were described as non-linear. There is also no theoretical end-point to 
knowledge building (beyond death). Consequently, the sen e of self would 
theoretically always be engaged in regulating self-stability with change that 
includes the potential for unpredictable hifts in any "direction." Nevertheless, a 
more nuanced ense of self may have provided participants with greater degrees 
of adaptability or flexibility in their sense of self that was conducive to recovery-
oriented growth and change. 
Greater adaptability or flexibility would, arguably, help maintain needed 
degrees of relative stability of elf in the context of uncertain obstacles and 
outcome associated with CDs recovery (i.e., the nuanced self could better "bend" 
without "breaking"). The more nuanced sense of self may also have helped 
participant adapt, develop or maintain a more positive sense of elf. Certainly, 
participants spoke of having a more positive sense of his or her self in relation to 
his or her recovery (e.g., Malcolm reaching his goal of being a" omebody" by 
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helping others with mental illness; Carmen being able to say she has so much 
about her self to be proud about). Mental health self-advocates often will identify 
a more positive sense of self as critical to recovery from mental illness (Ridgway, 
2001). 
In relation to chaos theory, the nuanced sense of self being more adaptable 
than the more absolutist primary self to dynamically changing internal/external 
sensations, contexts, challenges, and opportunities would be similar to the chaotic 
but not random pattern of the heartbeat and its benefits. However, a sense of self 
that is too flexible or has too much "give" could potentially fall into a more 
random or out of control pattern that would be highly disadvantageous to 
functioning. Consequently, a certain degree of continuity would have to be 
maintained or a new strange attractor would need to re-establish continuity. A line 
of inquiry could look at whether a relatively nuanced sense of self, regardless of 
how or when it is present, is particularly conducive in some way with COs 
recovery. 
5.3 Sense of Self, Coherence, Continuity, and Change 
Characteristics of the sense of self in this grounded theory share 
similarities with some theories of the self that were mentioned in Chapter Two. 
For example, George Herbert Mead' s work (1913; 1934) has some important 
conceptual characteristics that are similar to this grounded theory' s organizing 
concept. Both conceptualizations locate the sense of self within relationships and 
both integrate a more conscious awareness of the self occurring over time that is 
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driven by these relationships. Both theories also see the self as socially 
constructing a temporal coherence for itself. Finally, the two see the awareness 
and meaning of self changing over time. 
In terms of temporal change, Mead organized much of his view of the 
evolution of the self, self-awareness, and self-identity around notions of an 
organic "I" and the subsequent development of a conscious, learned sense of self. 
He called this conscious facet of the self the "me." Despite the emergence of the 
"me", the full extant of the "I" remains unknowable to the person and operates in 
the background. Mead thought this emergence of a conscious view of one' s self 
involved learning to take on the beliefs, values, or attitudes of others in childhood. 
Through communicative processes, social relationships molded a person's sense 
experiences of the "I" into a socially-based early meaning of the "me." Meanings 
of others both individually and/or collectively (e.g., a generalized "other") 
became social "objects." Again, communicative processes translated socially-
based meanings into internal ones, this time through the "inner speech" a person 
has with his or her self over time. Although Mead saw the self as socially 
constituted and, in turn, socially controlled; nevertheless, he also thought the self 
was simultaneously capable of unpredictable, independent, creative, personal 
initiative. This creative initiative stems from the socially-based "me" never being 
able to fully comprehend or control the "I", nor anticipate how the "I" might 
ultimately influence the self. Consequently, the unpredictable "I" can have an 
impact on ecosystem dimensions. 
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Mead also suggested that the "me" is involved in interpreting the past in 
such a way as to create a coherent continuity of the self in the present and the 
future (Maines, Sugrue, & Katovich, 1983 ). The formation of the primary 
standpoint elements in relation to SD meanings overlaps in a number of ways 
with Mead's "I" developing an initial, conscious, socially-based identity of its 
self. Once the primary sense of self s standpoint elements had settled then 
participants often defended the homeostasis of their primary sense of self in the 
face of disruptive external and internal event and communications. Descriptions 
of some of the benefits of substance use/misuse appeared to fit with protecting or 
defending the homeostasis of his or her primary self. 
Mead also suggested that the past and future of the "me" are also 
continually subject to reinterpretation as new sense experiences occur in the 
present and are molded into substantive meanings that need to fit somehow with 
the selfs coherence and continuity. Consequently, either new sense experiences 
can only be interpreted in certain ways to fit with the existing continuity and 
coherence of the self, or else the past and future need to be reinterpreted or 
reconstituted to regain continuity and coherence with the substantive meanings of 
new non-conforming experiences. The knowledge building positive (hermeneutic) 
feedback loop appears to conceptual! y overlap with this facet of Mead's theory. 
The more "nuanced" sense of self in CDs recovery also bears some similarities to 
Mead's temporally changing perspective of self that implies that the "me" 
develops greater internal source of meaning and reflection (although remaining 
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socially based). The nuanced sense of self in CDs recovery can be viewed in thi 
light as an evolving form of the conscious "me" that participants found simply 
helped them better regain, maintain, or regulate needed degrees of continuity and 
coherence (i.e., stability) of the self simultaneously with recovery-oriented growth 
and change. This appears to be associated with developing more situationally 
relative, compatible, and discerning perspectives of his or her self, ecosystem 
dimensions (including the generalized other), mental health, mental illness, 
addictions, treatment, and CDs recovery- in the past, the present, and the future. 
SD meanings and self-direction, in turn, appear to fall into line with regulating the 
re-constructed or "renovated" coherence and continuity of the sense of self, with 
the ongoing potential for further growth and change. 
Questioning and, at times, reinterpreting aspects of the sense of self that 
integrates the past (e.g., primary standpoint beliefs/values) and the future (e.g., the 
standpoint's goals and aspirations) in relation to a present that consciously 
integrates mental health and substance use issues was associated with the majority 
of participants pursuing CDs recovery. However, regulating coherence and 
continuity or relative stability of the sense of self for participants was not as 
simple an experience as a theory such as Mead' s might imply; reinterpreting the 
past in relation to new events were described a sometimes profoundly traumatic 
and could at times put their very survival at risk. Mead (1934) suggested that 
attitudes adopted from others were the base of purposeful behavior, orne were 
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easily reorganized via corrununication with the self and others, but other attitudes 
that were more fundamental to the self could only change with great difficulty. 
As mentioned above, subjective SD meanings and self-direction may be 
intrinsically linked to the need for people to regulate the relative stability of their 
sense of self simultaneously with experiencing if not pursuing growth and change. 
Not understanding and, in turn, not respecting clients' subjective SD meanings 
whenever and wherever possible in CDs recovery may contribute to severe crises 
in terms of Mead's notion of the self s need for continuity and cohesion. Offering 
people opportunities to consider reinterpretations is one thing. However, the 
therapeutic potential of such opportunities may be compromised when 
professionals pre-determine and control what that reinterpretation should be. In 
such situations ethical statements that emphasize egalitarian relationships are 
compromised and the professional power, whether intentionally or 
unintentionally, is arguably abused. Similarly, when programs are structured in 
such a way that SD is compromised and client goals and experiences are not 
considered meaningful aspects of the treatment plan then the asyrrunetrical power 
differential is reinforced to the detriment of the client who has less power in the 
relationship and within the program. No matter how well meaning, the findings of 
this study suggest aggressively persuading or coercing people to face and change 
what appear to be incoherencies is potentially risky because they can precipitate 
crises with unpredictable outcomes. Further, they could create or reinforce 
distrustful attitudes that guide people to avoid accepting help in the future. 
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One major difference between Mead's work and this theory's 
conceptualization of the sense of self in relation to SD meanings is the 
fundamental integration of the power of being determined about someone 
(including the self) or something. Mead does not refer specifically to an internal 
force or power (e.g., will or willpower) in relation to the capacity of the "r' to be 
unpredictable, creative, and socially uncontrollable. However, Otto Rank' s (1945) 
description of the creative "will" that was a focus of his applied therapeutic model 
is reminiscent of these qualities of Mead's " I." Mead also does not specify that a 
hermeneutic communicative process is behind the "I" developing an awareness of 
a part of the self in the form of the "me." In contrast, the finding interpret 
hermeneutic communicative processes being behind the primary sense of self 
moving to greater awareness of, and attention to, nuances of meaning of the self, 
ecosystem, mental health, addictions, CDs recovery, and, SD. 
There is some support in the literature for integrating hermeneutic 
processes with self-awareness and consciousness, including Mead's 
conceptualization of the sense of self. For example, Douglas Ezzy (1998) argued 
that Mead's notion of the "me" as self-identity occurs specifically in a 
hermeneutic narrative configuration. Ezzy suggested that integrating Mead's 
social psychological conception of the self relationally and temporally with Paul 
Ricreur's philosophical hermeneutic theory of narrative identity "provides a 
subtle, sophisticated, and potent explanation of self-identity" (p. 239). 
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According to Ricreur's theory, "selfuood" is a form of being that is able 
to reflect upon itself, through internal communication and communication with 
others, while "identity" is a narrative construction resulting from the reflective 
processes (Ricreur, 1992). Consequently, the self as "me" becomes known 
through hermeneutic narrative activities in association with interactions with the 
world. Random events of the lived experience of the "I" are interpreted through 
language as episodes of an unfolding coherent story and synthesized into the 
continuous narrative in a way that Ricreur describes as "emplotment" (1992). The 
narrative processes are hermeneutic in essence; lived experiences are continually 
related to the narrative, in terms of their place in the overall plot of the story, and 
the overall plot of the story is continually related to meaningful events that 
randomly occur. Interpreting and reinterpreting of the random events and/or the 
unifying narrative can and do occur. 
In terms of this study's grounded theory and Ezzy's thesis, SD and self-
direction would, by extension, be a natural, coherent, but changeable expression 
of the sense of self that is grounded in real world experience but subjectively 
interpreted. Hermeneutic processes are constructing and reconstructing a coherent 
and continuous narrative identity. Ezzy's blending of ideas associated with Mead 
and Ricreur shares some strong conceptual similarities with this study's self-
standpoint, determining processes, and their interactions in meanings of SD. 
Although Mead did not speak of the importance of a power such as "will" or 
"being determined" within his conceptualization of self, Ricreur does in his 
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"philosophy of the will" (1965). Ricceur related "will" or "willing" to decisions 
that lead to actions in the world. However, he suggested that the act of willing is 
inherently subjective and is a form of "being" that involves participating in social 
situations with other beings. In contrast, this study's conceptualization of being 
determined appears to be more omnipresent than Ricceur's view of will and more 
along the lines of Rank in psychology. Overall, this grounded theory's defining 
characteristics of the sense of self in relation to SD meanings appears to overlap 
in a number of ways with an amalgam of the work of Mead, Rank, and Ricceur. 
5.4 Sense of Self, Self-Stability, and Social Work 
As mentioned in Chapter Two, Howard Goldstein (1981) argued that the 
"self' in social work is best understood in terms of "states" and "processes" and is 
comprehensible only within its environmental context, rather than it being a 
"static entity" unto itself (p. 111). This study's findings share much with this 
view. However, this study's theory sees the sense of self, at least in relation to SD 
meanings and self-direction, as best understood in dynamic terms that involve not 
only states and processes but also forces or powers- the power associated with 
being determined as well as asymmetrical forces operating within both discrete 
and generalized self-ecosystem interactions and relationships. Another important 
similarity between Goldstein's view of the self and this theory' s is in relation to 
the self and "stability." Goldstein cites the work of psychologist Gordon Allport 
(1955) when he stated that the self is best seen as a multidimensional "propium" 
or composite. Goldstein discussed three "vital operations" of the self: (1) "[it] 
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involves adaptation and takes account of the self as both constant and variant in 
its commerce with reality"; (2) "[it] is intentional, future oriented, and in pursuit 
of meaning"; and (3) "[it is] a system that strives for stability although undergoing 
change, maintaining balance while experiencing tension" (p. 111-12). 
Goldstein's inclusion of "striving for stability although undergoing 
change" as a "vital operation" of the self appears to conceptually overlap with this 
grounded theory' s interest in the role of SD meanings and self-direction in 
regulating sense-of-self stability with growth and change in relation to CDs 
treatment and recovery. Further, Goldstein's view of the self suggests that 
regulating degrees of self-stability with change in relation to SD and self-direction 
may have some relevance to social work practice and CSD beyond this study's 
focus on participants' experiences in CDs treatment and recovery. 
The grounded theory also shares some qualities with Sharon Berlin's 
constructivist cognitive-integrative view of the self (1996; 2002). For example, 
her conceptualization of subjective memory-based narrative self-schema patterns 
con tructing personally coherent meanings of the self relate to this theory's 
temporal development of self-knowledge and the standpoint elements' initial set-
points and subsequent adjustments. Like Ricreur's narrative identity theory in 
philosophy, Berlin's social work practice model also conceptually overlaps with 
this grounded theory's interest in SD, regulating self-stability, and change in 
terms of the selfs narrative coherence and continuity. Berlin (2002) also speaks 
to "back and forth" interactions of the person with his or her environment and the 
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importance of experiential learning in therapeutic practice; however, she does not 
refer to the self-ecosystem interactions or the processes of experiential learning, 
knowledge building, and subsequent adjustments to narrative self schemas as 
hermeneutic in nature. She also does not integrate an internal force or power 
associated with being determined, as is highlighted in this study. Finally, she does 
not relate her view of the self to the role and purpose of CSD in social work. 
Berlin (2002) does make reference to "empowerment" and that 
asymmetrical powers associated with individuals and social structures (including 
social workers) can often negatively impact on peoples' constructions of self-
schemas and mental health recovery. Participants spoke of the negative impact of 
authorities/experts at a person-by-person level as well as at more macro levels 
such as through mental health and/or addiction treatment systems/structures or 
social benefit programs. At the same time, participants acknowledged a role for 
experts and authorities and that limits on peoples' SD are necessary to lessen or 
channel inevitable conflicts stemming from subjective and idiosyncratic needs 
and wants of individuals and groups. Most acknowledged times when their 
determination harmed others in some way. Nevertheless, many structural powers 
of the ecosystem were reported by participants to be a verifiable source of danger 
to their physical safety, sense-of-self stability, and personal growth, whether well-
meaning, impersonal, or malicious. This finding supports the role of CSD in 
social work in relation to protecting clients from potential harm. 
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Finally, Dennis Kimberley and Louise Osmond (2003) referred to the 
"stability of self' as an important theoretical dimension to understanding and 
better assisting people with CDs from an ecological social work perspective. The 
authors did not define this self-stability reference in detail or relate it to the role 
and importance of CSD in social work practice. Still, it provides further 
theoretical upport for this theory's interest in the role SD meanings may play in 
relation to regulating sense-of-self stability with change and growth in CDs 
treatment and recovery (although this study's theory moves towards complex 
chaos systems theory rather than reflecting a strictly ecological perspective). 
5.5 SD, CDs, and Stigma 
This study did not focus specifically on issues of SD meanings and CDs in 
relation to stigma and such differences as gender, ethnicity, and age. However, at 
least one open-ended question relating to stigma and CDs was posed to each 
participant. SD differences in meanings associated specifically with gender were 
mentioned by a number of female participants as views they held more in the past 
(i.e., associated with their primary standpoint). When interviewed, they did not 
believe that gender differences in term of stigma were fundamental to their 
essential meanings of SD but were more a sociated with social constructions of 
meanings about gender that they had uncritically adopted and that they, and 
society as a whole, were changing. However, one important gender-related area of 
interest might be in relation to subjective SD meanings associated with caring for 
others. For example, some participants mentioned biological differences 
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associated with pregnancy that they did not relate specifically to stigma issues. 
However, they also believed these could be relevant to meanings of SD for 
women, but different for men. This finding, as well a my male social location in 
relation to interviewing and analysis, suggests that further investigation into SD 
meanings associated with gender could enhance understanding of the concept and 
the applicability of the grounded theory. 
Understanding SD meanings in relation to various age groups is also 
important given how social structures asymmetrically assess risk, delegate, or 
expect people to accept and exercise different degrees of external direction with 
individual freedoms or autonomy based on age (Staller & Kirk, 1997). Also 
important to consider are the different beliefs, values, and attitudes that are in play 
in relation to parental roles and responsibilities cross-culturally and how beliefs 
and values are internalized as a part of a youth's view of self. Exploring SO 
meanings and issues in relation to children and youth may be particularly 
important to CDs prevention, treatment, and recovery because important 
epidemiological studies are finding, like the majority of this study's pruticipants, 
that most substance use issues among people with mental health disorders 
occurred years after the first emergence of mental health symptoms or fir t 
experiencing the effects of trauma/abuse in childhood, youth, or early adulthood 
(Kessler et al., 1994; Kessler et al., 1996; Rassool, 2001). As mentioned above, 
some CDs etiological theories, such as multiple risk theories, include the potential 
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stigma and social marginalization associated with being a victim of trauma and/or 
having a mental illness with a greater vulnerability to addiction. 
Participants spoke of how they thought mental illness was becoming ales 
stigmatizing issue for them generally. However, there was a strong shared 
perspective that having an addiction remained more stigmatizing than having a 
mental illness, having a co-occurring addiction often "trumped" improvements in 
the way their mental illness was viewed by others, and having a co-occurring 
addiction did lead to some discriminating practices among social in titutions (e.g., 
disability benefits criteria), some mental health treatment programs, and some 
treatment professionals. Participants' attitudes towards treatment professionals 
reflected these experiences. Although the primary sense of self was more 
generalized about attitudes such as those associated with distrusting all 
professional help, these attitudes were still integrated into their more "nuanced" 
sense of self in CDs recovery. The difference in recovery was that the distrust was 
more selectively incorporated into attitudes and self-directed avoidance behaviors. 
Steven Wineman's (1984) model of multiple, intersecting, and mutually 
reinforcing forms of oppression and the prevalence of CDs suggests that 
investigations into stigma and mental illness need to consider issues of addiction 
and CDs. I did not find any specific references to conflicting, interacting, or 
reinforcing issues of stigma associated with having a mental illness and having an 
addiction in relation to CDs recovery and CSD in social work texts. 
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One recent social work text does identify the lack of a social work 
perspective on addiction generally (Csiernik & Rowe, 2003). The authors 
proposed a "biopsychosocial" framework that considered addiction in terms of the 
"pharmacological" of the substance, the "individual characteristics" of the user, 
and also the "social context of use" (p. 12-13). The authors argued that 
understanding addiction within a social work perspective naturally incorporates 
social context issues of "oppression" and "social marginality" vis-a-vis the person 
and the addiction (p. 13). Consequently, such a social work perspective on CDs 
prevention, treatment, and recovery would seek to better understand oppression, 
social marginality, and stigma associated with having mental illness and addiction 
issues (as well as other potentially interlocking qualities or characteristics such as 
age, gender, sexual orientation, race/ethnicity/culture, geographical location, and 
other forms of disability). Examples of studies could include surveys that compare 
and contrast stigmatizing values and beliefs of mental illnesses, substance use 
problems or addictions, and CDs that are held by social workers. Using case 
vignettes that distinguish between issues associated with mental illness, 
addictions, and CDs in ways that reveal potential differences in social workers' 
degree of directiveness, along the Jines of the study done by Rothman et al (1996), 
could be illuminating. 
Notions of false consciousness, consciousness-raising, and critical 
consciousness are important aspects of many conceptualizations of anti-
oppressive practice. Critical consciousness seems to be somewhat similar 
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conceptually to this theory's "nuanced" sense of self in CDs recovery (e.g., 
notions of greater awareness and "insight," critically questioning socio-cultural 
beliefs/values and expert/technical information, and questioning and adjusting 
negative self-attitudes associated with social expressions of stigma and prejudice). 
Stephen Quintana and Theresa Segura-Herrera (2003) looked at the development 
of a state of false consciousness and the subsequent shift towards people 
achieving a less internally oppressive state of critical consciousness about their 
selves individually and collectively among a racially oppressed Mayan group in 
Guatemala. They refer to the shift as a "transformation of self' (p. 274). The 
authors proposed that the shift towards critical consciousness involved 
"questioning the legitimacy of outgroup dominance and increasing ingroup 
cohesion without reifying negative ingroup stereotypes" (p. 275). 
Some anti-oppressive texts may imply that clinicians should promote a 
greater awareness of "false consciousness" held among clients and help them shift 
towards a more "critical consciousness." Consequently, one consideration that 
seems to naturally arise from this study is whether social workers in CDs 
treatment and recovery should somehow arbitrarily promote or facilitate clients 
shifting from a primary sense of self to a more "nuanced" one. However, a trap 
may lie in inadvertently or non-critically examining whether CSD in social work 
points to a theoretically preferred state of consciousness, sense of self, or meaning 
of SD whether it is associated with an anti-oppressive, cognitive, medical, or 
some other intervention framework. Specifically, notions of "false" consciousness 
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add a judgmental quality to discussions of the sense of self. As mentioned above, 
the self appears to be engaged in regulating stability with growth and change and 
SD/self-direction appears to be important in this regard. Actively disrupting 
clients' relative sense-of-self stability for reasons such as diagnosing that they 
hold a form of false consciousness may be inherently dangerous to the person and 
can create/reinforce distrust of people trying to help, at least in relation to this 
study's participants who were pursuing CDs recovery. 
Anne Wilson and Peter Beresford (2000) suggested that there are some 
aspects of authoritative anti-oppressive practice in social work that violate social 
work's CSD values for people with mental illness and may even inadvertently 
perpetuate structural problems associated with expert-judgments and expert-
prescribed interventions. For example, they discuss the risk that some 
practitioners may not respect the psychiatric client's own knowledge and 
meanings but instead "diagnose" a person as having a false consciousness and 
then arbitrarily pre-determine treatment goals and prescribe interventions (e.g., 
developing a critical consciousness). This authoritative anti-oppressive approach 
appears to fall into the same utilitarian trap in relation to CSD that concerns many 
critical/anti-oppressive theorists around traditional authorities or experts 
diagnosing a client with mental health and/or substance use disorders that 
negatively labels the person and then arbitrarily prescribing treatment to achieve 
pre-determined treatment goals (e.g., absolute abstinence with non-prescribed 
substances and absolute compliance with prescribed medications). Similarly, it 
226 
,.---;-- -------------- ------------- - -·- -
seems possible that judging a primary sense of self as needing to be arbitrarily 
changed or shifted towards a more nuanced sense of self in CDs treatment could 
arise for some people from reading this study, especially if the findings are 
supported in some way by future investigation. However, no matter how well 
meaning, arbitrarily trying to "force" a shift from a primary sense of self to a 
more nuanced one in CDs treatment would run the risk of having a disdain or 
disregard for the client's personal knowledge, meanings of self, SD, and self-
direction. Further, an arbitrary approach to transforming a person's self in such a 
way is subject to being questionable in relation to workers' social location and 
abuses of power in relation to the client. Finally, an arbitrary approach could, 
arguably, unnecessarily interfere with a person needing to regulate degrees of 
sense-of-self stability and risk mobilizing the client's "being determined" 
component of SD to maintain or defend the way he or she is even more, both in 
the moment and with future attempts by others to help the person grow and 
change in relation to recovery. 
The findings of this study suggest that the shift towards a more nuanced 
sense of self in CDs recovery was be t described as hermeneutic in nature. Further 
study may find that it is a somewhat natural process for many people, including 
those with CDs vis-a-vis recovery (e.g., associated with notions of "maturity" or 
gaining "wisdom" with knowledge and experience). The challenge for clinicians 
would then be how to best nurture what might be a natural process of change in 
the sense of self, rather than either focusing exclusively on static states of stability 
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alone which runs the risk of stifling growth, or trying to force the dynamic 
process to occur in ways that interfere in the person's need to regulate degrees of 
self-stability with change. Outside of a highly directive temporary approach 
associated with crisis interventions and/or circumstances where immediate harm 
to self or others is imminent, one approach arising from this study could involve 
workers nurturing a hermeneutic circle between themselves and the person(s) they 
trying to help. An anti-oppressive hermeneutic approach in practice would not 
view any self-standpoint as inherently "false." It would guide the worker to 
bracket or be critically reflexive to his or her own beliefs/values and remain open 
to their own potential self-standpoint adjustments in a reciprocal therapeutic 
relationship with each client. Simultaneously, the worker can offer but not force 
on clients opportunities to: consider more critically nuanced or alternative anti-
oppressive interpretations of past events; question their attitudes towards self 
and/or others; increase their awareness of the utility of their beliefs and values; 
join with the worker in more empowering ways; and explore self-advocacy 
individually and collectively. Ultimately, this worker-client hermeneutic circle 
could be helpful whether a worker holds a critical standpoint or some other 
perspective under-riding treatment interventions. It could also blend with 
hermeneutic experiential learning in other areas, support clients regulating sense-
of-self stability simultaneously with growth and change, and, in tum, 
foster/uphold clients' subjective SD meanings in CDs treatment and recovery. 
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5.6 The Ecosystem and Sense of Self 
The dimensions of the ecosystem were described by participants as an 
abstract whole at times (e.g., "the world) and at times they were highly specific in 
participants' texts in relation to SD. Generally speaking, dimensions were never 
viewed as separate entities but different aspects of them became more discernable 
in recovery (similar, for example, to the greater discernments of the self within his 
or her ecosystem). The biological or physical dimension of the ecosystem was 
occasionally mentioned but, other than in relation to Carmen's spirituality, it was 
not generally an area of focus. Instead, people spoke more of "fused" 
physical/social spaces in relation to SD and CDs treatment and recovery. Being 
in a different social/physical space was sometimes associated with crises among 
many of the participants and the subsequent decision to pursue CDs recovery. 
However, consistent with other cautions about arbitrarily creating instabilities of 
self in treatment, forcing or directing people to be in a different physical/social 
space and thereby experience self-instability appears to carry a high degree of 
potential risk. This finding does suggest that having voluntary residential 
treatment options available for people with COs is warranted (i.e., choices for 
people to place themselves in therapeutic physical/social spaces). Both Alexis and 
Susan spoke highly of residential programs that integrated addiction and mental 
illness treatment when they chose to attend. Unfortunately, integrated CDs 
residential treatment programs are few in Ontario as services associated with both 
the mental health and addiction treatment systems have moved towards primarily 
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community-based services. Voluntary therapeutic hospital stay appear to be 
increasingly rare. There is currently no fully publicly-funded voluntary hospital or 
non-medical residential programs that I know of as a practitioner with a waiting 
list of less than six to twelve months, in Ontario, that provide integrated intensive 
residential treatment (rather than just tabilization or withdrawal) for most co-
occurring presentations of severe mental illness and addiction. 
Finally, as mentioned in Chapter Two, critical/anti-oppressive theorists in 
social work may challenge the use of "ecosystem" as under-representing the 
fundamental integration and interactions of people in social relationships, 
especially in terms of overlooking asymmetrical structural power and control 
issues faced by some people but not others (e.g., based on gender, age, 
ethnicity/race, sexual orientation, and/or disability). The notion of ecosystem in 
the context of this grounded theory metaphorically refers to the broadest inclusion 
of physical, psychological, social, and spiritual worlds that the self is integrated 
with and reciprocally interacting with. One benefit of using this broad view 
allows for the theory to remain as conceptually flexible, inclusive, or trans-
theoretical as possible. Nevertheless, the interpretation of the self and the 
ecosystem being separate and transactional rather than fundamentally integrated 
and interactive, as well as blurring asymmetrical structural power and control 
issues between the self and the ecosystem, are dangers associated with the 
presentation of the organizing concept as "the sense of self within his or her 
ecosystem." A final risk may be that readers will assume that the grounded theory 
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is located within ecosystems theory overall, rather than within a more complex 
chaos systems perspective. 
5. 7 Standpoint of the Self 
The use of the term "standpoint" in the theory reflects a participant's 
subjective perspective associated with a position in time and pace from which the 
self and participants' relationships with aspects of his or her ecosystem are 
viewed and understood. The standpoint encompasses the past (e.g., memories and 
their meanings in relation to beliefs, values, and attitude ), present (e.g., sense of 
control), and future (e.g., expectations and a pirations). As mentioned above, the 
SD standpoint shares many qualities with social constructivist theories and 
practice models in psychology and social work. The standpoint is grounded in the 
unique perspective of the person at any moment in time and context. It shares a 
relativistic view with criticalfeminist standpoint theories (e.g. , Harding, 1991) 
and is inclusive of many critical theory principles; however, it is not specifically 
organized around critical theory. Using the term "standpoint" empha izes 
subjective personal viewpoints and their associated interpretations of meanings. 
In addition to standpoint, other theoretical terms were considered such as 
identity and personality. However, the grounded theory is, arguably, conceptually 
inclusive and flexible or trans-theoretical and both terms are clo ely associated 
with constructs of discrete predictive theories such as identity theory in sociology 
and social identity theory or personality trait theories in psychology. Identity 
theory in sociology holds a more environmentally deterministic or absolutist view 
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than this grounded theory. It suggests that society defines the individual person in 
terms of social roles, the roles provide individuals with self-meaning, and 
influences their behaviors through these roles (Hogg, Terry & White, 1995). Role 
positions are often hypothesized as being hierarchical in nature and people are 
more committed to some of their roles than others (Stryker, 2007, p. 1092). Social 
identity theories in social psychology are based more on socio-cognitive processes 
of individuals and groups. They focus mostly on trying to explain group processes 
and "inter-group" relationships through social factors determining peoples' 
perceptions and actions (e.g., Tajfel & Turner, 1979; Hogg, Terry & White, 
1995). For example, these theories share assumptions that people fall into, and 
feel they belong to, various social categories (e.g., gender; class). Category 
memberships provide a self-definition of who one is and set normative 
expectations a to how members should think, feel, and act. Perceptions of other 
members are "stereotypical and normative" while those who are not included 
become "others" who are stereotyped in ways that can contribute to, among other 
things, stigma and discrimination (Hogg, Terry & White, p. 260). 
In contrast, personality theories suggest that identity and self-concepts are 
related to "dispositional structures of traits" internal to individuals (Stryker, 
2007). According to Sheldon Stryker (2007), traits are considered to be relatively 
stable across time and context and encompass an individual's patterns of 
emotions, thoughts, and behaviors. A "big five" set of traits are often studied: 
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openness, conscientiousness, extraversion, agreeableness, and neuroticism (e.g., 
McCrae & Costa, 1994). 
The above theories have a number of facets that overlap somewhat with 
this study's standpoint component of SD meanings (e.g., development and role of 
attitudes towards self and ecosystem). However, the overlaps appear to fit better 
with participants' primary sense of self. At least partly, they may reflect socio-
cultural contexts in which many of the models mentioned above were developed. 
Historically, a Western sense of self would have been, arguably, more subject to 
social forces and structures that expected, facilitated, enforced, and reinforced a 
potentially more static sense of self throughout one' s lifetime. This included 
leading psychological assumptions of the day that were, and continue to be, 
challenged (e.g., Gilligan, 1982). 
One of the strengths of this grounded theory is that it provides a more 
holistic framework for helping understand SD meanings. However, it does not 
assume what subjective individual standpoints or, in turn, SD meanings should or 
would be, outside of the suggested trend towards becoming more nuanced over 
time. Consequently, the theory does not appear to exclude other self-standpoints 
than what was found among participants, such as those more fundamentally based 
within a family, tribe, clan, cultural group or other community found among 
various meanings of selfhood across different cultures (Bukobza, 2007). As a 
result, the grounded theory does not appear to exclude more group-oriented or 
social "membership" meanings of SD that may be found (e.g., Falck, 1988; 
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Ramsay, 2003). Similarly, the theory does not appear to exclude elf-standpoints 
different than those found in this study, such as those organized more around 
social roles, age, gender, class, sexual orientation, race/ethnicity/culture, 
geographical location, and other forms of disability. 
5.8 Determining Processes: Decision Making 
Decision making and knowledge building are the two categories of the 
determining component of SD meanings. Making "right" decisions in recovery 
was of utmost concern to participants. People believed that one must learn for his 
or her self how to make their own "right" decisions in their recovery, and that it 
was impossible for them to always know ahead of time what was the right thing to 
do. These references place experiential learning ultimately at the heart of people 
being able to self-determine what "right" decisions are for them. 
Participants acknowledged that there is a need for collectively set and 
enforced limits, directives, controls, and boundaries to help regulate the effects of 
people being self-determining and self-directing on each other. Further, all viewed 
the need to set controls and enforce limils as legitimate in ituations of severe 
crises or when people were in immediate harm, provided these measures were 
temporary and took into account the context. Most external limits or controls on 
their decision making were viewed as being legitimate in relation to subjective 
notions of "fairness." Greater understanding of meanings of "fairness" in relation 
to limits or controls on SD meanings and self-direction may help inform practice 
further in this area. 
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Participants thought that a key for them was to learn to make their own 
"right" decisions in relation to CDs recovery and that actually making decisions 
and learning from outcomes was the optimal way that they gained knowledge and 
experience in thi area. This also facilitated protecting themselves from others, 
including professionals, when they are uncaring, biased, or outright malicious in 
intervening with them. The findings support social work's CSD meanings in 
terms of upholding or fostering clients' experiential learning through self-
determined decision making (e.g., Soyer, 1963). 
At the same time, all participants except Sam spoke at length of the 
difficulties they had in the past with making right or "good" decisions. This issue 
remained Colleen's most difficult challenge in her recovery. She spoke of 
continuing to feel overwhelmed, confused, and frightened of making decisions in 
her life and would often delegate her decision making to others. She also used to 
resent the people that she automatically delegated to more in the past- now she 
sees this as part of a major pattern she continues to struggle with. This issue of 
being overwhelmed and confu ed by having so much autonomy or freedom and, 
in turn, choices was a main point of American psychologist Barry Schwartz's 
notable critique, Self-determination: The tyranny of freedom (2000). However, as 
Colleen exemplified, participants' meanings of SD were not simply synonymous 
with, as Schwartz assumed, autonomy or freedom. Understanding clients' 
subjective SD meanings, rather than make such assumptions, would, arguably, 
help workers more ethically and effectively match their influence and activities 
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vis-a-vis helping clients such as Colleen with decision making processes in 
recovery, both in the present and with experiential knowledge building in mind. 
Finally, making "right" decisions is not just an issue for people with CDs. 
It is also a key issue for professionals in making mental health and substance use 
diagnose and treatment deci ions. For example, Howard Garb (2005) reviewed 
three problem areas in making "right" psychiatric diagnoses and treatment 
recommendations: (1) using an "affect heuristic" process that involves 
emotionally-based automatic shortcut in reasoning that may be positively 
associated with clinical intuition, but may also be associated with biases; (2) 
making diagnoses by comparing unique individuals to "hypothetical prototypes"; 
and (3) making diagnostic decisions underpinned by clinicians' ambient preferred 
causal theories. Making "right" deci ion appears to be a challenge for all people 
at different times and to varying degrees, including professionals. Social workers 
who are critically reflexive to, but not paralyzed by, their own difficulties in 
making "right" decisions may have more empathy for CDs clients' struggles in 
this area, give them more opportunities to collaboratively practice, and more 
safely help clients evaluate outcomes in the spirit of promoting and upholding 
their meaning of SD. 
5.8.1 Rational Decision Making 
The function of emotions/moods in decision making and problem solving 
has long been an area of debate and discussion in philosophy and p ychology 
(e.g., Plato's the is that reason needs to harness desire). For example, Subjective 
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Expected Utility (SEU) theory is the ba i of most theoretically prescriptive 
approache to applied decision making and problem solving in Western society 
(Simon et al, 1986). SEU theory assumes that conditions are ideal in terms of 
maximizing rational or logical decision making and involves heuristic searches 
for information that start out wide and then cuts problems down in size through 
using some sort of means-ends or cost-benefit analyses. Simonet a1 (1986) 
suggested that empirical research on decision making shows that we cannot rely 
on ideal generalized assumptions in a real world. The authors noted how studies 
were showing that dynamic micro-contexts of perceived risk and uncertainty or 
high ambiguity result in decisions that do not follow SEU predictions (e.g., 
"dilemmas"). They argued that feedback was essential to learning and that 
feedback and learning were keys for understanding decision making that is 
required for continuous adaptations to dynamic, risky, and ambiguous real-world 
environments. Oliver John and James Gross (2004) suggested that 
emotions/moods are viewed in Western society as either irrational forces that are 
destructive or else they are a repository of "wi dom" that functionally help us 
negotiate life's myriad of challenges and dilemmas (p. 1302). The emphasis on 
rational or cognitive problem solving over emotional sensations in problem 
solving and decision making is found throughout mental health and addiction 
theories and practice models (e.g., Wills & Holmes-Rovner, 2006). Problem 
solving and decision making difficulties among people with more cognitive than 
emotionally-based problems, such as those associated with symptoms of dementia 
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or psychosis, are dramatic. However, Antoine Bechera (2004) argued that people 
make decisions among choices not just by cognitively attending to consequences 
and probabilities but also "primarily at a gut or emotional level" (p. 30). He 
supported this opinion with studies of people with certain brain lesions that 
damaged their emotional processing but not their basic cognitive functioning 
centers. These studies found that such people who must rely on cognitions have 
impaired day-to-day decision making capacities. Bechera believed that emotional 
processing is strongly associated with memory. Thus, it provides an important 
experiential learning and self-knowledge component necessary for optimal 
decision making and problem solving, especially when preferred or expected 
outcomes are highly uncertain or ambiguous. 
As mentioned in the literature review, patient and/or professional decision 
making has been of utmost interest in current medical ethics and operationalizing 
patient SD or autonomy (Kaplan & Frosch, 2005). Euthanasia/end-of-life debates 
and decision-making processes, including advance directives and living wills, 
were mentioned in the literature review as operationally important to notions of 
patient SD in health care. Limiting the SD of people in these cases is often 
associated with professional judgments of the "capacity" of clients to make 
decisions based on a rational or logical standard. However, evaluating such 
decision making is rife with dilemmas associated with the perspective of the 
decision maker (e.g., the affect heuristic mentioned above) and subjective 
interpretations by some as to a patient's process behind making a particular 
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decision or the overall rational capacity of the person to make decision in the 
first place. 
The findings of this study illustrated a number of example of such 
dilemmas. For example, Carmen's decisions as an adult, until her thirties, to avoid 
treatment may have appeared to be irrational until one learned of the abuse she 
experienced when she was young at the hands of a psychiatrist. Many of the right 
decisions people made were very spontaneous and appeared to be based as much 
on a gut feeling, instinct, or emotion associated with past experiences a they 
were to any rational cognitive deliberations. Most of the catalytic elf-ecosystem 
experiences appeared to be associated with non-rational ba ed deci ions, 
including protecting children or pursuing treatment for addiction. Perhaps there 
needs to be a greater discussion in the CDs treatment literature in relation to how 
dangerous it is to trust an initial impression that a person 's decision making is 
"dysfunctional" if it is not obviously rationally based. For example, there may be 
a generalized bias in relation to non-rationally based decisions as alway a 
pathological expression of an addiction. The findings do not upport such an 
absolutist assumption despite the fact that participants identified addiction and/or 
mental health symptoms often did play a "nefarious" role in their decision 
making. Not assuming that clients' self-determined decision making was 
dysfunctional if not immediately understood was an important facet of the 
writings of Carl Rogers (1961) and the humanism movement in psychology and 
social work. This view continues today with many clinical frameworks such as 
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those associated with constructivism (Berlin, 2002), motivational interviewing 
(Miller & Rollnick, 2002), and strengths-based practice (Brun & Rapp, 2001). 
Perhaps regulating self-stability imultaneously with experiencing if not pursuing 
growth and change plays a functional role in CDs clients' decision making that 
appears superficially illogical, paradoxical, or self-defeating to other ? 
Nevertheless, the nuanced sense of self in CDs recovery was found to be 
associated with a greater use of cost-benefit analyses and other rational decision-
making strategies and a greater balance between, or integration of, both 
cognitions and emotion/mood in problem solving and decision making. Greater 
balancing also i uggested in recovery in relation to reactive and reflective 
decision making. The primary sense of self among most participants appeared to 
lean more toward being reactive (e.g., automatic decision to avoid, escape, or run 
from serious problems) in terms of basing "right" decisions on their own 
cognitions, emotions, or others' influences. Some emotionally based decisions to 
run or avoid appear functional and rational given their development as part of the 
primary self when young (e.g., less socially-designated powers given to them to 
advocate for themselves and fewer skills experientially learned to do so). Still, the 
majority of participants spoke of avoidance or "running", for example, as a 
pattern into adulthood that no longer was seen as necessary or functional in 
recovery as it might have been in the past. More situationally relative, compatible, 
and di ceming views of both their own thoughts and feelings, as well as the 
influence of others, seemed to help participants see more choices, fear mistakes or 
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uncontrollable outcomes less, and better balance their cognitions, emotions, and 
the influence of others in their problem solving and decision making overall. 
Many people with mental health issues that involve intense, unpredictable 
feeling states, arguably, face a great challenge with balancing feeling states and 
cognitive processes in decision making. It appears that treating CDs may need to 
specifically incorporate helping people to better understand, manage, or regulate 
his or her feeling states (i.e., emotion/mood literacy or emotional intelligence) in 
relation to SD and decision making, but not to reject them outright. 
There is a trend in therapy to re-evaluate the role and benefits of 
emotions/moods in day-to-day functioning (e.g., Greenberg, 2004). Some 
psychosocial programs for people with borderline personality disorders also focus 
more on the condition as a spectrum emotion management issue and treatment 
involves helping people better regulate feeling states in concert with their 
cognitive processes and behaviors (e.g., Linehan, 1993; Blum, Pfohl, John, 
Monahan & Black, 2002). CDs treatment that seeks to help people gain greater 
self-understanding and self-management of emotions/moods in concert with 
rationale decision making processes, in relation to both their mental health and 
substance use issues, appears to be a rich area to explore more in terms of 
integrated CDs treatment. 
5.9 Determining Processes: Knowledge Building 
Hermeneutics has its origins in Biblical studies (Flew & Priest, 2002). As 
opposed to God speaking directly to people without interpretation (i.e., divine 
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revelation), early Biblical scholars looked to meanings of scripture to emerge 
more fully over time through repeated reviews of the Bible interspersed with 
periods of reflection and periods of focusing on day-to-day tasks (Kezar, 2000). In 
the twentieth century, the philosopher Martin Heidegger (1889-1976) adapted the 
hermeneutic process to the task of gaining greater understanding of phenomena. 
Heidegger suggested that all meaning and shared understanding hinged on 
language and interpretation occurring in a circular process of pre-judgments, 
corrections, new questions, new pre-judgments, corrections, and so forth (i.e., the 
hermeneutic circle). Hans-George Gadamer (1989) emphasized hermeneutics in 
phenomenology research methodology, describing it as a never-ending spiral of 
greater understandings. Heidegger built his perspective on the work of Edmund 
Husserl's descriptive phenomenology. Husserl (1859-1938) viewed reality as not 
completely separate from a person's perceptions. One critical feature of Husserl's 
work is the idea of bracketing or suspending temporarily one's own beliefs, 
biases, assumptions, and/or theories of the physical world in order to better 
describe essences of phenomenon as unique from others (Laverty, 2003). 
Hermeneutics has since been used to explain a number of processes of the human 
condition, including the self (e.g. , Ricreur's theory of narrative identity mentioned 
above) and the occurrence of mental health problems. For example, Guy 
Widdershoven and Ron Berghmans (2006) refer to hermeneutics as a way of 
understanding how we learn, how we make sense of our lives, how we make 
decisions, and, consequently, how it is fundamental to our mental health overall. 
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They refer to mental health "breakdowns" as a sudden shattering of a person's 
presuppositions or current hermeneutic pre-understandings of self and the world 
because of some critical failure to make ense of an experience or circumstance 
that he or she is in. Developing a more "nuanced" sense of self may be one 
outcome of new understandings arising from the pieces of the shattered pre-
understandings, which hermeneutics suggests will occur and which "saves" or 
reconstitutes the continuity and coherence of the sense of self. 
This grounded theory suggests that the primary sense of self is 
characterized by mostly ambient SD-related processes, being determined power, 
and largely unquestioned standpoint of self elements. The hermeneutic positive 
feedback loop that banks self-knowledge is assumed to be occurring at all times, 
both gradually and/or suddenly. The more nuanced sense of self in CDs recovery 
is characterized by more consciously self-directed hermeneutic knowledge 
building through greater awareness and reflection of self-standpoint elements 
(e.g., greater awareness and questioning of internalized beliefs/values about 
addiction and mental health), potentially reinterpreting meanings, pursuing 
targeted external technical information, further reflection, questioning and 
potentially translating technical information into personal meanings that is banked 
as self-knowledge, and so on. The hermeneutic circle with respect to participants' 
SD meanings in CDs recovery is particularly interesting in terms of most 
participants' references to addictions. For example, participants saw their 
addiction-related substance use or behaviors as helping in some way, such as 
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enhancing their sense of control and/or facilitating belonging. Later, most 
described their addictions as gaining control over his or her elf and becoming a 
threat to hi or her stability or urvival. This change in per pective contributed to 
decisions to addre s addiction and/or persisting mental health/mental illness 
1ssues. 
Widder hoven and Berghmans' (2006) view of mental health crises as a 
"break" in a person's hermeneutic circle appears to fit particularly with Teresa's 
description of how she followed the "rules" as a child ward of CAS, succeeding in 
achieving her aspirations of having a home and family by following the e rules, 
but losing it all when her marriage ended and he could not "fix" it. She believed 
that this experience was critical to her "breakdown" in her late thirties that was 
associated with being hospitalized for the first time for mental health reasons and 
subsequently developing a drinking problem. She spoke of looking back at her 
childhood and deciding that she mi sed something as a teen by adopting and 
pursuing her goals and aspirations the way she did. Identifying that she had been 
missing something was important in terms of picking of the pieces of her life and 
making her own sense of how the rule failed her, how her a pirations were lost, 
and how she truggled to adjust her view of her self and other in ways that could 
be more conducive to improving her quality of life. Susan's crisi , hospitalization, 
and diagno is of differential identity disorder could also be viewed, in this light, 
as an even greater fragmentation in her selfs stable hermeneutic-ba ed narrative 
coherence and continuity. 
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5.9.1 Catalytic Self-Ecosystem Experiences 
Studies of natural change for people in terms of recovery from illnesses, 
including mental illnesses and addictions, make reference to sudden recovery-
oriented shifts. These references could be in terms of "spontaneous remission" of 
symptoms or problem behaviors (e.g., Melfi et al, 1998; Walter , 2000), 
"epiphanies", or "turning points" associated with narrative meanings of illness 
and the self in relation to the past, future goals, relationships with others, 
treatment, and recovery (e.g., Charmaz, 1991; Frank, 1993; Verghese, 2001). 
Twelve step programs such as Alcoholics Anonymous (AA), Narcotics 
Anonymous, and recent "double trouble" groups that have emerged for people 
with CDs also incorporate a similar notion of catalytic self-ecosystem experiences 
in their references to people hitting a subjectively perceived "rock bottom." The 
experience of hitting this rock bottom is considered by many to be essential for 
people who have the "disease" of alcoholism or addiction to decide to reach out 
for help and pursue recovery through the 12 steps (Morjaria & Orford, 2002). 
Change i often described in ecological terms as occurring in two ways. 
One form of change is slow and gradual and the other is sudden. The two are 
interrelated. For example, ecological discontinuities are defined as sudden 
changes in any property of a dynamic ecological system that occurs as a result of 
smooth and continuous change in an independent variable. If the pressure 
associated with the gradual change suddenly passes critical values that are called 
ecological thresholds, then the system will quickly shift from one stable state to 
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another (Muradian, 2001). This ecological view of both gradual and sudden 
change fits well with this grounded study's view of the sense of self as regulating 
relative self-stability and hermeneutic knowledge building associated with growth 
and change occurring simultaneously. Chaos theories also incorporate sudden 
unpredictable shifts occurring in patterns or fractals. Rory Remer (2006) referred 
to "bifurcation" as a splitting in two of the established pattern. If splitting happens 
slow enough or within the pattern's boundary limits then the system resources can 
accommodate the new conditions and the relative stability of the trend is 
maintained. However, if conditions are not met then a "bifurcation cascade" 
occurs. In the event of a cascade, then the system reorganizes into a different, 
although sometimes similar, pattern around a different strange attractor. 
According to Remer, an alternative outcome of such a cascade is the system 
becoming truly random and out of control in terms of any pattern or trend. 
In relation to this study, a participant's narrative coherence and continuity 
might be protected in order to maintain relative sense-of-self stability. SD 
meanings and self-direction would reflect this need or goal. New experiences that 
are continually occurring could then be interpreted to fit the established narrative 
in relation to maintaining self-stability. However, if an accumulation of 
experiences that somehow pressured the established primary narrative build up 
(such as around attitudes of trust towards others), then a threshold could be 
passed, a cascade could occur, and the person will need, instead, to adjust the 
subjective past and future narrative as a whole in order to regain a new relative 
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degree of self-stability (organized around a new strange attractor such as trusting 
others more, less, or in a more nuanced way depending on the respective initial 
pattern or trend). A single event would then be experienced as "the straw that 
broke the camel's back" even though it may be associated with a cumulative 
buildup. Consistent with chaos theory, these apparently sudden pattern shifts 
could happen in any direction. Whatever subjectively works for the person in 
terms of regulating or regaining degrees of self-stability, simultaneously with 
experiencing if not pursuing growth and change, would appear to be the outcome 
of such "grand" rather than "petite" shifts. A random, out-of-control, pattern 
"breakdown" or "fragmentation" could also conceivably occur without regaining 
a degree of relative self-stability, such as through reconstituting a coherent and 
continuous narrative. Arguably, another possible outcome for participants at many 
such complex, uncertain, and often shocking times was considering ending the 
self. 
The catalytic self-ecosystem experiences, as recounted by participants in 
this study, overlap somewhat with this conceptualization of sudden discontinuities 
or cascades. Pressures that are building towards some threshold could be 
associated with the unique internal state, processes, and power of the self and/or 
factors or forces located within the person' s ecosystem. However, the grounded 
theory does not conceptualize the primary or nuance senses of self as objectively 
stable states per se in reality. As mentioned above, they represent artificial 
"snapshots" of a dynamic phenomenon and so perhaps better reflect relatively 
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stable phases of chaotic but not random trends associated with hi or her sense of 
self. 
Many participants had catalytic experiences that were not associated with 
dangerous crises (e.g., Brian's realization people would not always be so hostile 
to others who are different, when he first went to college), and also were 
associated with many participants' decisions to pursue CDs recovery. 
Nevertheless, there were other catalytic experiences that were as ociated with 
life-threatening crises and suicide ideation. The findings of thi study suggest that 
CDs treatment should endeavor whenever possible to support clients needing to 
regulate self-stability simultaneously with growth and change. Consequently, 
gradual or petite change appears to be safest because of the unpredictable nature 
of the outcomes of self-ecosystem catalytic experiences. This study suggests that 
understanding and integrating clients' SD meanings and self-direction in 
treatment through the collaborative matching of freedoms and structure or 
directiveness, except under exceptional circumstances, may be critical to 
regulating self-stability simultaneously with growth and change. Non-life 
threatening catalytic self-ecosystem experiences could still occur within this 
approach along the lines of Brian's suddenly feeling less marginalized at college 
or Susan's experience of needing to end her relationship with a substance-abusing 
boyfriend when she was at the intensive treatment program. It al o means that 
crisis-associated catalytic experiences could still occur, such as when a client 
faces fairly applied authoritative limits based on safety issues. However, the 
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association with life-threatening destabilizations could, arguably, be lessened and 
certainly not be promoted as necessary for CDs recovery. The findings suggest 
that professionals could contribute to experiences that orient people towards CDs 
recovery by acting in caring, trustworthy ways and hermeneutically assisting in 
stability-regulation simultaneously with facilitating recovery-oriented activities. 
5.10 Being Determined 
The third component of the grounded theory's model of SD meanings in 
CDs treatment and recovery experiences is being determined. The pervasive 
nature and role of being determined in relation to this grounded theory's SD 
meanings is not inconsistent with Foucault's notion of power pervading all 
relationships. As mentioned in Chapter Two, Foucault's non-committal stance 
towards ideals of power in relationships argued that people have and exercise 
innate creative or "productive" power individually and collectively, but it cannot 
be objectively discerned as legitimate or illegitimate outside of the power-
knowledge nexus underpinning such perceptions. Nevertheless, the findings are 
also not inconsistent with aspects of critical theory as participants did perceive 
legitimate and illegitimate uses of their own power associated with being 
determined, the power of other people they directly interacted with, and/or social 
system or structural powers. Other peoples' individual and collective 
determination in an interactive world was sometimes experienced by participants 
as being a source of mutual support and action. At other times the determination 
of others was an obstacle to recovery or even a threat to a participant' s life. 
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Participants in recovery appeared to recognize in recovery more relative, 
compatible, and discerning ways in which other peoples' determination (e.g., in 
terms of other individuals', groups', and/or structures' power associated with their 
stubbornness, persistence, or dedication) could work collaboratively with them, be 
indifferent to them, or purposively work against them. Perhaps most important to 
SD meanings in relation to empowering practice, survival, and CDs recovery 
involve participants' descriptions of experiences associated with their power of 
being determined being somehow weakened, destroyed, or "lost." 
The power associated with being determined also appears to overlap with 
notions of human will and willpower. Otto Rank's will therapy (1945) and the 
will's organizing function as the key to innate motivation in SDT were previously 
mentioned. There are many other views of will. For example, Mathew Gailliot 
and Roy Baumeister (2007) hypothesized that blood glucose is a physiological 
source of energy for the "will." Lower blood glucose levels are suggested as one 
important factor impacting on notions of low "will power" and, in turn, low self-
control. It may be that the power associated with being determined is best 
understood in terms of an integrated multi-dimensional construct that integrates 
emotions, cognitions, spirituality (e.g., faith, hope), relationships (e.g., 
empowering communities) and physiology (e.g., oxygen, glucose). Participants' 
descriptions brought to my mind a form of "life force." 
Professional terms such as "denial", treatment "resistance" or "non-
compliance" may refer to issues associated with participants being uniquely 
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determined in treatment interactions. Miller and Rollnick (2002) state in relation 
to motivational interviewing that: "what fewer people appreciate is the extent to 
which change talk and resistance are substantially influenced by counseling style. 
Counsel in a directive, confrontational manner and client resistance goes up. 
Counsel in a reflective, supportive manner, and resistance goes down while 
change talk increases" (p. 9). Miller and Rollnick emphasized a blending or 
joining approach that does not give a client a need to mobilize their determination 
to fight against the counselor while simultaneously motivating and supporting the 
client's self-determined and self-directed change. The findings of this study 
support treatment approaches that do not automatically try to confront a person's 
power of being determined except under exceptional circumstances associated 
with crises involving risks of harm to the client and/or other . Instead, joining 
with a client's determination with respect to his or her goals and aspirations, along 
the lines of motivational interviewing, appears to be an appropriate initial stance, 
especially if regulating sense-of-self stability through SD meanings and self-
direction is as important as this grounded theory suggests. 
5.11 Recovery, CDs, and Substance Abstinence 
Participants' notions of recovery focused more on improving his or her 
experience of living or quality of life than on fmding cures for CDs or being 
completely abstinent from all substances that are often associated with addictions. 
Their view of recovery was largely congruent with recovery meanings associated 
with the mental health consumer/recovery movement that were reviewed in 
251 
Chapter Two. Some participants may have been influenced by the literature on 
consumer/survivor vision of recovery through their peer support involvement or 
they may have been influenced by my reference to mental health self-advocates' 
meanings of recovery in the Participant Explanatory Letter (Appendix I). 
However, Carmen never connected with peer support and she immediately 
assumed I meant "cure" when I first asked what recovery meant to her. 
Participants ' meanings of CDs recovery were not limited to abstinence 
from non-prescription psychoactive substances or to complete compliance with 
the use of prescription medications. The findings suggest that expert/authority 
expectations of absolute abstinence versus clients' relative, compatible, and 
discerning views of self-determined use/non-use of substances (that could include 
decisions to abstain and also could include prescription medication within the 
meaning of potentially problematic substances) may represent a potentially 
divisive or "wedge" issue in the development of integrated CDs treatment and 
recovery. For example, at the U.S. Center for Substance Abuse Treatment (2007) 
"National Summit on Recovery" in 2005, a working definition of recovery that 
could be used across systems, programs, and stakeholders (including CDs) was 
proposed: "recovery from alcohol and drug problems is a process of change 
through which an individual achieve abstinence and improved health, wellness, 
and quality of life" (p. 6). Twelve guiding principles sought to clarify and 
operationalize the definition. One principle stated: "recovery is self-directed and 
empowering" (p. 7). The working definition appears to suggest that being self-
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directing does not include self-determined decisions around continued use of 
substances associated in the past with problems and/or substance use that is 
perceived by others as an addiction risk in the future. The working definition's 
abstinence-only directive does not appear to conceptually fit with the more 
nuanced views found among participants or the SD/self-direction themes 
associated with the mental health consumer/survivor movement. 
Not recommending abstinence may be viewed as tantamount to 
encouraging the use of potentially harmful substances among people already 
struggling with mental illness symptoms. Not recommending abstinence may also 
be seen as buying in to a person's subjective view of his or her use of substances 
that underestimates the potential risks of continued use or the seriousness of 
problems already occurring and/or being insensitive to the negative impact of 
continued use on society, family members, or loved ones (especially those who 
may be vulnerable such as children) (Marlatt, 1996; Marlatt & Witkiewitz, 2002). 
However, notions of personal responsibility that balances caring for self and for 
others found in both the findings of this study and mental health self-advocates' 
notions of recovery does, arguably, cover addressing self-determined controlled 
or moderate use of non-prescription psychoactive substances that are beginning to 
cause harm to self and/or others. This is an area that needs further examination. 
How the abstinence/compliance issue plays out may have a major impact on the 
development of integrated CDs treatment and rehabilitation theory and practice. 
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Harm reduction (Marlatt & Witkiewitz, 2002) is a more nuanced treatment 
stance than pre-determined abstention/compliance-only ones. It typically includes 
abstinence/compliance recommendations but the approach does not expect an a 
priori commitment to it in order to begin to work with the client. Harm reduction 
in relation to CDs appears to have the potential to be congruent with mental health 
self-advocates' vision of a recovery that emphasizes SD and self-directed pursuit 
of improved quality of life. Harm reduction is supported by a relatively strong 
base of research evidence and it has been relatively well-accepted and practiced 
over the past fifteen years among community-based addiction treatment providers 
in Ontario (Hobden & Cunningham, 2006). 
Alan Marlatt and Katie Witkiewitz (2002) suggested that abstinence-only 
goals continue to be pushed by U.S. institutional views of addiction treatment. To 
be sure, the possible risks associated with harm reduction and client-directed 
attempts to control his or her use of substances may be frightening if not 
excruciating in a variety of ways for workers, family, and/or loved ones. 
However, many of the difficulties associated with harm reduction and CDs, as 
suggested by the findings, may also have a lot to do with structural power/control 
issues, socio-economic agendas associated with managed care, and/or some 
absolutist views of addictions and mental health among practitioners. Canadian 
studies of harm reduction versus abstinence approaches specific to CDs recovery 
are needed given that much of American theory, research, and practice in this area 
appear to be out of step with many Canadian practice contexts. 
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5.12 Trust: Professional Diagnoses and Treatments 
Participants referred to many experiences where they encountered mental 
health or addiction treatment deliverers as malicious, indifferent, out of their 
realm of knowledge or expertise, or else well-meaning but still not trustworthy in 
a variety of other ways. However, having participants maintain a healthy dose of 
distrust of professional services in CDs recovery is also well-founded in terms of 
the lack of trustworthiness, validity, or reliability of mental health and/or 
addiction diagnoses and treatments (Basco et al., 2000; Nath & Marcus, 2006). 
Whether problems with mental health and substance use disorder diagnoses and 
treatment are viewed from a critical/anti-oppressive standpoint (e.g., labeling and 
stigma) or from a positivist one (e.g., validity and reliability), the fact remains that 
they are rife with problems and risks for people seeking help. One area of concern 
is whether the validity of diagno es is better found through seeing symptoms in 
functional or dimensional terms that can better take into account their 
heterogeneity rather than the current categorical approach (e.g., Muthen, 2006). 
Another concern is the degree of subjectivity in the interpretations of categorical 
criteria found in the DSM (Garb, 2005). Concerns associated with the influence of 
the affect heuristic, theoretical prototypes, and preferred causal theories in clinical 
assessment and treatment decision making were mentioned above (Garb, 2005). 
In essence, categorical psychiatric diagnoses are qualitative and are open to the 
same critiques as qualitative research findings such as those in this study. 
Categorical diagnoses are based on the subjective self-reports of people 
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experiencing problems, as subjectively interpreted against standardized criteria or 
methodology by trained and accredited professionals (this can include specialized 
social workers in the U.S and U.K.; it is restricted to physicians, especially 
psychiatrists, and some clinical psychologists in Canada). 
In practice, psychiatric symptoms are well accepted as often cutting across 
categorical criteria and they are not amenable to technology-based diagnostic 
procedures such as x-rays and various blood tests that have helped advance 
physical health care diagnostics. However, psychiatric diagnostic validity and 
reliability is an essential component to treatment in the current managed health 
care environment. Managed care depends on cost-saving measures that include 
quick and accurate diagnoses in order to fulfill its promise of efficiently 
prescribing or recommending evidence-based treatment interventions as soon as 
possible (Basco et al, 2000; Shear et al, 2000). Clinically significant co-morbidity 
(e.g., CDs) adds significant tension to managed care's treatment planning 
tendencies because efficient algorithmic treatment planning naturally seeks to link 
treatment linearly with one discrete disorder (Shear et al, 2000). 
Fortunately, research and discussion is focusing more on understanding 
problems with mental health and addiction diagnosis and treatment 
trustworthiness. For example, Shear et al (2000) examined the degree of 
agreement between psychiatric diagnoses through "routine" unstructured 
assessments by an experienced and accredited psychiatrist and diagnoses for the 
same people that were obtained using a structured standardized format for the 
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DSM-Ill (the Structured Clinical Interview or SCI). Participants were in the 
community and sampled from both an urban and rural location. They found that 
only 51 % of the SCI and the routine diagnoses were in agreement for a mood 
disorder and this was the highest degree of agreement found among all disorders 
diagnosed. In terms of co-morbidity, they found that 53% of the participants had 
two or more current Axis I diagnoses identified by the SCI and 29% met the 
criteria for three or more. The formal study did not include common Axis II 
disorders such as personality disorders. However, the authors did use a 
standardized tool to estimate the prevalence among participants. They found that 
77% of all participants and 91 % of those with two or more Axis I diagnoses 
scored in the range that suggested they could also be given an Axis II personality 
disorder diagnosis. Finally, the study looked at substance use disorders. The SCI 
found 17 substance use disorders and the routine assessments identified 23. 
Among the same group, 14 of the 23 routine diagnoses were for alcohol but the 
SCI identified only 3 for alcohol among the same group. The SCI and routine 
diagnoses agreed on only six of the substance diagnoses. 
Participants' experiences with being diagnosed reflected the confusion and 
disagreement involved in psychiatric diagnoses that the study above suggests. 
Such confusion among participants contributed to distrustful attitudes towards 
experts, especially when an expert's absolutist views were just the latest in a long 
line of previous, often conflicting, absolutist expert views. People eventually 
257 
translated the technical information into their own meanings that made sen e to 
them and facilitated their own recovery goals and aspirations. 
Increased diagnostic triangulation that included clients could, arguably, 
improve diagnostic validity and reliability for CDs. Basco et al (2000) tudied 
diagnostic stability or reliability by using triangulated stepped approach The 
triangulated steps were: (1) routine diagno es among 200 severely mentally ill 
outpatients; (2) interviewing the patients using the SCI; (3) the ub equent review 
of each person' medical records by a research nurse and potentially amending the 
diagno i ; and ( 4) a second interview by a research psychologist or psychiatrist 
who had reviewed the diagnostic data gathered in steps 1,2, and 3. They found 
that diagno tic reliability improved with each additional step and a1 o was the 
most effective at identifying clinically significant co-morbidity. 
Basco et al (2000) sugge ted that sy tern-imposed and/or context-specific 
time limitations are major impediment to using proven ways to increase 
diagnostic accuracy. However, their tudy did not include clients or other 
important stakeholder such as family members being included in the 
triangulation process. Many argue that people receiving services hold important 
personal knowledge and should be routinely involved in developing and 
reviewing their psychiatric assessments (Sadler & Fulford, 2004; Flanagan, 
Davidson, & Strauss, 2007). Studies uggest that there may be some risks 
associated with confidentiality and potentially increasing confu ion or worry for 
some clients or loved ones with increa ed triangulation, but overall the adverse 
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effects are minimal, increases in accuracy are gained, and the approach helps 
develop treatment partnerships (Cimino, Patel, & Kushniruk, 2002; Flanagan, 
Davidson, & Strauss, 2007). 
A number of participant acce sed some of their assessments. They found 
agreement with much of the content of the assessments they were able to read, 
found some errors of basic facts such as important dates, and also discovered 
some significant interpretative differences that could be associated with 
practitioner bias or stigma. For example, after Alexis' first hospitalization she was 
involved with another treatment agency. The agency helped her gain access to her 
hospital records which stated that she compulsively lied about her mental health 
symptoms because she was an addict. All participants said that they wanted and 
needed the option of accessing the technical record of their symptoms, potential 
diagnoses, and treatment options when they had self-determined to pursue CDs 
recovery; however, they were not willing to accept without question 
professionals' interpretations even when there was trust in the relationship. 
Bringing caregivers/loved ones into assessment and treatment planning (e.g., 
whenever possible, appropriate, and ethical vis-a-vis SD meanings) could also 
increase the rigor of clinical judgments and the coordination of collaboratively 
developed treatment plans. 
Sara Nath and Steven Marcus (2006) suggested that research on the nature 
and impact of medical errors in psychiatry still lags behind most other medical 
and urgical specialties. Findings of this study, in light of diagnostic validity and 
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reliability problems reported in the literature, supports participants' distrust of 
treatment generally, his or her need for cautiousness when working with even 
trusted professionals, and the client safety dimension of upholding SD in CDs 
treatment and recovery activities even further. One way of operationalizing CSD 
in CDs practice as well as improve diagnostic trustworthiness could involve social 
workers writing CDs assessments in such a way as to fit the needs of the agency 
or interdisciplinary treatment team, but at the same time also write it for the client 
to read and provide opportunities for their contribution. Other than in exceptional 
cases, a focus on the client as the primary audience of, and important contributor 
to assessments, arguably, could: attune framing mental health and substance use 
issues in texts in ways that are sensitive to treatment collaboration and client 
dignity and respect; potentially increase rigor through client-worker triangulation; 
help people make better narrative sense of their mental health issues or symptoms 
of mental illness; facilitate a hermeneutic circle in terms of collaborative 
assessments, treatment planning, evaluations, and adjustments; and promote and 
uphold SD meanings and self-direction. Longitudinal studies are needed to 
confirm that greater diagnostic rigor and, in turn, improved outcomes are 
achieved through greater assessment triangulation that routinely includes clients -
as well as potential difficulties that may arise and how to address them. 
5.13 Support for CSD in Social Work 
The findings support a number of historical arguments in support of CSD 
as a core concept in social work ethics and practice. Points mentioned above 
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include: (1) restraining social workers from arbitrarily limiting client freedoms in 
ways that risk harming the client or interfering in clients' abilities to protect 
themselves from risks associated with treatment; (2) restraining social workers 
from unneces arily normalizing directive behaviors in client-worker interaction ; 
(3) supporting client empowerment in CDs recovery, including individual and 
collective self-advocacy; and (4) upholding and fostering experiential learning 
and knowledge building (except in circumstances associated with crisis and 
obvious risk of harm occurring to self and/or others). 
Participants' meanings of SD did not conform to any particular absolutist 
professional or philosophical perspective associated with individual autonomy, 
positive or negative freedom, or ocial comrnunitarianism. Participants of this 
study held unique meanings of SD that ranged from generally emphasizing 
autonomy to more situationally relative meanings that reflected balancing SD 
rights and responsibilities in relation to his or her self and to other people, both 
specifically and generally in terms of "the world" or "society." Participants' SD 
meanings in recovery also typically balanced SD as defending their autonomy in 
relation to basic "survival" and SD a conditional or subject to limits in relation to 
self-growth or safely "living", which includes with others in a social world. 
Participants also reported that there were discrete times associated with risks and 
self-instability when they supported greater worker or social directiveness (as 
long as it was "fairly" applied) or they wanted the option of sharing their decision 
making with professionals, peers, family members or loved ones (a Jong as they 
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were trustworthy) . Finally, participants said that their SD meanings in recovery 
shifted from their meanings in the past. The grounded theory conceptualized shifts 
in relation to the sense of self, regulating self-stability simultaneously with growth 
and change, and hermeneutic knowledge building. 
Although further study that builds on these findings is needed; 
nevertheless, CSD in social work may be advanced in practice by placing an 
emphasis on understanding each and every clients' subjective and dynamic 
meanings of SD (e.g., as part of a generalist social work assessment), rather than 
trying to arbitrarily deduce and operationalize ideal, vague professional value 
statements that assume meanings of SD for clients. Taking this approach may 
identify and make use of a potential nexus around social work's concept of CSD 
and the mental health self-advocacy movement's vision of recovery which 
includes respecting service-recipients' subjective SD meanings and is inclusive of 
CDs. From this perspective, CSD in social work needs to focus more on how we 
work with clients' SD meanings and self-direction ethically and therapeutically. 
The grounded theory arising from the findings suggests that a social work focus 
on clients' SD meanings needs to include clearer statements about how the self is 
being viewed. Finally, this study suggests that it is feasible and worthwhile for 
there to be more of a research emphasis in social work into the concept of SD and 
CSD. A number of possible research avenues have already been suggested. This 
study's findings could also be built upon through exploring the subjective 
meanings SD among social workers working in the fields of mental health and 
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addiction, and the subjective meanings of stakeholders such as family members 
and loved ones of people with CDs. 
5.14 SD Meanings in CDs Recovery: Policy and Practice 
Policy and practice are interrelated. For example, as discussed above, 
mental health policy that privileges public and/or private managed health care 
values and principles has significant implications for diagnosis and direct 
treatment of mental illness, addiction, and CDs. Front-line service delivery 
through to regional and system programming and also research activities are 
ideally coordinated, evaluated, and improved through the platform and framework 
of mental health and addiction policy. The findings of this qualitative grounded 
theory study offer some potential considerations for CDs policy and practice. 
5.14.1 Policy Implications: Mental health policy seeks over time to 
improve mental health overall and reduce the burden of mental health disorders in 
a population (World Health Organization, 2004). It sets out values, principles, 
goals, and a plan for action to achieve both an overall vision of the future and 
specific benchmarks. Two general trends have been mentioned in relation to 
recent mental health policy developments: (1) a greater integration and 
coordination of treatment and support among and between addiction and mental 
health systems and programs across Canada; and (2) more privilege being given 
to the perspectives and experiences of consumers of mental health and/or 
addiction treatment services and supports. Evolving traditional mental health 
and/or addiction policy that emphasizes treatment objectives of cure and acute 
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care to one that reflects a longer-term client-centered vision of recovery that is 
inclusive of CDs and respects subjective meanings of SD is complex to say the 
least. Nevertheless, it appears to be occurring in various ways and to various 
degrees across Canada. 
A number of possible implications arise from this study that could be 
important in the current evolution of mental health and addiction policy. One 
involves recognizing that widely-held stigmatizing beliefs and values about 
people with addiction may undermine improving the overall burden of prejudice 
and stigma for the majority of people with mental illness, who appear to be at risk 
for developing CDs. Such beliefs and values are potentially also held by a number 
of treatment program developers and practitioners in mental health. It may also be 
found that there is a greater degree of stigma for some or all mental illnesses 
among addiction providers. Such beliefs within and between the two systems 
could sabotage overall policy evolution or lead to a selective approach to 
implementing a recovery vision that sidelines people with CDs or further 
marginalizes people dealing solely with addiction issues. 
The findings also suggest that participants will ultimately make self-
determined decisions about abstinence and use of various substances in recovery. 
These decisions are not restricted to substances normally associated with 
addiction, but include prescription drug use. A harm reduction approach to 
addiction issues is not inconsistent with policy values and principles that privilege 
SD within a client-centered recovery approach for people with CDs, as well as for 
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people dealing solely with mental illness issues. Similar policy values and 
principles of meeting the client where he or she is "at" in relation to SD meanings 
could also be applied to prescription medication compliance concerns within 
mental illness/CDs recovery. 
A third policy implication is perhaps the most critical. Mental health 
policy may need to address what may be widespread distrustful attitudes towards 
treatment programs, services, and professionals. This distrust among participants 
was possibly associated with certain beliefs and values. More importantly, such 
distrust was often reinforced if not established by real-life experiences. Further 
data needs to be gathered in this area to inform policy and action needed to be 
taken, including whether this distrust is more prevalent among people with CDs 
than people with mental illness (e.g., there may be a relationship with the CDs 
stigma issue discussed above). Regardless, policy would need to address this 
obstacle if it is found to be widespread. Policy that guides practice to seek to 
understand client meanings of SD, work collaboratively with them as much as 
possible, help people make sense of expert/technical information regarding mental 
illness and addictions due to diagnostic and treatment validity/reliability issues, 
and be mindful of notions of "fairness" when applying limits to SD meanings 
could, arguably over time, help address this risk to people trusting reaching out 
for help. 
5.14.2 Practice Implications: A number of practice implications have been 
mentioned throughout the discussion above. They include the possibility that 
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recovery-oriented CDs practice that is inclusive of peoples' SD meanings may 
need to focus more on the sense of self, in particular the self-standpoint elements, 
in relation to motivation, determination, decision making, knowledge, and 
experience (i.e., rather than focus solely on determination-related issues and 
processes such as motivation and decision making). A second implication is that 
CDs practice that attempts to work with or match with SD meanings among 
different clients may also need to adjust over time with changes in SD meanings. 
The grounded theory suggests that the changes will be towards more "nuanced" 
meanings. Thirdly, CDs assessment and treatment planning could potentially 
benefit from exploring substance use issues in relation to the aspirations and the 
sense of control elements of SD meanings. Practitioners could try to help clients 
discern differences and connections between their mental illness symptoms and 
substance use/misuse. Such discernments could help people see more recovery-
oriented strategies to address addiction issues and mental illness symptoms 
separately and together. Finally, programs and practitioners might assume that the 
"normal" and potentially healthy attitude of clients towards them is one of 
distrust. Adopting this initial stance would hopefully lead practitioners to be 
mindful of the trust issue in relation to fostering, upholding, or "fairly" applying 
limits to peoples' SD and self-direction (after first understanding what they 
actually are). One question that might be helpful for practitioners to continually 
ask themselves in relation to trust, SD, and their clients' CDs recovery is: "How 
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do I want to be remembered by this client in his or her continuing story of living 
with and recovering from CDs?'' 
5.14.3 A Social Work Practice Model?: Although more thought, 
reflection, and investigation is needed; nevertheless, it may be possible that a 
social work practice model in mental health that is inclusive of CDs and is 
organized around SD-related principles and concepts could arise from this study's 
grounded theory. The theory's emphasis on subjectively-perceived dynamic 
states, processes, and powers associated with individual points of view would lead 
such a model to be primarily complementary to other treatment models and of 
heuristic rather than predictive value. The utility of such a model would also have 
to be carefully considered in relation to group and community development 
"client" modalities in social work. Still, key features of such a model could 
include: 
• Viewing SD as a dynamic fusion of the subjective standpoint of self, 
determining processes, and the power associated with being determined 
about someone (including the self) or something. 
• Recognizing the importance of understanding clients' subjective meanings 
of SD and self-direction in CDs treatment. 
• Seeking to understand and respect, if not always agree with or uphold a 
client's subjective meaning of SD within his or her vision of recovery. 
• Recognizing that clients' sense of self may be discernable from but is still 
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relatively integrated with their ecosystem and its dimensions. 
• Recognizing that client SD meanings and self-direction may be involved 
in simultaneously regulating a need for degrees of relative self-stability 
with experiencing if not pursuing growth and change. Consequently, 
workers would need to understand clients' subjective SD meanings in 
order to consider the impact of upholding clients' SD meanings, fostering 
them, or limiting them within the dynamic context of CDs recovery. 
• Recognizing that a subjective primary sense of self, and its expression 
through the components of SD meanings, can adjust over time gradually 
and/or suddenly. 
• Recognizing that sudden adjustments in the sense of self may be 
associated with recovery-oriented self-determined change but they may 
also be equally associated with significant risks and dangers associated 
with severe sense-of-self instability. Consequently, gradual change is 
preferred whenever possible. 
• Recognizing that the sense of self may shift in association with CDs 
recovery towards a greater attention to, and integration of, "nuances" of 
meaning of the self, dimensions of the ecosystem (and its relationships 
with the self), SD, mental health and mental illness, addiction, treatment, 
and recovery. 
• Recognizing how much trust affects clients' SD meanings and 
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self-direction in treatment and how being trustworthy may facilitate the 
person self-determining to seek, accept, and collaborate with help in the 
future even if not immediately. 
• Recognizing it is important for clients to potentially maintain a level of 
distrust of treatment and professionals, and to be able to be self-
determining whenever possible, given systemic/structural risks to clients 
associated with asymmetrical powers in therapeutic relationships, the 
stigma associated with CDs, and the reliability/validity problems with 
mental health and substance use disorders' diagnoses and treatments. 
• Not assuming that any individual client, regardless of cultural background, 
gender, age, sexual orientation, race/ethnicity, geographical location, other 
forms of disability and so forth holds to some theoretical or heuristic 
prototype vis-a-vis absolutist or relativistic views of SD, free will, 
determinism, individualism, or social membership. 
• Ideal CSD statements of support for clients' wishes, desires, 
rights, and decisions being extended in practice to include wishes and 
desires vis-a-vis clients' unique and subjective meaning(s) of SD. 
• Workers being critically reflexive to their own absolutist/relativist views 
and how these views may reflect their social location and influence the use 
of their powers in relation to CDs etiology, treatment, and clients' 
recovery goals and aspirations. 
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• Whenever possible, workers facilitating a reciprocal hermeneutic 
knowledge building circle between themselves and clients in relation to 
clients' SD meanings and their relationship to assessments, treatment 
options, evaluating treatment outcomes, and CDs recovery. 
• Worker directiveness being applied transparently, temporarily, with 
attention paid to clients' perceptions of "fairness," and reflexively in 
relation to professional CSD values and CDs clients' recovery-oriented 
goals and aspirations. 
5.15 Study Limitations 
Epistemologically, the inability to generalize from the findings of 
qualitative grounded theory studies is not a limitation per se (Pidgeon & 
Henwood, 1997). The purpose of this study is not to suggest that the eight 
participants are representative of the millions of people living with and recovering 
from CDs across North America. Instead, the study sought to inductively explore 
in-depth the meanings of SD among a select group of people living with and 
recovering from CDs. This study's grounded theory seeks to provide a stimulating 
and disciplined inductive conceptual frame that is grounded in participant 
perspectives and is conducive to further reflection and systematic investigation. 
Methods of enhancing the study's research rigor were outlined in Chapter 
3. Methods included closely following research procedures as outlined by Strauss 
and Corbin (1998) and Charmaz (2006). Nevertheless, the study could have 
benefited from a greater variety of data gathering approaches or procedures (i.e., 
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greater triangulation). One example would have been to ask participants to share 
any meaningful poems, prose, artwork, or other materials that could have been 
included in analysis (Appendix VIII is a poem spontaneously offered by the 
seventh participant sampled). 
The study explored participants' understandings and the retrospective 
nature of their stories reflects how they have made meanings of experiences that 
informed their understanding of SD over time. Consequently, their recall 
potentially containing significant gaps, being significantly affected over time, 
and/or retrospectively reinterpreted is not so much a limitation as a part of the 
findings and the grounded theory. Finally, the small sample size represents 
another potential limitation as it was due partly to feasibility issues. However, 
grounded theory guides the researcher to sample until reaching theoretical 
saturation, which was considered to have been achieved. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
Conclusion 
I would like to conclude by stating that the experience of doing this study 
with the participants has affected me in ways I never could have anticipated. I 
have been focused over the past six years on working closely with people with 
CDs; however, doing the study took me somehow deeper into appreciating the 
courage and the challenges facing people living with and recovering from CDs. 
Perhaps this difference was associated with me not feeling I had a specific clinical 
role to play and I was there simply to listen and try my best to understand. 
Perhaps it was also associated with participants not seeing me as a clinician or 
that they were not talking with me within a clinical context. Regardless, I know it 
has made me a better social worker, counselor, and person. My acknowledgement 
of them at the beginning of this dissertation does not do them justice. I consider it 
a great privilege and honor that the participants shared with me their meanings 
and experiences. It is an understatement to say how much I respect their courage, 
wisdom, and SD. 
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APPENDIX I 
Participant Explanatory Letter 
Dear ______ _ 
Thank you for agreeing to participant in my study exploring the meanings of self-
determination in treatment among people in recovery from co-occurring 
symptoms of mental illness and substance use problems. I am a Ph.D. candidate at 
Memorial University of Newfoundland, through the School of Social Work. For 
my dissertation, I am studying the meanings of self-determination in treatment 
and recovery experiences for people who have had to deal with both mental 
illness and substance use disorders (that is, concurrent disorders). I will also be 
exploring how these meanings may be similar or different from idea of client 
self-determination in social work. 
Self-determination can mean different things to different people. Many advocates 
in mental health promote a person-centered, person-driven recovery that includes 
treatment and support services respecting the person's own need and right for 
self-determination. This idea of recovery does not mean "cure," "fixing," or 
"controlling" people and symptoms. Instead, it is about finding personal hope, 
meaning, supports, and skills to improve one's quality of life despite the 
challenges of mental health or mental illness. 
Each person is unique and will have a personal sense of what self-determination 
means for them and their own sense of recovery. For some it may mean having 
more control or power over treatment choices and treatment decisions. It may also 
mean feelings of being empowered and respected as an individual with respect to 
professional supports and services, from planning and developing policies and 
systems to fighting stigma to evaluating local programs and direct services. It 
could also mean something else entirely to others. I hope that through this study 
we can begin to develop a better understanding of the meanings of self-
determination in treatment among people who are in recovery not just from 
mental health challenges but from concurrent disorders. It is my hope that this 
study will contribute to better understandings and collaborations between persons 
who are seeking recovery from concurrent disorders challenges, social workers, 
and other members of their professional support and treatment network. 
As a valued participant in this qualitative research study, you are asked to take 
part in two audio-taped interviews conducted by myself. The first interview is 
anticipated to last about one and one-half hours long. The econd interview is 
expected to occur shortly after the first and last about one hour to an hour and a 
half. In the first interview, I plan to ask a few questions about you living and 
recovering from concurrent disorders and how self-determination has meaning for 
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you through your personal experiences with treatment and support services. For 
the most part, I plan to leave the discussion very open and encourage you to share 
simply what you think is most important for me to know. In the second interview, 
I will share with you the information that I have drawn from your interview and 
ensure with you that it is accurate. I may ask some follow-up questions to clarify 
anything I may not be sure about or to understand more certain significant themes. 
You may also wish to add anything further that you feel is important but did not 
come up in the first interview. I will also offer at that time to arrange to meet with 
you once more to share with you the understandings arising for me from your 
interviews and the interviews of other participants. This will again give you a 
chance to give me your valuable comments and feedback as to its accuracy. 
I have attached a consent form which outlines some of the precautions I have 
taken to ensure the respectful use of the information you share with me. The 
audio-tapes of interviews and their transcripts will be assigned a unique code 
number. Names and any other identifying features will be altered in the numbered 
transcripts, the thesis or any other written material arising from the study. As the 
researcher, only I will have the list of participant names and their identifying 
numbers. I will be the only person transcribing the audiotapes into written text. 
My three-member thesis committee through Memorial University will be the only 
persons other than myself with authority to access the audiotapes. They require 
this authority to access tapes to ensure the integrity and quality of the research 
project and the written thesis. 
An advisory committee consisting of a maximum of 3 members will have access 
to the anonymity-protected numbered transcripts but not the audiotapes, 
participants' names, or any other identifying information. The advisory committee 
members are mental health peer support workers in another region of Ontario. 
The advisory committee will provide a peer/consumer support perspective that 
oversees and advises me on the research process, in terms of maintaining a 
respectful and ethical approach to the research process with participants, provide 
advice on relevant issues that may arise through data collection, and provide a 
check on potential biases of my interpretation. 
The audio-tapes and transcripts will be used solely for research and will be kept 
locked in my home office. One year after the completion of the research, names, 
identifying information, audio-tapes, and other related research materials will be 
destroyed. As mentioned above, any participant information that is in the thesis 
text will be altered to remove any identifying features. Participation in this study 
is entirely voluntary. You are free to withdraw at any time during the research 
process and any information you provide may be removed up to the point that the 
thesis is approved for defense. 
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Although no harm is anticipated from your participation, it is possible that during 
the interviews some emotional distress may arise for you due to past experiences. 
Consequently, we will discuss a plan to ensure you are safe before and after the 
interviews. You are encouraged to stop the interview or move to another area of 
discussion if you feel the need to. 
If you share with me that you were a victim of criminal or unethical behavior then 
we will discuss your options with respect to possibly addressing this unfortunate 
experience. I will support your decision-making control over what action, if any, 
you may wish to take. If there is a clear and present continuing danger to others, 
then I will collaborate with you to develop a plan that protects your anonymity. 
If you should express concern about your immediate safety, such as suicide, or 
concerns about harming others then I will have a legal and professional 
responsibility to ensure you and/or others will be ok. I will discuss with you any 
concerns or responsibilities that I might have and try to come up with a plan with 
you. For example, this could involve me going with you to the nearest hospital's 
emergency ward. However, I may have an obligation to take action and this may 
involve me acting independent of your wishes, to ensure safety. 
You may withdraw at any time from participating in the research project and if 
you wish, all information that pertains to you up to and including the time that my 
research is approved for defense will be destroyed. 
Your participation in this study is greatly appreciated. You are the central 
contributor and I would be pleased to provide you with a copy of its findings if 
you wish. Professional supports and services for people recovering from not only 
mental health challenges but also from concurrent substance use issues have much 
to learn from the individual and collective experiences and meanings of all the 
people who share their knowledge with me. 
Please feel free to call me should you need to discuss more details about any of 
the information give above. I can be reached at ( ) __ . You may also discuss 
this research project with my thesis supervisor, Professor Dennis Kimberley. You 
can reach him at ( ) __ or by e-mail at __ _ 
The proposal for this research has been approved by the Interdisciplinary 
Committee on Ethics in Human Research (ICEHR) at Memorial University. If 
you should have any ethical concerns about the research (such as the way you 
have been treated or participants' rights), you may contact the Chairperson of the 
ICEHR at __ or by telephone at ( ) __ . 
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As we discus ed on the phone, I will be meeting with you in _ _;c~i~tYL--- on 
date at 
time at participant's preferred place to meet for our first interview. 
I Jook forward to seeing you then. 
Sincerely, 
John Ostrander MSW Ph.D. (candidate). 
309 
APPENDIX IT 
Participant Statement of Informed Consent 
I, consent to participate in the research project exploring the 
meanings of elf-determination in treatment among people in recovery from co-
occurring symptoms of mental illness and substance use problems (that is, 
concurrent disorders). I understand the nature and the purpose of this project 
being conducted by John Ostrander is as a doctoral dissertation at Memorial 
University of Newfoundland, through the School of Social Work. I also 
understand that the purpose of this study is to expand the existing knowledge of 
the experience of self-determination in treatment for people recovering from 
concurrent disorders. 
I understand that the interviews will be tape recorded and will be solely used for 
research purposes. I also understand that the audio-tapes and identifying 
information will be stored in a secure manner that protects my confidentiality and 
that of the other participants. I am aware that John Ostrander will solely transcribe 
the audio-tapes and that only anonymity-protected numbered transcripts will be 
shared with the peer advisory committee. I understand that John Ostrander 
guarantees that my identity will be disguised in any written materials originating 
from the study. Names, identifying information, and audiotapes will be destroyed 
one year following successful completion of the research. Anonymity-protected 
numbered transcripts will be destroyed after five years. 
I have been informed that participation in this study is voluntary. I am aware that 
questions regarding the research process are welcomed. I am also aware that I can 
refuse to answer or participate in any portion of the research process. I understand 
that I can withdraw consent and stop my participation at any point in the research 
project and should I choose to do so, all information pertaining to me will be 
destroyed. 
I have been informed that there is the possibility that I might experience some 
distress as a result of exploring past professional/personal experiences. I am aware 
that a safety plan will be discussed with me before and after interviews to ensure 
my wellbeing. I am also aware that the researcher may offer referrals for further 
support should the need arise. 
I am aware that in exceptional circumstances such as if I become suicidal or intent 
on harming others in some way then John Ostrander has a legal and professional 
responsibility to ensure that I and/or others are ok. I understand John Ostrander 
will try to work with me to ensure safety but could also involve him acting 
independently. I am also aware that if I share being the victim of criminal and/or 
unethical behavior then John Ostrander will discuss with me my possible options 
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to address it. If there is a clear and present continuing risk to others then John 
Ostrander will collaborate with me to address the situation in a way that, if I wish, 
protects my anonymity. 
I under tand that the proposal for this research has been approved by the 
Interdisciplinary Committee on Ethics in Human Research (ICEHR) at Memorial 
University. I also understand that if I have any ethical concerns about the research 
(such as the way I have been treated or participants' rights), that I may contact the 
Chairperson of the ICEHR at or by telephone at (709) ___ _ 
I acknowledge that I have read and fully understand the consent form. My 
signature indicates my agreement to voluntary participate in this research. A copy 
of this consent agreement has been given to me. 
Participant Signature Researcher 
Date 
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APPENDIX Ill 
First Interview Guide: Question Pool 
Self-determination (general): 
• Does self-determination mean anything in particular for you? 
• How would you define self-determination? 
• How might it be similar or different to ideas about freedom or being free? 
• How might it be similar or different to having control over choices and 
decisions in your life? 
• Do you think it is a right? Can you tell me more about that? A 
responsibility? Can you give me an example? Is it an expectation you have 
of yourself or others have of you? Any example ? 
• Is it a need in some way for all people? 
• Are there ways in which we are mostly always self-determining, no matter 
what? 
• Are there ways in which we are almost never self-determining, no matter 
what? 
Mental health: 
• Tell me about your struggles with your mental health? 
• When did you f1rst find yourself struggling? 
• Whathappened? 
• Tell me about your experiences with professionals? 
• What did they do? 
• Were you forced in any way to accept treatment? Can you give me an 
example? 
• Do you feel you were ever tricked or manipulated? Can you tell me more 
about that? 
• Were you ever not directed, guided, or even pushed in terms of treatment? 
What did you think of that? 
• Were you diagnosed? If so, how many different diagno es have you had? 
• Were you informed and educated about any diagnoses? 
• How do you feel about being diagnosed? Did it help in some way? Has it 
caused you problems? 
• Were you ever given any choices about treatments? 
• Does anything or anyone stand out for you as being particularly re pectful 
of your choices? Can you tell me more about them? 
• Were you able to make some decisions in your treatment experiences? 
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• Did you feel you had power or control over your life in terms of your 
mental health symptoms? In terms of treatment? In terms of dealing with 
professionals? Any specific examples? 
• How do you define recovery in terms of your mental health? 
• How does self-determination fit for helping you in your treatment and 
recovery experiences? 
• Have there been times when your being, or trying to be, self-determining 
ha caused you problem ? In your interactions with treatment 
professionals? Can you give any example ? 
• Ha self-determination ever been a problem in your recovery in any other 
way? 
Substance use: 
• Tell me about your challenges with substance use problem ? Can you give 
me some examples? 
• When did you first begin to use sub tances? 
• Was there a relationship for you between your mental health and 
substance use? Can you tell me more about that? 
• Did you try to get any help for substances use problems? Examples? 
• If you asked for help, how were you treated by professional ? 
• What did they do? Examples? 
• Were you forced in any way to accept treatment? 
• Do you feel you were tricked or manipulated? If o, in what way? 
Example? 
• Were you ever not directed, guided, or even pushed to get help? 
• Have you been diagnosed in term of substance u e problems? If so, what 
sort of diagnosis was it? Do you agree with it? Has it helped you in some 
way? Has it caused you any problems? 
• Were you informed and/or educated about any diagnoses? 
• How do you feel about being diagno ed? Did it help in some way? Has it 
caused you problems? 
• Were you able to make orne decisions in your treatment experiences? 
• Does anything or anyone tand out for you as being particularly re pectful 
of your choices? Can you tell me more about them? 
• Did you feel you had power and control over your life in term of your 
substance use? In terms of treatment? In terms of dealing with 
professionals? 
• How do you define recovery in term of your substance use problems? 
• How does self-determination best fit for helping you in your treatment and 
recovery experiences? 
313 
• Have there been times when your being, or trying to be, self-determining 
has caused you problems? In your interactions with treatment providers? 
Can you give me any examples? 
• Has self-determination ever been a problem in your recovery in any other 
way? 
Co-occurring substance use and mental health disorders: 
• What has been your overall experience with professionals, programs, 
services and so forth in terms of needing help for both substance use or 
addiction issues and your mental health concerns? 
• Are there any similarities or differences between your recovery 
experiences with mental illness and with substance use problems? 
• Are there differences between being self-determining in the treatment and 
recovery from mental illness and being self-determining in the treatment 
and recovery from addictions? Any examples? 
• Are there similarities? Again, could you give me any examples? 
• Are there differences or similarities in terms of mental health and 
addiction professionals and treatment services supporting, enhancing, or 
negating your ability to be self-determining? Can you tell me more about 
these? 
• To what degree have you felt able to be self-determining while dealing 
with both mental health and addiction problems? 
• To what degree have the combined problems created barriers to you being 
self-determining? 
Gender and relationships: 
• Are there any issues associated with being a [woman/man] that are 
important to you in terms of self-determination in your treatment 
experiences? Can you give me examples? 
• Have relationships with friends, family, or loved ones affected your 
experiences of self-determination in treatment and recovery in any way? 
Can you tell me more about that? 
• To what degree have these close personal relationships supported you in, 
or created barriers for you in some way, to you being self-determining in 
your treatment and recovery experiences? 
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Age, geographical location, social and cultural considerations: 
• Do you have any feelings or thoughts about self-determination and the 
different ages you were when experiencing problems with symptoms of 
mental illne s? Substance problems or addictions? Co-occurring mental 
health and substance use issues? 
• Have you lived in many different locations? Have you any comments 
about the differences in where you have lived and your experiences with 
self-determination in your treatment and recovery experiences? 
• Have you had treatment experiences with rural or city treatment services? 
Both? Are there any benefits or barrier in terms of self-determination in 
treatment between rural or city treatment services? 
• Are there any cultural i sues important to you in terms of your treatment 
experiences? How might they relate to self-determination for co-occurring 
disorders? 
• What about any other areas affecting your treatment and recovery such as 
housing or employment and being self-determining? 
• To what degree has housing and employment supported you in, or created 
barriers for you in some way, to you being self-determining in your 
treatment and recovery experiences? 
Conclusion: 
• Do you have anything else you would like to share with me about this 
topic of elf-determination in your treatment and recovery experience? 
• How has this interview experience been for you? 
• Are you feeling any distress or concern about what we have talked about? 
About your confidentiality and anonymity? About the research project? 
About yourself? 
• Are you ok? If later on, tonight or tomorrow, you are bothered in some 
way by some of the things we talked about or some of the memories from 
our discussion are there things you can do or people you can reach out to 
in order to help you feel better? 
• Let's review your safety plan. Is there anyone else we could add? May I 
refer you to ? 
• You have my phone number? You can call me anytime if you have any 
further questions or concerns. 
• Can we set up another time in the next two weeks to meet again so I can 
share with you the transcript of our interview and my initial analysis of 
this interview? 
THANK YOU! 
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Memorial 
University of N ewfoundla nd 
Office of R esearch 
November 20, 2006 
ICEHR No. 2006/07-015-SW 
Mr. John 0 trander 
School of Social Work 
APPENDIX IV 
Memorial University of Newfoundland 
Dear Mr. Ostrander: 
Thank you for your correspondence of November 9, 2006 addressing the issues 
raised by the Interdisciplinary Committee on Ethics in Human Research (ICEHR) 
concerning your research project "Self-determination meanings in concurrent 
disorders treatment and recovery experiences. " 
ICEHR has examined the proposal and the revisions, and is satisfied that concerns 
raised by the Committee have been adequately addressed. In accordance with the Tri-
Council Policy Statement (TCPS), the project has been granted full approval for one 
year from the date of this letter. 
If you intend to make changes during the course of the project which may give rise 
to ethical concerns, please forward a description of these changes to ICEHR for 
consideration. 
If you have any questions concerning this review you may contact the Co-ordinator 
for ICEHR, Ms. Eleanor Butler, at ebutler@mun.ca. We wish you success with your 
research. 
The TCPS requires that you submit an annual status report to ICEHR on your project, 
should the research carry on beyond November 2007. Also, to comply with the TCPS, 
please notify ICEHR upon completion of your project. 
Yours sincerely, 
T. Seifert, Ph.D. 
Chair, Interdisciplinary Committee on 
Ethics in Human Research 
TS/bl 
St. John's, NL, Canada AJC 5S7 • Tel.: (709)737-8251 • Fax: (709) 
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737-4612 • http://www.mun.ca/research 
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APPENDIXV 
Review Prior to Beginning First Interview 
Introduction: 
Thank you for agreeing to participate in my study exploring the meaning and 
experiences of self-determination in treatment among people in recovery from co-
occurring symptoms of mental illness and substance use problems. 
• I am a Ph.D. candidate at Memorial University of Newfoundland, through 
the School of Social Work. 
• I am also a clinical social worker working with people dealing with mental 
health and substance use issues through both an addiction agency and a 
mental health agency in another part of Ontario. 
• For my dissertation, I am studying the meanings of self-determination in 
treatment and recovery experiences for people who have had to deal with 
both mental illness and substance use problems (that is, concurrent 
disorders). 
• I will also be exploring how these meanings may be similar or different 
from ideas of client self-determination in social work. 
• I am interested in how better understanding what self-determination in 
treatment means for people who have experiences living with and 
recovering from co-occurring mental health and substance use challenges, 
and how this understanding can help improve social work practice in this 
area. 
All information you provide is confidential and your participation will be 
anonymous: 
• Your participation is voluntary and you may withdraw at any time. 
• You will be assigned a code number and this code number will identify 
any reference to information provided by you. 
• Your names and/or identifying data will not appear in any part of the 
numbered transcripts. 
• Only the thesis committee has authority to access audio-tapes to ensure 
research integrity/quality. 
• The Peer Support Advisory Committee will only see the anonymity-
protected numbered transcripts. 
• No audio taping will be conducted without your expressed written consent 
[written consent signed and agreement to audio tape interview requested -
if participant wishes not to be audio-taped than permission sought to take 
written notes during interview]. 
• Audio-tapes, face sheets, and other identifying information will be 
destroyed one year after successful completion of the study. 
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• Audio-tapes and written transcripts of interviews will be kept locked in 
John Ostrander's home office and your anonymity will be protected in any 
written reports and the dissertation thesis. 
You may at times find some of the questions I ask farfetched, perhaps even silly, 
or perhaps difficult to answer: 
• This is because ideas about self-determination may mean different things 
to different people or be appropriate for some but not others. 
• There are no right or wrong answers. I am most interested in what you feel 
is important to share with me. I am only interested in your opinions, 
personal experiences, and what they mean to you. 
• Feel free to interrupt me, ask me to be clearer or explain what I mean, 
criticize my questioning and so forth. 
You may find some of the professionaVpersonal experiences we discuss could 
upset you: 
• If you share being the victim of criminal and/or unethical behavior then I 
will discuss with you your possible options to address it. 
• I will respect your decision-making control. 
• If there is a clear and present continuing risk to others than I will 
collaborate with you to find a way to address it while, if you wish, 
protecting your anonymity. 
• If you become suicidal or intent on harming others I have a legal and 
professional responsibility to ensure you and/or others will be ok. 
• I will discuss with you my concerns and responsibilities and try to work 
collaboratively with you to ensure safety. 
• However, I could act independently to ensure safety. 
Do you have any concerns about this? 
• I have a safety plan form I would like to fill out with you. 
• We can stop at any time to take a break or end the interview. Just let me 
know. 
• Do you have somebody we could call if you feel you need some support 
after we finish? 
• Is there anything else I might need to know to help make sure you are ok if 
you are in some distress from the questioning or the memories? 
Given what we have discussed, do you still wish to continue? 
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With permission, begin audio-
taping and tum to Face Sheet 
APPENDIX VI 
Participant Safety Plan 
Some people interviewed may become distressed from being interviewed about 
their experiences with recovery and self-determination from concurrent disorders. 
Consequently, this form is intended only to help ensure that you are not left 
without any supports or people to reach out to, should your participation in this 
study cause you any difficulties immediately following the interview or even 
sometime later. 
• Are you "ok"? 
• Has being interviewed caused you any problems or distress in any way? 
(Even if you haven't expressed any concerns, it might be best if we have a safety 
plan in place just in case some issues do come up for you later. I really want to be 
sure that you are going to be ok?). 
1. _____ County Community Crisis Support: Phone number: ___ _ 
Address: 
2. Distress Line: Phone number: 
----- ----
Address: 
Participant's Professional Treatment and Support Team: 
1. Name: ____ _ Phone: ____ _ 
2. Name: ____ _ Phone: ____ _ 
Participant's Peer Supports (e.g., AA member/sponsor; mental health peer 
support, etc.): 
1. Name (first only): Phone: ____ _ 
2. Name (first only): ____ _ Phone: ____ _ 
Friends and/or Family Supports: 
Referral to therapist/concurrent disorders worker requested? 
If you have any questions or concerns about the study, do not hesitate to contact me at ( 
__ . The proposal for this research has been approved by the Interdisciplinary Committee on 
Ethics in Human Research (ICEHR) at Memorial University. If you have any ethical concerns 
about the research (such as the way you have been treated or participants' rights), you may contact 
the Chairperson of the ICEHR at __ or by telephone at ( ) __ . 
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Appendix VII 
Peer Support Advisory Committee 
Consent to Participate & Agreement to Maintain Confidentiality 
I, , consent to participate as an Advisory Committee member in the 
research project exploring the meaning of self-determination in treatment among 
people in recovery from co-occurring symptoms of mental illness and substance 
use problems (that is, concurrent disorders). I understand the nature and the 
purpose of this project being conducted by John Ostrander is as a doctoral 
dissertation at Memorial University of Newfoundland, through the School of 
Social Work. I also understand that the purpose of this study is to expand the 
existing knowledge of the meanings of self-determination in treatment for people 
who are recovering from concurrent disorders. 
I understand that my role on the committee is to provide an advisory 
consumer/peer perspective to the research project. The three members of the 
committee will oversee and advise John Ostrander with respect to such areas as 
his maintenance of a respectful and ethical approach to the research process with 
participants, providing him with advice on relevant issues that may arise through 
data collection, and providing him with a consumer/peer support check on his 
potential biases in interpretation. 
I am aware that John Ostrander will code transcripts and the information they 
contain, and that he guarantees that participant identity will be kept confidential 
and will not appear in any written materials originating from the study. I am 
aware that transcripts will be given a unique identifying code and that transcript 
identifying details will be adjusted to help disguise participants. I am also aware 
that participants are not from the area in which I work as a peer support worker. 
All names, identifying information, audiotapes and related research notes and 
materials, including those of the Advisory Committee, will be destroyed one year 
following successful completion of the research. 
I understand that my participation is voluntary and that I may withdraw at 
anytime. I am aware that all transcript-related written material are to be returned 
to John Ostrander at the end of any Advisory Committee meetings. I am al o 
aware that I will be asked for my written notes, memos, or other written texts that 
I may have made during these meetings to become part of the research audit trail. 
I understand that these materials will be preserved and stored in a secure manner 
that protects the confidentiality of the participants while remaining part of the 
audit trail. 
I understand that participant names will not be disclosed to me and that 
protecting the confidentiality and anonymity of participants is critical. I 
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agree that I will not share in any way information associated with 
participants, or any of the interview information shared with me as part of 
my Advisory Committee role, with anyone other than privately with John 
Ostrander, the two other members of the Committee, or the members of the 
Thesis Committee. 
I also understand that the proposal for this research has been approved by the 
Interdisciplinary Committee on Ethics in Human Research (ICEHR) at Memorial 
University. If I have any ethical concerns about the research (such as the way I 
have been treated or participants ' rights), then I may contact the Chairperson of 
the ICEHR at __ or by telephone at ( ) ___ _ 
I acknowledge that I have read and fully understand the consent form. My 
signature indicates my agreement to voluntary participate in this research. A copy 
of this consent has been given to me. 
Participant Signature Researcher 
Date: ___________ _ 
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APPENDIX VIII 
Dear Crack 
I hate you. 
You are evil. 
Now I finally see how you ruined so many lives, 
caused such misery. 
At first you were a game, 
something I did for fun . 
But I didn't realize, 
the nightmare had just begun. 
I'd smoke your sweet rocks, 
exhale the smoke through my nose. 
Every minute of every day, 
on my life you imposed. 
You took away all my pain, 
at least that is what I thought. 
When really it was my mind and my soul, 
that you got. 
I thought the 5 minute high, 
with each hit I take, 
was the best thing by far, 
but that was such a mistake. 
You took over my life, 
you were everything to me. 
I didn ' t care about anything else, 
you never set me free. 
I walked the streets all alone, 
night after night, 
making money for you, 
each day was a fight. 
You took me to places, 
I never imagined I'd go. 
Because you had me in your grip, 
I hit an all time low. 
Now that you are out of my life, 
I don't miss you one bit. 
You will never see me again. 
You mean less to me now than shit 
(Alexis) 
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